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This study argues that early modern English dramatists and prose writerser  
reevaluating the subject’s offices.  Officeholders appear frequently on the early 
modern English stage, in roles ranging from lord mayors to constables to lord 
chancellors.  Widely circulated prose tracts established officeholders’ authority and 
defined their duties.  Dramatists who staged officeholders, along with men who wrote 
officeholding manuals, drew on humanist and classical republican concepts of 
citizenship in depicting officeholders; they were also responsive to contemporary 
religious and political pressures.  They were redefining the very parameters of office 
by redescribing officeholding as a site of political representation.     
I begin by establishing the investment subjects had in officeholding as 
evidenced by the proliferation of contemporary officeholding manuals.  My first chapter 
canvases the range of manuals s well as their socio-political context.  I then focus on 
William Lambard’s Eirenarcha (1581), a manual for justices of the peace.  By emphasizing 
that the justice is duty-bound to God and to the common law as well as to the 
  
monarch, Lambard raises questions of obligation and representation for officeholders.  
In chapter two, I consider representations of justices of the peace in Anthony 
Munday’s Downfall of Robert, Earl of Huntington, William Shakespeare’s Merry 
Wives of Windsor and Ben Jonson’s Every Man in His Humor (all three c. 1597-98).  
By juxtaposing officeholding with quasi-feudal and chivalric models of service, these
dramatists define what officeholding was notand what it could be.  In my third chapter, I 
consider depictions of the lord chancellor in Anthony Munday’s Play of Sir Thomas More (c. 
1592-94) and in Henry VIII (1613), by Shakespeare and John Fletcher.  I argue that these 
plays challenge the claims made by early modern magistrates to be ministers of justice.  The 
last chapter considers scenes featuring London’s lord mayor in Shakespeare’s Richard III 
(c.1593), Thomas Heywood’s Edward IV (1599), and Heywood’s 1 If You Know Not Me, 
You Know Nobody (1604).  I read these plays in the light of contemporary disputes over 
free speech in Parliament.  By asking how freely the lord mayor can speak, these 
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In William Shakespeare’s Richard III, even as he plots his way to the throne, 
Richard needs the support of English subjects—or at the very least, the appearance of 
their support.  He solicits the aid of London’s lord mayor, who acts complicitly as his 
intermediary.  Having heard Richard and Buckingham’s justification for executing 
Hastings, the Lord Mayor declares that he will “acquaint our duteous citizens / With
all your just proceedings in this cause” (3.5.64-65).1  Richard applauds this intent, 
since “…to that end we wish’d your lordship here, / T’avoid the censure of the 
carping world” (3.5.66-67).  Later, ignoring Londoners’ refusal to voice their 
approval for Richard, the Lord Mayor urges Richard to accept the crown to which 
“your citizens entreat you” (3.7.200).  The Lord Mayor plays exactly the role Richard 
desires of him and his complicity enables Richard to accede to the throne.  In 
Shakespeare’s dissection of monarchy and its legitimizing practices, London’s most 
important officeholder plays a crucial role.   
Officeholders appear frequently on the early modern English stage, in roles 
ranging from lord mayors to constables to lord chancellors.  Shakespeare’s 
officeholders include Henry VIII’s two lord chancellors, Thomas Wolsey and Thomas 
More; Much Ado About Nothing’s constable, Dogberry; Measure For Measure’s 
constable, Elbow; 2 Henry IV’s Lord Chief Justice; and Justice Robert Shallow, who 
appears in both 2 Henry IV and The Merry Wives of Windsor.  Other dramatists 
feature officeholders in both central and marginal roles: Simon Eyre rises to b come 
London’s lord mayor in Thomas Dekker’s The Shoemaker’s Holiday; the Lord Mayor 
                                                




and Lord Justice pass judgment on the murderers George Brown, Nan Sanders, Anne 
Drury, and Roger Clement in the anonymous A Warning for Fair Women; similarly, 
the Knight who serves as justice of the peace in the anonymous A Yorkshire Tragedy 
laments the crimes of the Husband.   In Thomas Heywood’s 1 If You Know Not Me, 
You Know Nobody, London’s lord mayor welcomes the newly-crowned Queen 
Elizabeth to London, even after Queen Mary’s lord chancellor, the Bishop of 
Winchester, has done his best to dispatch Elizabeth.  Officeholders are also present in 
widely circulated prose tracts in sixteenth-century England.  William L bard’s 
Eirenarcha, or Of the office of the Justices of the Peace in Four Books (1581) and 
John Hooker’s A Pamphlet of the Offices, and duties of everie particular Sworne 
Officer, of the Citie of Excester (1584) establish officeholders’ authority and define 
their duties.  In what follows, I will argue that dramatists who staged officeholders, 
along with men who wrote officeholding manuals, were redefining the very 
parameters of office by redescribing officeholding as a site of political representation.   
An examination of early modern representations of officeholding, an 
institution with roots in classical forms of government (imperial and republican) as 
well as in the ancient customs of England, this dissertation joins an ongoing cross-
disciplinary dialogue about subjects and citizens in early modern England.  Arthur
Ferguson, Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock have illuminated what English people 
thought about and how they participated in government.2  Patrick Collinson, John 
                                                
2See Arthur Ferguson, The Articulate Citizen and the English Renaissance (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 
1965); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975); Quentin Skinner, 




Guy, and Peter Lake have examined the English polity through the lens of religi n.3  
The historian of political thought, Markku Peltonen, and the literary scholar, David 
Norbrook, have recuperated strains of republican discourse present in pre-civil war 
England.4  In the course of these discussions, scholars have paid some attention to 
officeholding, examining, for instance, power in relation to office.  They have also 
considered sociological aspects of officeholding, such as the social and financial 
benefits of holding office and its growth as a profession.5  It has been argued that 
officeholders played an important part in mediating between national authorities and 
local communities.6  For their part, Patrick Collinson and Mark Goldie have 
emphasized officeholders’ important roles in what the former calls a “monarchic l 
republic” and the latter, an “unacknowledged republic.”7    
                                                
3See, for example, Patrick Collinson, The Sixteenth Century, 1485-1603 (New York:  Oxford UP, 
2002); John Guy, Tudor England (New York: Oxford UP, 1988); Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans 
(Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1988). 
4David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000); Markku Peltonen, 
Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Politica  Thought:  1570-1640 (Cambridge:  
Cambridge UP, 1995). 
5See Richard Cust and Peter Lake, “Sir Richard Grosvenor and the Rhetoric of Magistracy,” Bulletin 
of the Institute of Historical Research 54 (1981): 40-53; Robert Tittler, “Seats of Honor, Seats of 
Power:  The Symbolism of Public Seating in the English Urban Community, c. 1560-1620” Albion 
24.2 (1992): 205-23; Paul Griffiths, “Secrecy and Authority in Late Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-
Century London” Historical Journal 40.4 (1997): 925-51; Michael J. Braddick, “Administrative 
performance:  the representation of political authori y in early modern England,” Negotiating Power in 
Early Modern Society, eds. Michael J. Braddick and John Walter (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 2001) 
166-87; Robert C. Braddock, “The Rewards of Office-holding in Tudor England” The Journal of 
British Studies 14.2 (1975) 29-47; A.J. Fletcher, “Honour, Reputation and Local Officeholding in 
Elizabethan and Stuart England,” Order and Disorder in Early Modern England, eds. Anthony 
Fletcher and John Stevenson (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985) 92-115. 
6See Keith Wrightson, “Two concepts of order: justices, constables and jurymen in seventeenth-
century England,” An Ungovernable People: The English and their law in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, eds. John Brewer and John Styles (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1980) 21-
46; Joan R. Kent, The English Village Constable, 1580-1642: A Social and Administrative Study 
(Oxford: Clarendon P, 1986). 
7Patrick Collinson, “The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I,” Bulletin of The John Rylands 
University Library of Manchester 69.2 (1987): 394-424; Mark Goldie, “The Unacknowledg  
Republic: Officeholding in Early Modern England,” The Politics of the Excluded, c. 1500-1850, ed. 




Collinson and Goldie also have helped us to understand officeholding in terms 
of the practical matters of governance.  Collinson argues that the early modern 
bureaucracy, that network of administrative offices that enabled the state to functi n, 
constituted something like a republic within the monarchy: while “everything which 
was done, publicly and by due legal authority, was in a sense done by the monarch,” 
the monarch herself did not attend to every aspect of governing.8  Goldie elaborates, 
noting the mutual benefit for Crown and subject when subjects hold office: the 
monarchy needed administrative help, and the “gentleman needed office as a mark of 
status and an instrument of social authority.”9  Officers who mediated between their 
local community and the Crown negotiated outcomes that served the interests of 
both.10  Needless to say, subject-citizens served in a number of different offices.  
Goldie lists the sheriff, coroner, constable, justice’s clerk, militia mustermaster, gaol-
keeper, mayor of the borough, and alderman, among others.11  He observes that the 
practice of holding office was “remarkably socially extensive…. [I]n parishes, offices 
were held by an array of people from minor gentry to cottagers.”12  The City of 
London developed its own particular bureaucracy, including its Court of Common 
Council, which served a primarily legislative function, and its Court of Aldermen, 
which served a primarily executive function.13  London’s lord mayor was the city’s 
most prominent officeholder.  Certain offices were more desirable than others; and 
                                                
8Collinson, “Monarchical Republic” 399-400. 
9Goldie, “Unacknowledged Republic” 159. 
10Goldie, “Unacknowledged Republic” 166.   
11Goldie, “Unacknowledged Republic” 160-61. 
12Goldie, “Unacknowledged Republic” 163. 
13Ian W. Archer, The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London (Cambridge:  
Cambridge UP, 1991) 18-19.  See also Valerie Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan 
Revolution:  City Government and National Politics (Oxford:  Oxford UP, 1961); Frank Freeman 
Foster, The Politics of Stability: A Portrait of the Rulers in Elizabethan London (London:  Royal 




while people were occasionally fined for failing to uphold their duties, the very 
existence of such fines points to the value placed by the community on holding office:  
“governance was the required activity of any and every citizen.”14 
The range of contemporary tracts devoted to officeholding is another 
indication of subjects’ investment in this avenue for civic participation.  Many 
humanists insisted on civic participation as the “key to public good.”15  Works such 
as Sir Thomas Elyot’s Boke of the Governor emphasize the need for magistrates to be 
virtuous.16  Translations of Cicero’s De Officiis canvas a much broader range of 
qualities that a magistrate needed. 17  Manuals devoted to particular offices constituted 
an emerging genre.  William Lambard’s The Dueties of Constables, Borsholders, 
Tythingmen, and such other lowe and lay Ministers of the Peace and Sir Anthony 
Fitzherbert’s Office et auctoryte des iustyces de peas discuss the duties of local 
officeholders, often explaining how they interact with other local officeholders.18  
John Hooker’s A Pamphlet of the Offices, and duties of everie particular Sworne 
Officer, of the Citie of Excester (1584) localizes its discussion by dwelling on the 
offices of a particular town.  One 1600 tract served as a calendar, reminding London’s 
lord mayor of the responsibilities he held throughout the year.19  Another focused on 
the duties required of more elevated officeholders: “A Treatise of the Office of a 
                                                
14Goldie, “Unacknowledged Republic” 168. 
15Goldie, “Unacknowledged Republic” 181.       
16Thomas Elyot,The Boke Named the Governour, ed. Donald W. Rude (New York: Garland, 1992). 
17Marcus Tullius Cicero, Marcus Tullius Ciceroes thre bokes of duties, trans. Nicolas Grimalde, ed. 
Gerald O’Gorman (Cranbury, NJ:  Associated University Presses, 1990); see also Barnabe Barnes, 
Four Bookes of Offices (London, 1606).      
18William Lambard, The Dueties of Constables, Borsholders, Tythingmen, and such other lowe and lay 
Ministers of the Peace (London, 1583); Sir Anthony Firzherbert, Office et auctoryte des iustyces de 
peas (London, 1538).  Both Lambarde’s and Fitzherbert’s texts went through numerous editions.      





Councellor and Principall Secretarie to her Ma[jes]tie,” presumably written by Robert 
Beale around 1592, provides detailed instructions for the Principal Secretary to Queen 
Elizabeth.20  Taken together, these tracts were, following David Norbrook, “writing 
the English republic.”   
If we look closely at these prose and dramatic depictions of officeholding, we 
may begin to glimpse the changing nature of government.  Goldie, who argues for the 
importance of subjects’ governing through office, also separates this model of service 
from the psephological model, or electoral politics.21  But, as Hadfield notes, 
officeholding “can be seen to constitute a public realm developing alongside that of 
formal political representation in parliament.”22  Surely, Parliament’s role as a 
representative institution has been much debated. 23  Derek Hirst and Mark 
Kishlansky, in particular, have explored Parliamentary election or selection 
procedures, accounting for the shift by the end of the seventeenth century according 
to which elected politicians were presumed to represent constituents.24  If nascent 
Parliamentary electoral politics help to explain the shift toward represntative 
government, evolving concepts of officeholders’ duties are equally important to our 
understanding of the development of constituencies.  Political representation had 
                                                
20Robert Beale, “A Treatise of the Office of a Councellor and Principall Secretarie to her Ma[jes]tie,” 
appendix, Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1925) 423-43.  
21Goldie, “Unacknowledged Republic” 156-57. 
22Andrew Hadfield, Shakespeare and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005) 53. 
23See John Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, 1559-1601, 2 vols. (New York: St. Martins, 1958); 
G. R. Elton, The Parliament of England, 1559-1581 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986); T.E. Hartley, 
Elizabeth’s Parliaments: Queen, Lords and Commons, 1559-1601 (Manchester: Manchester UP, 
1992); Parliament and Liberty from the Reign of Elizabeth to the English Civil War, ed. J.H. Hexter 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 1992); Norman Jones, “Parliament and the political society of Elizabethan 
England,” Tudor Political Culture, ed. Dale Hoak (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995) 226-242.          
24Derek Hirst, The Representative of the People? Voters and Voting in England under the Early 
Stuarts (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975); Mark A. Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection: Social and 




increasingly to acknowledge the officeholder’s duty to his or her constituents.25  
Many town and county officeholders, like the mayor, recorder and justice of the 
peace, would have sat in Parliament.26  They would have participated in debates over 
issues related to representation and the right to free speech, and they would have 
brought to such debates their own experiences negotiating the competing demands of 
the monarch, the Privy Council, and their local communities.  Contemporary writing 
about officers executing their duties was consistently responsive to the various 
pressures brought to bear upon officeholding. 
While literary scholars have yet fully to consider officeholding, they have 
made a case for the political agency of what we now call literary texts.27  New 
historicists and cultural materialists have examined discursive exchanges between the 
theater and the state.28  Their investigations have led to fruitful conversations about 
subjectivity and identity.29  And significant aspects of early modern representations of 
officeholding have been noticed, for example the staging of particular officers and the 
                                                
25Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley:  U of California P, 1967) 155. 
26Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection 39.  Kishlansky cites Vivienne J. Hodges, “The Electoral 
Influence of the Aristocracy 1604-1640,” PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1977, pp. 437-54.  
Justices were also often returned to Parliament.  See J. H. Gleason, The Justices of the Peace in 
England, 1558-1640: A Later Eirenarcha (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1969) 26. 
27See, for example, Marie Axton, The Queen’s Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession 
(London: Royal Historical Society, 1977); David Norbrook, Poetry and Politics in the English 
Renaissance, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002). 
28Seminal works include Stephen Orgel, The Illusion of Power (Berkeley:  University of California 
Press, 1975); Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Chicago:  University of Chicago 
Press, 1980); Jonathan Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1983); Louis Montrose, The Purpose of Playing (Chicago:  University of Chicago 
Press, 1996).  
29See, for example, Stephen Greenblatt, “Invisible Bullets:  Renaissance Authority and its Subversion,” 
Glyph 8 (1981): 40-60; Carol Thomas Neely, “Constructing the Subject,” English Literary 
Renaissance 18.1 (1988): 5-18; Leonard Tennenhouse, Power on Display (New York: Methuen, 
1986); Annabel Patterson, Shakespeare and the Popular Voice (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1989); 
Richard Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of Engla d (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1992); Jean E. Howard and Phyllis Rackin, Engendering a Nation: A Feminist Account of 
Shakespeare’s English Histories (New York: Routledge, 1997); Christopher Pye, The Vanishing: 




theatricality of specific offices, such as the lord mayor’s pageants.30  But a fuller 
investigation will allow us further to explore intersections between dramatic and 
political representation.31  Andrew Hadfield has noted that among the most pressing 
political issues in early modern England was the question of “ how exactly the people 
at large should be represented by their rulers.”32  Popular dramatists and the early 
modern writers of officeholding tracts were coming up with a host of answers.   
They were deliberating on nothing less than duty, justice, law, loyalty, 
warrants, oaths, conscience, ministering, and free speech.  That these terms surface 
repeatedly in the following chapters indicates the early modern English con ideration 
of the promise of government amidst shifting social, economic, political, and 
religious dynamics.  As these writers articulate their concerns, they draw attention to 
the limitations of such terms.  But they reconceive their scope, hence the potential to 
broaden their parameters for subjects, governors, and government.  A variety of what
Raymond Williams calls “keywords” were newly scrutinized.33  They were words 
like “represent,” whose meanings were “offered, felt for, tested, confirmed, asserted, 
qualified, changed.”34  We may take some of these words for granted today, but we 
must reassess their early modern force if we are to understand their significance n 
                                                
30See, for instance, Phoebe S. Spinrad, “Dogberry Hero:  Shakespeare’s Comic Constables in their 
Communal Context,” Studies in Philology 89.2 (1992): 161-78; Julie Sanders, “A Parody of Lrd 
Chief Justice Popham in The Devil Is an Ass,” Notes and Queries 44.242.4 (1997): 528-30; David 
Bergeron, English Civic Pageantry 1558-1642 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 197); 
Theodore B. Leinwand, “London Triumphing:  The Jacobean Lord Mayor’s Show,” CLIO 11:2 (1982): 
137-53; Leinwand, “Negotiation and New Historicism,” PMLA 105.3 (1990): 477-90.  Edward Gieskes 
examines the professionalization of bureaucracy in Representing the Professions: Administration, Law, 
and Theater in Early Modern England (Newark: U of Delaware P, 2006).    
31Cf.  David Norbrook, whose Writing the English Republic traces the “parallels between artistic and 
political representation” (10). 
32Hadfield, Shakespeare 12. 
33Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1983). 




centuries gone by.  As I outline my chapters, then, I will identify the keywords that 
each chapter brings to the fore.   
 In chapter one, I provide an overview of contemporary officeholding manuals.     
While these manuals described an officeholder’s duties, they also often expanded 
those duties and the concept of office itself.  To whom or what was the officeholder 
dutybound?  To the monarch? To God? To other subjects? To the law?  To justice?  
This overview canvases a range of manuals as well as their socio-political context.  I 
then focus on William Lambard’s Eirenarcha, first printed in 1581.  Whereas earlier 
manuals for justices were primarily printed lists of statutes that justices were expected 
to enforce, Lambard theorizes about the justice’s office, providing the office’s history 
and establishing the justice’s authority.  In doing so, he points to a justice's sources f 
obligation.  Historians have noted that the justice’s office became important in late
medieval England as a way for Tudor monarchs to centralize power.35  When 
Lambard discusses the officeholder’s duties, he shifts from a model according t 
which the justice is primarily duty-bound to his monarch to one in which he is equally 
duty-bound to God or to the common law—Lambard's justice has the capacity to 
discern for himself to whom or what he is duty-bound and how he should execute his 
duties.  Taken together, these tracts provide evidence of the early modern investment 
in expanding office and establishing the officeholder as a representative of intrests 
besides those of the monarch.   
                                                
35For the relationship between central and local governing agencies during the Tudor period, see A. 
Hassell Smith, County and Court:  Government and Politics in Norfolk, 1558-1603 (Oxford:  
Clarendon P, 1974); Peter Clark, English Provincial Society from the Reformation to the Revolution:  




As this chapter suggests, “office” itself is a cultural keyword.  “Office” 
derives from classical Latin officium, meaning task, duty, moral obligation, service, 
official post, function of a thing, bodily function, rite or ceremony.  Medieval and 
early modern uses include the sense of “official post.”  Robert Wimbledon asks in 
one of his sermons (c. 1387), “How hast thou rewlid, that is to seye, the people and 
the office that thou haddist to gouerne?”  In 1433, the Rolls of Parliament record that 
“no man that hath been in the seid Offices of Corouner.”  Following on the Latin ex 
officio, one could indicate one’s authority as being “of office.”  And by 1586, one 
could instruct that one’s “signet of office [be] thereto affixt.”  Modern usage typically 
refers to positions of public service.  But medieval and early modern usage also often 
emphasized one’s general moral obligation.  For instance, Robert Whittinton defines 
honesty as “the offyce and dutie of a man” in his translation of Cicero, The Three 
Bokes of Tullyes Offyces (c. 1534).  Edward Hall, in 1548, has in mind not just a 
monarch’s public position, but a monarch’s duty as well: “To thentent yt he worthely 
might be called a king, whose office is to rule & not to be ruled of other.”36  It is the 
early modern emphasis on this sense of “dutie,” I would argue, that enables “official 
post” to become a site of political contest.         
 The officeholding manuals also call attention to the varied connotations of 
“law” and “justice” in early modern England.  According to William Lambard, for 
example, justices were called justices precisely because they “doe (or should doe) law 
and Iustice.37  But determining exactly what that means, in turn, requires manuals.  
“Law” derived from the Old Icelandic lag, which meant something laid or fixed (as in 
                                                
36"office, n." The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., OED Online (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989) 29 Jan. 
2005  <http://dictionary.oed.com >.




a layer, or a fixed relationship like a partnership).  Latin lex is usually translated into 
English as “law,” so English connotations of law have inevitably been inflected by 
Rome.  As early as the eleventh century, the “laws” of Engla, Dena, Cnutes are 
referred to in works such as the Laws of Ethelred and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 
indicating recognition of a set of rules that communities considered members to be 
obligated to follow.  This law could be divine, as it is in Wulfstan’s Homilies (1023), 
where God’s law is invoked.  Five hundred years later, Edward Hall, in his 
Chronicles, was still concerned with “christen men” making out “the law of God.”  
But Hall also refers to the law in terms of something natural, discernible by human 
reason: “I shuld not do that whiche by the lawes of nature and reason I ought to do, 
which is to rendre kyndnes for kyndnes.”  In sixteenth-century England, there were 
civil, canon, and common laws; Raphael Holinshed describes Peter Mallart as a 
“doctor of both lawes,” civil and canon, in his Chronicles. 38  In early modern 
England, those who were responsible for “doing” law had an inherently complex 
duty.   
 “Justice,” for its part, is derived from Latin justitia, meaning righteousness, 
uprightness, or equity.  Of course justice pertained to the exercise of power and the 
authority to punish and reward: in the Old English Chronicle (1140), we read that 
“He dide god iustise and makede pais.”  And in 1548, Edward Hall’s Chronicles 
describes the duties of a king: “I am…an anoynted kyng, to whom…it 
apperteineth…to minister to them indifferent iustice.”  But justice could denote the 
administrative process that leads to punishment or the punishment itself.  In William 
                                                





Caxton’s Historie of Jason (c. 1477), we read: “He sente to Zethephius that he sholde 
do iustice on his seruauntes.”  Caxton aside, justice typically had theological 
connotations: John Man’s Musculus' Common places of christian religion (1563) 
urged “suppressyng the raygne of synne, [that] we may serve justice.”  Thomas Usk 
spoke of the “Vertues of soule ... whiche been Prudence, Justice, Temperaunce, and 
Strength” in The Testament of Love (c. 1387).  Justice was then a civic and a 
theological virtue.  As for justices, in 1276, they were sent out to inquire into 
complaints: “Acorde est..que Iustices ailent parmi la terre, a enquere e oier et terminer 
les pleintes e les quereles de trespas.”  But by the sixteenth century, a justice in 
England typically referred to a justice of the peace or another low-level magistrate.  
In 1586, in The English Secretary, Angel Day writes of one “being ... brought before 
a Justice upon suspition of his wretched living.”  Day’s justice was a far cry fom the 
sword or scales-wielding, veiled-eyed goddess whom Shakespeare invoked in 2 
Henry IV (c. 1599): “You are right Iustice, and you weigh this well: Therefore still 
beare the Ballance, and the Sword” (5.2.102).39   
In chapter two, I consider three dramatic representations of justice – of 
justices of the peace – in Anthony Munday’s Downfall of Robert, Earl of Huntington, 
William Shakespeare’s Merry Wives of Windsor and Ben Jonson’s Every Man in His 
Humor.  By juxtaposing officeholding with quasi-feudal and chivalric models of 
service, these dramatists define what officeholding was not and what it could be.  
They respond to traditions based on chivalric champions of justice, knights whose 
personal quests for honor entail distributing justice by force and rewarding personal 
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loyalties.  But these same dramatists were alert to republican assertion of the value of 
office and civil (as opposed to chivalric) service.  They were anything but oblivious 
to the absolutist rhetoric according to which governing was solely the monarch’s 
responsibility.  Munday’s play reveals that justice can be confused by personal 
loyalties, and it suggests the dangers of meting out justice according to those 
loyalties.  In Shakespeare’s Merry Wives, Justice Shallow’s longing for the old days 
takes the form of a misguided nostalgia for chivalric traditions that threatens to 
disturb the common peace.  Jonson in turn considers officeholding an alternative to 
chivalry.  In Every Man In His Humor, vows of chivalry turn out to be empty oaths. 
But the warrants that are issued by Justice Clement are equally suspect.  Only he 
officeholder's office – the institution and its processes – fully authorizes justice.     
All of these dramatists acknowledge that championing justice is not the same 
as executing justice.  If their plays dwell on “warrants” and “oaths,” it is because 
these two words confirm the power of words to bring about justice.  “Warrant” is 
related to guarantee.  Both words derive from Old French warant, warand, a variation 
of guarant, garant, which in turn is related to Frankish Latin warens, warentem, 
warandus, -um.  Warrant was used as early as the thirteenth century to denote a 
person who guaranteed one’s safety, or to denote that safety itself.  For example, in 
The lay of Havelok the Dane (c.1300), “Cum now forth with me, … For now wile y 
youre warant be.”  In 1490, in William Caxton’s translation, The Boke of Eneydos: 
“… [E]lecor, that was ryght swyfte & lyght, fled toward the castel for his waraunt.”  
While these senses are now obsolete, they were still current in early modern Engla d, 




an urgent need for safety.  By the fifteenth century, however, a warrant could be 
something much more impersonal, a document authorizing action: in 1464, according 
to the Manners & Household Expenses of England in the thirteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, “Iohn Boteler of Herwesche is on of the iij. that was arested at the same 
towen be Pertones warente.”40  And by the fifteenth century, “warrant” could also be 
used to indicate that one guaranteed the truth of a statement.  Or it could express the 
authorization to act; as William Lambard later elaborates in Eirenarcha, “the forme 
of [the justices’] commission was enlarged, so as they … were … warranted also to 
arrest Felons that were indited.”41     
Of course, a warrant could also be vapid.  In The Merry Wives of Windsor, 
Mistress Quickly warrants Falstaff five times in quick succession that Mistress Ford 
is enthralled with him (2.2.57-72).  Similarly, an oath could be a guarantee or an 
empty promise.  The etymology for “oath” is uncertain.  The word existed in various 
forms in Old and Middle English; cognates existed in Old Frisian, Old High German, 
and other languages.  An oath invokes a higher authority as witness to a statement’s 
truth.  The higher authority is often God or a supernatural deity, but not always; in 
Lord John Berners’s Boke of the duke Huon of Burdeux (1533) the emperor “hath so 
made his oth and promyse & hath sworne by his crowne imperyall.”  In early modern 
England, authorities and dramatists alike were sensitive to the possibly blasphemous 
nature of oaths.  In 1550, Robert Crowely warned against “wycked othes and the 
tyme myspent.”  In 1606, Thomas Dekker defined oaths as “Crutches, vpon which 
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Lyes ... go, & neede no other pasport ... oathes are wounds that a man stabs into 
himselfe.”42  The potentially profane act of swearing before God is of concern in 
chapter three, as well. 
In chapter three, I consider depictions of the lord chancellor in Anthony 
Munday’s Play of Sir Thomas More and in Henry VIII, by Shakespeare and John 
Fletcher.  These plays interrogate the claims made by early modern magistrates that 
they were ministers of justice and of the law.  I read these plays in the light of 
contemporary debates over the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, a court designe  
to mitigate the rigor of the common law.  Because the lord chancellor, the head of the 
Court of Chancery, judged these cases according to conscience, the court became 
known as the court of conscience.  The lord chancellor himself, deputized by the 
monarch, was known as the keeper of the king’s conscience.  Chancery became 
associated with monarchical prerogative, however, and disputes occurred over 
whether the monarch’s judgment could supersede common law judgment.  Both plays 
challenge their officeholder’s claim to be a minister.  Munday’s drama about the rise 
and fall of Sir Thomas More questions whether an officeholder, and the monarch by 
proxy, has jurisdiction over a subject’s conscience.  In He ry VIII, Shakespeare and 
Fletcher respond to concerns over James’s claims to be above the law by making 
clear that “ministering the law” does not mean “ministering the monarch’s will.”  
Both dramatists indicate that officeholders, including the monarch, need limits; only 
by staying within those limits do officeholders best serve subjects.   
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The key terms, justice and law, again feature in this chapter.  But here, we are
also asked what it means to “minister.”  “Minister” stems from the Anglo-Norman 
and Old and Middle French menestre, ministre, servant, as in a person in the service 
of the king or of God, and ministrer, menistrer, to serve, which in turn derives from 
the classical Latin ministrare, to provide, to supply, to manage or control, to act as a 
servant, to wait on, to serve food or drink, to administer medicines.  The term was 
used as early as the twelfth century to denote a priest; in specific orders of Franciscan 
friars and Jesuits, it came to signify one who was in command.  In 1450, the Rolls of 
Parliament mentions “Nicholas, nowe Maistir or Minister of the ordre of Seynt 
Gilbert of Sempyngham.”  During the Reformation, the term “minister” was used in 
opposition to priest, “to imply that officiating at the commemoration of the Lord’s 
Supper did not constitute the offering of a sacrifice.”  And in the fifteenth century, 
one could be said to minister justice or minister the law.  In 1467-8, the Rolls of 
Parliament laments that “this Londe was full naked and bareyn of Justice, the Peas 
not kepte, nor Lawes duely mynystred within the same.”  But it is not until the late 
sixteenth century that the word “minister” designates a high officer of state, a person 
acting for a head of state in a particular department.  George Puttenham observed in 
1589, in the Arte of English Poesie, that a “politien is rather a surveyour of civilitie 
than civil, & a publique minister or Counseller in the state.”43  Munday, 
Shakespeare, and Fletcher explore the tension between a minister who supplies, waits 
on, serves, and a minister who administrates, manages, controls.    
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 As they examine the public and private nature of the minister of state's office,
Munday, Shakespeare and Fletcher also examine the public and private nature of 
“conscience.”  As a judge and as an administrator, the lord chancellor relied on 
conscience to determine what was right.  “Conscience” derives from the Latin 
conscientia, meaning privity of knowledge, knowledge within oneself.  This in turn 
derives from conscire, con –together + scire –to know.  The word was used as early 
as the thirteenth century to connote a sense of moral right and wrong; by the sixteenth 
century, as we have noted, conscience had become important for litigants.  But as the 
editors of the OED acknowledge, and as our playwrights underscore, determinations 
of “right” have varied “from the conception of the mere exercise of the ordinary 
judgment on moral questions, to that of an infallible guide of conduct, a sort of deity 
within us.”  William Tyndale’s The Parable of the Wicked Mammon (1528) speaks of 
being “without conscience of God, and without knowledge of the true intent of 
fasting.”  For Shakespeare, to “tell one’s conscience” meant to speak one’s mind or 
voice one’s conviction.  In Henry V, the disguised King ironically declares that “By 
my troth, I will speake my conscience of the King” (4.1.113).44     
 In the fourth and final chapter, I discuss officeholders who are charged with 
speaking for the monarch and subjects, and whether or not they speak their 
conscience.  I examine three plays that feature London’s lord mayor—Shakespeare’s 
Richard III, Thomas Heywood’s Edward IV, and Heywood’s 1 If You Know Not Me, 
You Know Nobody—in the light of contemporary disputes over free speech in 
Parliament.  Members of Parliament were fleshing out what exactly it meant to 
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counsel the monarch.  All three plays shift these concerns to office, placing London’s 
officeholders in relation to the concept of free speech.  In Shakespeare’s Richard III, 
Richard scripts the lord mayor’s speeches.  By casting Richard as a tyrant, 
Shakespeare also points to a healthy monarchy, in which officeholders have the right 
to speak the truth.   Heywood’s quasi-republican Edward IV celebrates the lord mayor 
and London’s citizens while depicting Edward as yet another tyrant, trampling on his
subjects’ rights.   The lord mayor plays the smallest of roles in If You Know Not Me, 
appearing at the end to welcome the newly crowned Elizabeth to London.  But even 
via the most conventional of exchanges, Heywood can assert the lord mayor’s duty to 
speak Londoners’ opinions.  Each of these dramatists expects London’s officeholders 
to speak for Londoners.  By asking how freely they can in fact speak, they associate 
office itself with the representation of subjects. 
It was not until the mid-seventeenth century that “represent” connoted acting 
on behalf of constituents in a legislative or deliberative assembly.  In 1655, Oliver
Cromwell observes in a speech to Parliament that “I have been careful of your safety,
and the safety of those that you represented.”  But the seeds of political representation 
were in part planted in early modern representations of officeholders.  “Represent” 
derives from Latin representaere, re + praesentare, to present.  By the fifteenth 
century, the term could be used to denote the artistic depiction of something.  Late in 
the sixteenth century, Sir Philip Sidney writes in The Arcadia of “the Painter meaning 
to represent the present condition of the young ladie.”  By the sixteenth century, the 
word could also mean “to substitute” or “act as a deputy.”  In his 1595 recollections 




Captain Jobson, repraesentinge his person with his authoritie, as his Leiftenante 
Generall.”45  When they staged officeholders, dramatists, like the writers of 
officeholding manuals, were broadening not just the connotations, but the denotations 
of “representation.” 
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Chapter 1: The Subject’s Office  
Office (Officium)  doth signifie not onely that function, by virtue wherof a 
man hath some imploiement in the affaires of another, as of the King or other 
common person; but also an Inquisition made to the Kings use of any thing by 
vertue of his office who inquireth….46 
 
John Cowell’s definition of “office” in his dictionary of legal terms suggests 
that the officeholder is not just a surrogate, but the king’s surrogate.  But Cowell was 
an absolutist, and it is no surprise that members of the 1610 Parliament were outraged 
by his claim that the king was above the law.47  Of course, any definition of “office” 
would have been ideologically-driven and so a site of contest.  For Cowell, “office” 
entailed a “position of trust, authority, or service under constituted authority; a postin 
the administration of government, the public service….”48  For him, the Latin root 
officium (task, duty, moral obligation) is in play.49  Cowell was hardly alone in 
defining office.  Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century officeholders’ manuals and 
treatises proliferated, and both the jurisdiction and duties of those holding positions of 
“service under constituted authority” were their abiding concern. 
  The very range of these works and the extensiveness of their printing history 
indicate their significance.  Some focus primarily on local offices.  Others examine 
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the duties required of more elevated offices, such as the monarch’s secretary.  Thei  
descriptions of officeholders’ obligations are often prefaced by narratives of the
offices’ histories and etymologies of the offices’ titles.  They share a vocbulary of 
virtue and service.  But because these manuals assume “service under constituted 
authority,” they necessarily get involved in defining “constituted authority” itself.  
Virtually all of them uncontroversially stipulate service to God.  Cowell, we hav
seen, binds office to service to the king; but others locate authority in Parliamentary 
statute, common law, and/or custom.  These tracts, then, explore the representative 
nature of public office in the early modern period.  They recognize that questions of 
obligation always refer back to the individual or group whom a public officeholder 
represents.  In the following overview of officeholding manuals, I first canvas early 
modern debates over the parameters of the subject’s offices.  A close examination of 
William Lambard’s Eirenarcha (1581) then reveals the ways in which office can be 
made to serve the subject.   
The first manuals for local officeholders such as justices of the peace and 
sheriffs were printed early in the sixteenth century.  They were often bound with 
other tracts concerning local government, which, circulating in manuscript at the end 
of the fifteenth century, had provided information for example on the Court Baron, 
the Leets, and the Court of Hundred.50  The movement of these manuals to print was 
certainly a consequence of the advent of the printing press in England.  But it also 
was part and parcel of the professionalization of the law.  Lawyers not only were 
receiving a more formal education, they had begun to rely on standardized textbooks 
that evolved in part from common law court practices dating to the thirteenth century. 
                                                




51  Courts began keeping reports of cases, recording precedents for pleas and 
judgments.52  By the seventeenth century, lawyers arguing a case could “‘vouch the 
record.’”53  Meanwhile, yearbooks, named reports, abridgements, and registers 
compiled important aspects of legal information, enabling quick access to precedents 
and forms of writs. 54  Various expositions of the common law were also composed.  
These treatises included twelfth and thirteenth-century tracts attributed to Ranulf de 
Glanvill  and Henry de Bracton; the anonymous fourteenth century Old Tenures and 
Old Natura Bevium; Littleton’s New Tenures, composed in the fifteenth century; and 
in the sixteenth century, Fitzherbert’s New Natura Brevium and Christopher St. 
German’s Doctor and Student.55  These reports and treatises informed lawyers and 
judges about common law principles and practices.  Similarly, manuals for justices of 
the peace, sheriffs and constables spelled out their duties in and out of court.   
The widespread dissemination of such manuals was also a response to the 
Tudor program to centralize power and achieve stability in the aftermath of fifteenth-
century upheaval.56  Crucial to these efforts were customary networks of law 
enforcement already in place.57  But printed manuals also provided information to 
local officials who were expected to uphold Crown policies.58  Cardinal Wolsey, for 
example, emphasized the authority of the commission of the peace over the office of 
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sheriff, an office that had become associated with the powerful nobility. 59  The 
justice’s office gained in prestige and power as Wolsey counted on justices to effect 
Crown policies.60  Not by accident, the number of men commissioned as justices 
mounted steadily over the sixteenth century.61  While increasingly these men were 
trained in the law, many were not; clergy and county gentry with connections to the
Court were also appointed.62  As their responsibilities grew, they turned to manuals 
for guidelines about their duties and about procedures.  Later in the century, at 
meetings of quarter sessions, “all but the most experienced chairmen would read from 
a prepared classification available in an up-to-date procedural handbook like 
Lambarde’s Eirenarcha.”63  In general, as Tudor policies emphasizing the importance 
of local offices increased the pressure on local officeholders, officeholders reli d on 
manuals to help them perform duties.      
It is well-known that this was also a time when humanists were discussing 
governance.  Classical works such as Cicero’s De officiis were recovered and cited 
for their catalogues of the virtuous qualities that men needed in order to govern.64  De 
officiis was published in both Latin and English editions throughout the sixteenth 
century.65  Cicero discusses the concept of duty, establishing that the “foundations of 
                                                
59 Clark, Kent 17. 
60 Clark, Kent 17, 19. 
61 Clark, Kent 17-18; Smith 86.  A number of sources remark on this fact; Lambard himself comments 
on it in Eirenarcha, or Of the Office of the Justices of the Peace in Four Books (London, 1581) 37-38. 
62 Clark, Kent 18-19. 
63 Smith, Norfolk  92. 
64 Skinner, Foundations 84-88; Markku Peltonen, Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English 
Poltiical Thought, 1570-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995) 7-11. 
65 Erasmus published an annotated Latin edition of Cicero’s work in 1520.  In 1556, Richard Tottel 
printed Nicholas Grimalde’s English translation of Cicero’s work; over the next forty-five years, 
Grimalde’s edition was printed at least seven more tim s.  See Gerald O’ Gorman, introduction, 
Marcus Tullius Ciceroes thre bokes of duties, by Marcus Tullius Cicero, trans. Nicolas Grimalde, ed. 




justice” are “first, that no man be hurt: next, that common profit be served.”66  For 
some men, holding office was a path to living dutifully:  “But all lingering sett aside, 
offices ar to be taken, and the commonweale to be served of those: who have by 
nature the helpes of dispatch of maters.  For otherwise can neither the state be 
governed, nor the greatnesse of corage be declared.”67  Officeholders were uniquely 
able to act on behalf of the entire realm, not just themselves:   
Whoso shall bee governours of the commonweale, lette them observe twoo 
precepts of Platoes:  one is, that they so mainteine the profit of the commons:  
that whatever they doo, they referre it therto, allwayes forgetting their owne
commodities:  the other is, that thei have care over the holle bodie of the 
commonweale: leste while they upholde somme one parte, the rest they leave 
destitute.”68   
For Cicero, private virtue becomes public virtue when men fulfill their obligation to 
the commonweale.  
The values championed in classical works were carried over into an English 
context in works like The Mirror for Magistrates and Sir Thomas Elyot’s The Boke 
Named the Governour.  Elyot cites Cicero’s De Officiis as required reading for a 
gentleman preparing for public service, arguing that he would find “incomparable 
swetnesse of words and mater … in the saide warkes of Plato and Cicero.”69  Even 
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with help from ancient sources, however, defining office proved difficult.  Elyot, who 
struggled with translating Cicero’s Latin title, notes that “whereunto yet is no proper 
englisshe worde to be given: but….it may be sayde in this fourme: of the dueties and 
maners appertaynynge to men.”70  First printed in 1531, a revised edition of Elyot’s 
work was printed in 1537; from 1544 to 1580, six subsequent editions were based on 
this extended 1537 edition.71   Elyot establishes that the “publike weale” ought to 
have one sovereign, but that other “inferior governours called magistrates” will be
necessary, since “one mortall man can nat have knowlege of all thynges done in a 
realme or large dominion.”72  He then describes the education and virtues that these 
lesser magistrates should have.  According to Mary Polito, Elyot sought to induct
readers into English civil service by making practical an “art of government.”73   
At least four different manuals for justices of the peace were printed in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and each one was printed in several editions.74  
No fewer than thirty-two editions of the anonymous The Boke of Justyces of Peas 
appeared between 1505 and 1580.75  The author describes men who were eligible to 
be justices: “well disposed men and lawfull that ben not meyntenours of quarelles.”76  
At least “two or iii. men of moost reputacyon and Worshippe sholde be assigned to be 
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Justyces of the peace.”77  Justices’ duties are presented in a list format, including 
summaries of statutes mandating what the justices ought to do, the charge to officers, 
and examples of legal documents, such as indictments of felonies. 78  That these 
examples are provided in Latin indicates an educated audience.  Still more important 
to note is that The Boke grounds the justice’s authority in statutes, not the king’s 
commission.  This was not always the case.     
More explicitly than the anonymous author of The Boke, Sir Anthony 
Fitzherbert defines the justice’s office in relation to larger networks of authority.  
Fitzherbert’s compilation of the justice’s duties, first published in 1538 in French, 
was entitled Loffice et auctoryte des Justyces de peas.  At least eleven editions of an 
English translation, The newe boke of Iustices of peace, appeared from 1538 to 
1566.79  Fitzherbert’s manual is considerably longer than, and differs in significant 
ways from, the anonymous Boke.80  Fitzherbert first explains that “it is nowe 
conveniente for oure purpose to declare and shew the effecte of this commission [of 
the peace] & what auctoritie the Justices of peace have, as well by vertue th rof as 
also by divers statutes, when they be constituted and made Justicers by the kinges 
commission.”81  By postponing discussion of statutory authority and by beginning 
with the commission, Fitzherbert emphasizes that justices are charged “to enquire of 
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all such things as to them shall be enioyned on the kingsbehalf, whiche they by theyr 
commission have power & auctoritie to heare and determine….”82  Fitzherbert next 
provides the oath the justices were required to take.  Only then does he list all or parts
of important statutes, elaborating on The Boke’s summaries.83  The statutes are 
ordered according to the monarch under whom they were ordained: “The statutes of 
Henry the fourth concerning the power of Justicers of the peace.”84  Fitzherbert 
subordinates the justice to the monarch, and he provides the charge justices should 
give to jurors at quarter sessions.  He also includes descriptions of other offices, such 
as sheriff and bailiff.  In sum, Fitzherbert articulates the justice’s place within a 
hierarchy of authority.   
Two more series of manuals for justices were printed, each invoking 
Fitzherbert.  William Lambard’s Eirenarcha: or of The Office of the Justices peace 
appeared in at least thirteen editions between 1581 and 1619.  Although Lambard’s 
title does not reference Fitzherbert, the manual’s prefatory material does. In his 
dedicatory epistle, Lambard informs Sir Thomas Bromley, Lord Chancellor of 
England, that when he first began writing his tract, he consulted earlier works, in 
particular Fitzherbert’s.85  Lambard’s manual, however, substantially amplifies 
Fitzherbert’s work, adding material about the history of the office, clarifying the 
differing responsibilities of a single justice versus two or three, and providing 
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procedures for the quarter sessions.  Lambard does not include Fitzherbert’s sections 
on other local offices.86  In general, Lambard’s tract, as I shall argue, elevates the 
justice’s office, putting the “keeper of the peace” on a par with the monarch.   
The second series that cites Fitzherbert, Richard Crompton’s L ffice et 
aucthoritie de Iustices de Peace, appeared in 1583 and was reprinted at least five 
more times by 1617.  Crompton’s work claims to be a compilation of Fitzherbert’s 
work, enlarged by Crompton.  The entire title of the 1583 edition reads Loffice et 
aucthoritie de Justices de Peace, in part collect per le iades tresreverend Iudge, 
Mounsieur A. Fitzherbert, et ore enlarge per Richard Crompton, un Apprentice de le 
common ley, & publie lan du grace.  Crompton prints the commission, the oath, and 
the charge; he also treats other offices, like constables.  He too amplifies Fitzherbert’s 
work, adding information about the sessions and the justices’ jurisdiction.  If he failed 
to achieve Lambard’s success, it may have been because of what Bertha Putnam calls 
his “chaotic arrangement and impossible language.”87  Or perhaps it was just that his 
legal French failed to define adequately the English justice. 
Tracts on the office of the justice continued to be printed throughout the 
seventeenth century.  In terms of commercial success, Michael Dalton’s manual w s 
the next Eirenarcha.  His The countrey justice, containing the practice of the justices 
of the peace out of their sessions: gathered for the better help of such justices of 
peace as have not been much conversant in the study of the laws of this realm was the 
basis for at least twenty editions from 1618 up through 1746.  William Sheppard’s 
The justice of peace his clerks cabinet, A book of presidents, or warrants, fitted and 
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made ready to his hand for every case that may happen within the compass of his 
masters office was printed in at least four editions from 1654 to1672.  Any one of 
these titles might have political force.  J. H.’s Justice restored, A guide for His 
Majesties justices of peace… was printed in at least three editions from 1660-1671.  
A 1681 tract entitled The practick part of the office of a justice of the peace: 
containing precedents upon acts of Parliament.  As also appeals, informations, 
indictments, and other proceedings relating to the office of a justice of the peace,
printed at least one more time in 1682, conspicuously omits “His Majesty” from its 
title.   
As I have noted, manuals were also written for local offices, such as sheriff, 
constable, and coroner.  Not surprisingly, these manuals frequently were compiled by 
the authors of the justices’ manuals, and they were often bound with those tracts.  Sir 
Anthony Fitzherbert’s manual for sheriffs and constables was printed in at least eight 
editions from 1538 to 1579.88  William Lambard’s The dueties of constables, 
borsholders, tythingmen, and such other lowe and lay ministers of the peace ran to at 
least twenty-six editions, including later enlarged editions, from 1583 through 1677.  
Michael Dalton wrote another manual for a “lowe” office.  His Officium vicecomitum 
The office and authoritie of sheriffs: Written for the better incouragement of the 
gentry (upon whome the burthen of this office lyeth) to keepe their office, and 
undersherife, in their houses; that so by their continuall care of the businesse, and 
eye over their officers, they may the better discharge their dutie to God, their Prince, 
and countrey, in the execution of this their office.  Gathered out of the statutes, and 
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bookes of the common lawes of this kingdome appeared five times between 1623 and 
1700.  And William Sheppard’s The offices and duties of constables, borsholders, 
tything-men, treasurers of the county-stock, overseers for the poore, and other lay-
ministers.  Whereunto are adjoined the severall offices of church-ministers and 
church wardens aw seven reprints between 1641 and 1664.  Fitzherbert lists the 
duties and regulations of the office, noting that the term of office for a sheriff is one 
year.89  Lambard concerns himself not only with describing officeholders’ duties, but 
also with providing the history and jurisdiction of offices.  He explains the titles’ 
etymologies and defines legal terms, such as what constitutes a “breach of the 
peace.”90  Like the manuals for the justices, these tracts for local officeholders define
and redefine these offices in relation to authorities such as God, Prince, 
commonwealth, and the common law.   
Urban magistrates required direction as well.  The tracts for London’s 
officeholders emphasize the system of shared governance of which Londoners were 
so proud.91  The ordre of my Lorde Mayor, the aldermen & the sheriffs, for their 
meetings and wearyinge of theyre apparel throughout the yeare (1568) elaborates on 
the ceremonial meetings of London’s officeholders, beginning with the August 
election of sheriffs and covering the election of the lord mayors, as well as reigious 
holidays such as Christmas and Easter.  J. Windet’s G nerall matters to be 
remembred of the Lord Maior, throughout the whole yeare (1600) focuses more 
specifically on London’s lord mayor.  Like The ordre, Generall matters dispenses 
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with the history of the office and character requirements; instead, it lists the lord 
mayor’s tasks, organizing them first by general topic and then chronologically.  The 
tract derives the lord mayor’s authority from custom and the Crown.  For instance, a 
regulation regarding the Thames is to be enacted “accordyng to the law and the 
Chartres of the Citie and her Maiesties speciall commaundement.”92  Like The ordre, 
Generall matters recognizes rituals of office, including proper procedures for the 
election of the new lord mayor and various attendant ceremonies.  Piers Cain has 
suggested that these “calendars” of duties reflect City leaders’ efforts to maintain the 
City’s celebrated liberties by bolstering London’s identity as a powerful city.93  Due 
reverence was paid to monarchical authority, but its encroachments were strenuously 
defended against. 
If The ordre of my Lorde Mayor and Generall Matters provides practical 
timelines for the lord mayor and his fellow aldermen, a more personal account is 
provided by Thomas Norton, London’s remembrancer and also a member of 
Parliament for London.94  Norton encourages the newly elected lord mayor, James 
Hawes, nodding first in the direction of the Crown:  “Yowe are to remember howe 
great a thinge is the L. Maior, and of London so great a citie, the imperiall Chamber 
of so great a Prince, of our Soveraigne Ladie, the ymediate leeftenaunte of the m ste 
great and mightie God.”95  Having acknowledged the higher authorities that the lord 
mayor serves, Norton reminds Hawes that, in addition to the recorder, “Yowe have a
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painefull, carefull, and zealous Chamberaline: yowe have an olde, diligent, 
experienced Common Sergeant: yowe have a readie and hable Towneclerke…” and 
many other willing and able officers to help govern the City.96  A devout Protestant, 
Norton insists that above all, “you are firste to have care of God….Some particulars 
of your service to hym properlie are theis: that yow advaunce his religion, the true 
understanding whereof he hathe revealed in his owne worde.”97  The lord mayor 
should support preachers and suppress papists.98  He should serve the Queen, take 
care of widows and orphans, protect orphans from kidnappings, insure London’s 
provisions, and look after the poor.99     
By the end of the sixteenth century, men who held high offices were 
themselves recording their duties.  “A Treatise of the Office of a Councellor and 
Principall Secretarie to her Ma[jes]tie,” a manuscript presumably written by Robert 
Beale around 1592, provides detailed instructions for Queen Elizabeth’s secretary.100  
Beale’s tract, like Norton’s, is a personal account, but it resonates with the vocabulary 
of civil service that characterizes the officeholding manuals.  Beale includes 
reminders about the secretary’s clerical responsibilities, such as overseeing the 
keeping of the Privy Council’s “perfect booke of the L[ord]’s sittinges, of the place, 
daye and number and likewise of their l[ett]res signed” and keeping minutes of the 
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Privy Council’s meetings.101  He exhorts the secretary to prioritize important matters 
of state, to keep public and private interests separate, and to keep written records.  To 
manage matters diplomatically, he recommends that the secretary “Leane before 
your accesse her Ma[jes]tie’s disposic[i]on.”102  The secretary ought not to take it 
personally when he is corrected by the Queen: “The Princes themselves knowe best 
their owne meaninge and ther must be time and experience to acquainte them w[i]th 
their humours before a man can doe anie acceptable service.”103   
 For their part, members of Parliament were also formulating opinions on 
officeholders.  The author of A Pamphlet of the Offices, and duties of everie 
particular Sworne Officer, of the Citie of Excester (1584), John Hooker, like Thomas 
Norton, was a member of Parliament.  Hooker had earlier written a tract on 
Parliamentary authority, Order and Usage (1572), which argued that members of the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords were equally noble when Parliament was 
in session.104  Hooker likewise views local office as equalizing; he dedicates his 
manual for Exeter to the mayor, bailiffs, recorder, aldermen, and “all others, t  
sworne officers of the Citie.”105  He exhorts officeholders to live up to their 
responsibilities, appealing to their desire for “the preservation of the bodie of th
commonwealth.”106  For Hooker, the status of “freeman” is itself an office: he devotes 
the first section of his manual to the “office and duetie of a Freeman,” who he 
considers to be “the cheefest and principallest member of the common wealth of the 
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Citie.”107   It is then unsurprising that this champion of freemen describes the 
evolution of offices by appealing to custom and common law in his efforts to 
establish their authority.  As did Cicero, Hooker emphasizes the duty of each citizen
to the commonwealth.  According to Mark Goldie, Hooker’s pamphlet provides 
evidence of the “ancient and republican” nature of England’s polity, especially its 
emphasis on the officeholders’ role in governing.108  
Interest in defining the parameters of various offices held by subjects was, as 
we have seen, widespread.  I have also noted that Tudor manuals have been 
understood in the context of the Crown’s efforts to centralize its power.  While the 
Crown sought to limit the powers of the church and the nobility, common lawyers 
sought to increase the Crown’s prerogative, utilizing available avenues such as 
Parliamentary statute.109  Mary Polito argues that the manuals aided Crown policies, 
since their broad dissemination could only further the aims of the government.110  
Once a broad cohort of men was educated in the laws of the land, however, they 
began to use them to defend the subject’s position against encroaching monarchical 
prerogative.     
William Lambard’s Eirenarcha, first printed in 1581, provides us with a 
compelling example of a tract that undertakes such a defense.  We have already seen 
that Lambard’s tract is far more extensive than previous tracts in its trea ment of the 
history and authority of the justice’s office.  That the tract also provides thorough 
descriptions of the justice’s responsibilities may be reason enough for its popularity.  
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As I will argue here, however, Lambard’s tract is more radical than has been 
assumed.  Lambard defines the subject’s duties in relation to the king’s or queen’s 
peace, assiduously acknowledging the Crown’s prerogative.  But at the same time, he 
offers an alternative to conventional depictions of the justice as the monarch’s deputy.   
For Lambard, both the monarch and the justice are God’s deputies, sworn to uphold 
the common law.  By reconstituting the hierarchy of authority, then, Lambard 
broaches the question of political representation.  Whose interests does the justice 
ultimately represent?  Lambard sets out to transform office on the subject’s half.  
The justice of the peace was a key position in the English hierarchy of 
authority.  Justices were appointed by the Crown through a commission, and they 
served their counties in both judicial and administrative capacities.  They issu d 
warrants for arrest and took “recognizances,” bonds or money pledged by subjects to 
warrant their behavior.  They presided over quarter sessions, the local court 
gatherings held four times a year, filing reports on actions they had taken in the 
meantime and hearing criminal cases.  They also were expected to attend assize 
sessions, certifying records for the traveling assize judges.  Their administrative tasks 
included regulating commodities like grain, attending to the relief of the poor, 
ensuring road maintenance, enforcing regulations in times of plague, and recruiting 
and training soldiers.  Charged with “keeping the peace,” justices enforced statute  
concerning criminal behavior as well as statutes and Privy Council orders regarding 
social and economic issues.111    
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William Lambard was the right man to author a work on the history and 
authority of the justice’s office.  Born in 1536 to a prosperous merchant family in 
London, Lambard eventually entered Lincoln’s Inn and was called to the bar in 
1567.112  While a law student, Lambard became acquainted with the circle of 
antiquarians that included Matthew Parker and Laurence Nowell.  Lambard’s 
antiquarian interests manifest themselves in works such as Archaionomia (1568), his 
compilation and translation of Anglo-Saxon laws and customs, and A Perambulation 
of Kent (1576), his history of the county and its customs.  Appointed justice of the 
peace in 1579, Lambard served until he died in 1601.  While a justice, he advanced to 
other offices, too, having been appointed a Master of Chancery in 1592, Keeper of the 
Records of the Rolls Chapel in 1597, and Keeper of the Records of the Tower in 
1601.  With his legal background and an antiquarian’s scholarly interests, Lambard 
was well equipped to write the tome that describes the justice’s office.  
Scholars have mined Lambard’s Eirenarcha for information about various 
social, economic, and legal concerns.113  But often it is referred to only in connection 
with Lambard, when he is noted, for example, as “the author of a best-selling manual 
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for justices,” or otherwise dismissed as “a practical, everyday guide to ‘keeping the 
peace.’”114  Scholars also have assumed that Lambard wrote the manual after being 
commissioned as a justice and discovering that there was no useful guide.115  
Certainly Eirenarcha updates prior manuals for justices, acknowledging the many 
new statutes that were creating new responsibilities.116  Wilbur Dunkel suggests, 
however, that scholars have been misled by Lambard’s own prefatory comments.117  
Pointing to the prodigious amount of research required for such a learned text, Dunkel 
posits that Lambard began his studies before he even assumed office. 118  H  argues 
that Lambard understood the office in terms of humanist and classical concepts of 
governance, comparing Lambard to the author of The Common Weal of this Realm of 
England.119  While Dunkel believes that Lambard’s primary goal is to increase 
respect for the office, I will argue that Lambard’s Eirenarcha had greater 
ambitions.120      
Lambard himself has been characterized as a loyal servant of the Crown.121  
Dunkel considers any inconsistencies with this characterization to be evidence of the 
scholarly Lambard’s lack of tact.122  But James D. Alsop and Wesley Stevens argue 
that Lambard was more astute about the political pressures shaping Elizabethan 
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England than he has been given credit for.123  Alsop and Stevens’ Lambard was not 
anti-monarchical; rather, he championed mixed monarchy, with a view to limiting the 
royal prerogative in favor of the common law.124  Alsop and Stevens do not address 
Eirenarcha at length, noting that it was an “uncontroversial … production.”125  But 
they do call attention to Lambard’s prefatory remarks to Eirenarcha, in which he 
requests pardon for any misunderstanding he may occasion.   Alsop and Stevens 
argue that his words do not so much express scholarly humility as his awareness of 
the politically charged Elizabethan atmosphere, and they surmise that Lambard’s true 
concern was with content, not style.126  Hence, Lambard’s apprehensions might have 
had something to do with the fact that in a manual on the justice of the peace, he 
remarks quite a bit on the monarch’s limited powers.  In the course of establishing the 
justice’s jurisdiction, Lambard emphasizes that the “constituted authority” that the 
justice serves is that of a mixed monarchy. 
Theories of English mixed monarchy were widely promulgated in response to 
the Henrician Reformation.127  The separation from the Roman Catholic Church had 
necessitated a legal and theological justification for the monarch’s supremacy over 
the church and his repudiation of papal authority, and men such as Stephen Gardiner 
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argued that the Bible provided evidence of the king’s authority over the Church.128  
The monarch was “conceived in hieratic terms: king, not pope, as vicar of God.”129  
But these theories of “imperial” kingship also caused alarm, and humanist scholar 
such as Thomas Starkey and Christopher St. German were concerned about the 
potential for tyranny in such a polity.130  Both Starkey and St. German conceived of 
sovereignty as being invested in the king-in-parliament, as opposed to the king on his 
own.131  St. German, in particular, argued that the basis for the king as “supreme 
head” over the church lay in the common law and parliamentary statute.132  These 
were not totally novel ideas; Bracton had argued that the king was “‘under God and 
the law, because the law makes the king.’”133  Sir John Fortescue, writing in the 
fifteenth century, had compared the “‘regal’” monarchy of France to England’s 
“‘mixed’” monarchy.134  St. German’s particular interest was in defining authority 
over the church, and he argued that the king-in-parliament had a “sovereignty 
delegated from God to men, enabling parliament to expound scripture and identify (if 
need be reform) the common law….”135  In this sense, the king-in-parliament became 
the vicar of God.                                          
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  Elizabethan concepts of the mixed monarchy were indebted to these earlier 
theories.136  John Guy has argued for the “two reigns” of Queen Elizabeth: before 
1585, the ruling elite endorsed St. German’s concept of the king-in-parliament; by the
1590s, sovereignty was considered to be invested in the monarch alone.137  Whereas 
Guy emphasizes the powers of the Privy Council, Stephen Alford focuses on the ways 
William Cecil, Lord Burghley shaped policy.138  Alford notes the Elizabethan 
appreciation for the classical republican vir civilis leading a vita activa.139   He 
concludes that Cecil’s influence helped turn the Privy Council and Parliament into 
“institutions which actively participated in the running of the polity and contributed to 
decisions which affected the future of the realm.”140  For her part, A.N. McLaren has 
emphasized ways in which the mixed monarchy was conceived by Tudor apologists 
in response to gender.  She argues that “the ‘mixed monarchy’ was defined as a 
corporate body politic; one in which the wisdom of the many (a contested, but 
gender-specific identity during this period) ‘bridled’ and imparted grace to a female 
prince, and thereby preserved both Protestantism and national autonomy.”141  If for 
McLaren, Parliament was the primary “institutional means” of expressing the 
“political virtue of the body of the realm,” Guy, Alford, and McLaren taken together 
focus on the Privy Council and Parliament. 142  The latter is obviously crucial to the 
king-in-parliament formulation, and it is to this version of the polity that Lambard’s 
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Eirenarcha responds.  All along the way, Lambard also dwells on office as an 
effective institutional means for expressing political virtue and for participating in the 
running of the polity.   
Lambard might have had personal reasons for shifting the focus from 
Parliament to the institution of office.  Alsop and Stevens argue that he was the “Mr. 
Lambert” involved in the 1566 Parliamentary disputes over free speech.143  Whether 
or not he actually served in Parliament, as a resident of Lincoln’s Inn, Lambard had 
many personal connections to its members and in 1579, he wrote Arch ion, a history 
of Parliament.144  In the two prior decades, Parliament had engaged in a series of 
disputes with Queen Elizabeth over their role as counsel.  Members wanted the right 
to speak freely in Parliament about issues such as the Queen’s marriage, the 
succession, and the religious settlement.145  Concerned to assert her prerogative even 
then, Elizabeth responded to an initiative by the Commons on the succession question 
in 1566: “My Lords, do what you will; as for myself, I shall do nothing but according 
to my pleasure.  All the resolutions which you may make have no force without my 
consent and authority….”146  In the 1570s, members such as Peter Wentworth 
questioned whether the Queen was “reprobate” in her role in the mixed monarchy, 
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and deemed her too willful to accept proper counsel.147  At the same time, Queen 
Elizabeth, who herself was paying careful attention to local governance, was aware of 
who was being commissioned as justice of the peace and who was being removed 
from the commission for incompetence.148  Of course, incompetence was not the only 
reason justices were removed; since the Crown relied on the justices to enforce its 
policies, it had good reason for dismissing “dissident” justices.149  Justices benefited 
greatly from their office, but they also experienced tensions as agents of the Crown.  
Like their MP brethren, they feared an imperious, if not an imperial, sovereign.    
European affairs were also influential.  Jean Bodin’s Six Livres de la 
Republique was published in 1576.150  By 1579, a student at Cambridge observed that 
“‘you cannot step into a scholar’s study but (ten to one) you shall lightly find open 
either Bodin’s De Republica … or some other like French or Italian politic 
discourses.’”151  Bodin undertakes to define “sovereignty,” concluding that it consists 
of a “‘high, absolute and perpetual power over the citizens.’”152  For Bodin, a mixed 
polity such as English theorists laid claim to could not exist; there could only be three 
types of governments: monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy.153  Insofar as England 
and France were concerned, Bodin concluded that sovereignty was indivisible.154  
Indeed, he argued, “‘the principal point of sovereign majesty, and absolute power, 
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[consisted] principally in giving laws unto the subjects in general, without their 
consent.’”155       
Queen Elizabeth’s marriage negotiations with the French Dukes of Anjou in 
the 1570s sparked concerns over English sovereignty.156  Jean Bodin, in fact, was in 
the service of the Duke of Anjou and had visited England on his behalf.157  While 
Elizabeth perceived the alliance to be one that would give England control over 
France and an ally against Spain, others worried that England would instead be 
subsumed under French rule.158  Protestants, remembering the killing of thousands of 
French Protestants in the 1572 St. Bartholomew Massacre, feared a Catholic 
alliance.159  For printing a pamphlet that warned against the dangers of the French 
marriage, John Stubbs lost his right hand.160  William Camden described the moment 
in his History of the Princess Elizabeth: “‘the multitude standing about was deeply 
silent: either out of an horror at this new and unwonted kind of punishment, or else 
out of commiseration towards the man, as being of an honest and unblameable repute, 
or else out of hatred of the marriage, which most men presaged would be the 
overthrow of religion.’”161  William Lambard was apparently a close friend of Stubbs, 
mentioning his punishment in his personal notes and loaning him substantial amounts 
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of money.162  While there is no record of Lambard speaking out on Stubbs’ behalf, he 
clearly was affected by these events. 
By the time Lambard was writing Eirenarcha, Sir Thomas Smith had 
conceptualized the English polity in his De Republica Anglorum.163  Lambard, like 
Sir Thomas Smith, emphasizes the mixed monarchy model of Elizabethan England.  
But Lambard’s account differs from Smith’s in that the latter, in describing the 
justice’s office, authorizes the justice primarily in terms of his relationship to the 
monarch: “The Justices of the peace be men selected out of the nobilitie, higher and 
lower, … and of such as be learned in the laws, such and in such number as the Prince 
shall thinke meete, and in whome for wisedome and discretion he putteth his trust.”164  
Smith reiterates several times that “the Prince putteth his special trust” in the men 
chosen by him to be justices.165  He explains that 
The Prince with his counsell chooseth out certaine articles out of penall lawes 
aleadie made for to represse the pride and evill rule of the popular, and 
sendeth them downe to the Justices, willing them to looke upon those pointes, 
and after they have mette together and consulted among themselves, howe to 
order that matter most wisely and circumspectly, whereby the people might be 
kept in good order and obedience after the lawe, they divide themselves by 
three or foure: and so each in his quarter taketh order for the execution of the 
saide articles.  And then within certaine space they meete againe and certifie 
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the Prince or his privie counsell how they do finde the shire in rule & order 
touching those pointes and all other disorders.166   
In Smith’s account, the justice is appointed by the monarch, who places special 
confidence in him; the justice is in turn accountable to the monarch.  Lambard 
recalibrates this hierarchy of authority, at least in relation to the execution of the law.  
Lambard’s justices, while they are appointed by the monarch, are obligated primarily 
to God and to the common law.  They enact justice on behalf of the realm, not in the 
interest of the monarch.   
This difference suggests that Eirenarcha is also responsive to the religious 
conflicts of the sixteenth-century.  Advocating for forcible resistance to imperial 
rulers, Protestant resistance theorists advanced a range of arguments according to 
which lesser magistrates were also authorized by God.167  Andreas Osiander, a 
Lutheran theorist, argued that inferior magistrates were “‘no less ordained of God’” 
than their prince and thus were authorized to resist a superior magistrate who failed to 
fulfill his duties.168  According to Martin Bucer, inferior as well as superior 
magistrates “‘have been ordained of God.’”169  In England, both John Ponet and 
Christopher Goodman argued that rulers are ordained “‘to see justice administered to 
all sorts of men.’”170  They insist that rulers are “‘but executors of God’s laws.’”171  
Ponet argued that “‘before magistrates were, Goddes laws were.’”172  Lambard was 
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not interested in theorizing resistance, but he did draw on the vocabulary of equality 
under God, which subjected both the monarch and justice to the common law.   
 All of which is to say that William Lambard’s manual for justices includes 
more than a description of duties.  In the first part of Eirenarcha, in particular, 
Lambard addresses the officeholder’s authority, virtue, and judgment.  By doing so, 
he establishes the office of justice of the peace as an ancient institution tha provided 
subjects with another avenue for participation in the polity: officeholding, not 
Parliament.  For Lambard, all virtuous subjects share the monarch’s responsibility of 
governing.  But Lambard does more than acknowledge these responsibilities as the 
subject’s customary duties.  He privileges the authority of the common law and of the 
king-in-parliament, defending the mixed nature of England’s polity.173  Instead of 
serving as a deputy of the monarch, Lambard establishes that the justice act on
behalf of the commonwealth.  Indeed, according to Lambard, both justice and 
monarch are equal citizens who act on behalf of God and the commonwealth.   
From the beginning of his treatise, Lambard adopts the posture of a humble 
subject.  Dedicating the work to his patron, Sir Thomas Bromley, Lord Chancellor of 
England, who had appointed him to the commission of the peace in 1579, he explains 
that he writes the manual “aswel for saving you (my speciall good L. and favourer) 
blamelesse in the Choice [of Lambard], as also for mine owne Information and 
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discharge in the Service itself.”174  Honored and humbled by his charge, Lambard 
“thought it [his] part…to looke diligently into that portion of our Lawe which 
concerneth the office of the Peace, wherewith I had before that time very littl  or 
none acquaintance.”175  Even after his considerable research, he flaunts the modesty 
topos, certain that his work is “neither answerable to your woorthinesse, nor to myne 
owne wish.”176  He hopes the lord chancellor will accept the work, since then “the 
booke it selfe shall have the more curteous entertainment and freer passage with other 
men.”177  Ever deferential, Lambard hopes that his book will “remaine a perpetuall 
Monument of the Sacrifice of mine owne thankefulnesse for those your rare and long 
continued favours, from time to time (even undeservedly) bestowed and cast upon 
me.”178  This is the conventional pose of the good servant, common to dozens of 
dedications. 
At the same time, however, Lambard fashions himself a virtuous citizen.  Like 
the Doctor in Sir Thomas Smith’s Discourse of the Commonweal, he has a deep 
appreciation for learning.179  Lambard calls attention to the careful research that has 
gone into his work: not only has he examined treatises such as Anthony Fitzherbert’s, 
he also has gone to “the olde and newe books of the Common Lawes, and to the 
Volumes of the Actes and Statutes.”180  Nor is this praise of learning for learning’s 
sake.  Like Smith’s Doctor, Lambard conjoins learning and rule: “For we see in all 
kind of government, for the most part, the wiser sort have the sovereignty over the 
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rude and unlearned as in every house the most expert, in every city the wisest and 
most sage, and in every Commonweal the most learned are most commonly placed to 
govern the rest.”181  As a virtuous citizen, Lambard contributes his knowledge for the 
betterment of all.  Although he did not originally intend to publish his tract, “sundrie 
godly, wise, and not unlearned gentlemen” persuaded him that most other justices 
“had neede of some helpe in writing for their better conduict in this office, & it might 
increase the knowledge of many of [the justices], and consequently doe a common 
good, to have the booke made common by Impression.”182  In writing and printing his 
manual, Lambard not only betters himself, he serves the commonwealth by 
disseminating knowledge.   
Lambard thus plays and advocates the part of the virtuous citizen.  He hopes 
that his manual will teach other justices to judge well—and to criticize well, too.  
Perhaps critics will judge his Eirenarcha; perhaps they will judge Crown policies and 
actions.  Lambard’s own “respect” or reason for presenting his manual to the lord 
chancellor is significant.  He wants Bromley, “according to the Rule of lawe (in your 
owne hands) [to] rectifie the Commission of the Peace, and some other crookednesse, 
whereof this booke shall bring complaint before you.”183  This is to subordinate the 
lord chancellor to the common law and, indirectly, to the wisdom of a lesser subject.  
Lambard’s justice’s jurisdiction extends all the way to Crown policies, first on behalf 
of God, then the commonwealth, and, lastly, the monarch and the justice.  Lambard 
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effectively confirms Patrick Collinson’s estimation that in Elizabethan England, 
“citizens were concealed within subjects.”184                                    
Lambard the humble servant in the “Proheme” is always Lambard the 
defender of   the subject’s rights.  He acknowledges that it might seem unnecessary to 
contribute another treatise on the justice’s office, in light of the widely available 
works of “M. Marowe” and “Justice Fitzherbert.”185  But he notes that “since their 
time, this Office is charged with manie Statutes, which were not made when their 
writings were penned,” and other responsibilities have been taken away from justices 
“by the force of law.”186  He reiterates that he “collect[s] some discourse, that may 
serve for the present age wherein wee now live, and somewhat further the good 
endevour of such as bee not trained up in the studie of the laws.”187  In these efforts, 
he assures the reader that he “meane[s] to robbe no man of his right, but to yield to 
eche one the due prayse of his owne.”188  Then he concludes with a defense of his 
own right freely to offer his opinions:  “So if I my selfe shal be found here and there 
to dissent in opinion from other men, I desire heartilie that my good meaning bee not 
evill interpreted, that my allegations and reasons be weighted indifferently, a d that 
the respect of my person bring no preiudice to the thing in question.”189  All of this 
resonates with the protests of members of Parliament who defended their right to 
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speak freely and to dissent.  Reasonable exchanges of ideas can only benefit the 
commonwealth.190      
Lambard again indicates his loyalty as a subject but also his concerns as a 
citizen when he reproduces the Oath of Supremacy.  Later editions of Fitzherbert did 
not include this text, which declared that “the Queenes Highnesse is the onely 
supreme Governour of this Realme, and of all other hir Highnesse Dominions and 
Countries, as well in all spirituall and ecclesiasticall things (or causes) a  
temporall.”191  Lambard connects the Oath to fears of foreign influence, reminding his 
readers that the Oath was “appointed” for justices “after the seconde abolishment of 
the usurped authoritie of the Romish Pharao, by the ioyous entrie of our gratious 
Queene Elizabeth.”192  The inclusion might also remind justices throughout England 
of the Queen’s duties, particularly amid concerns over her marriage negotiations wi h 
the French Duke of Anjou.  The Oath states that “no forraine Prince, person, Prelate, 
State, or Potentate, hath, or ought to have, any iurisdiction, power, superioritie, 
preheminence, or authoritie, ecclesiasticall or spirituall, within this realme….”193  The 
swearer then agrees to renounce any foreign jurisdiction and to defend the realme 
against any foreign incursion.194  Lambard is anxious about justices who have been 
asked to swear the Oath of Supremacy only once or twice.  He notes that “many a 
Iustice there is, that by indirect practice never tooke, neyther thys, nor the f m r, 
whereof what harmes doe, and may grow, I leave to wiser and higher men to be 
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considered.”195  He suggests that the justices’ vigilance against foreign threats, 
whether invasion by army or by marriage, might wane.    
Lambard protests another form of foreign invasion when he defends the office 
and common law against incursions of civil law.196  Explaining the etymology of the 
justice’s title, he notes that “in many olde histories, the Chiefe Iustice of England, is 
termed, Capitalis Iustitia” and that the “Originall Writtes that are in M. Glanvils 
Booke (which was written under the raigne of king Henry the second) have this 
forme, quod sit coram me, vel Iustitius meis….”197  He is certain that this “was done 
of speciall purpose, and to the ende, that the mention of their name should put them in 
minde of their office, and should continually (as it were) sollicite them to administer 
Justice, for whose sake they were appoynted.”198  But, he recounts, “in the days of 
King Henry the third, M. Bracton (who reduced the body of our law into Latine, and 
therein imitated the Methode of the Civile Lawyers) changed the worde Iustitius, into 
Iustitiarius, (how Latine like, let them judge that can skil) and setteth downe the 
Writtes accordingly, coram Iustitiarius nostris.”199  Since then, writs and 
commissions have utilized the form Iustitiarius, and it is for this reason that 
Fitzherbert’s tract denominates justices as “Iusticers, … and not Iustices, as we 
commonly (and not altogether unproperly) do name them.”200  Bracton, an earlier 
English jurist, had studied Roman law and “brought Roman ideas to the discussion of 
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English law.”201  After his dig at Bracton’s Latin, his learning, and civil lawyers in 
general, Lambard pointedly resumes use of “Iustice,” the term he deems most 
appropriate.  For Lambard, Justicer privileges the person executing the law; Justice 
privileges the law.  
Lambard’s historicizing of the office further suggests that the justice is bound 
to the law.  As he defines the office, “Iustices of the Peace, bee Iudges of Recorde, 
appointed by the Queene to bee Iustices within certaine limites, for the Conservation 
of the Peace, and for the execution of sundrie things comprehended in their 
Commission, and in divers laws committed unto them.”202  While justices are 
appointed by the monarch, the office’s authority stems from the common law:   
As the common lawe hath, even from the very beginning, continued a speciall 
care for the Conservation of this peace: So did it not want meete officers 
(beefore that these Wardeins or Iustices of the Peace were made) to whose 
charge it did committe maintainance of the same.203  
Since “it will give no small light to the understanding of the office of the present 
Iustices of Peace, to have that auntient authoritie unfolded, upon the which this latter 
power is (as it were upon a Stocke) set and engrasssed,” Lambard explains these 
ancient offices.204  Like the common law, the justice’s office is immemorial: “At the 
Commune law therefore, and before ye time of King Edward the third, there were 
sundrie persons, that had interest in the keeping of the Peace.  Of these, some had that 
charge as incident to other Offices that they did beare,” and were thus called by the 
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name of those other offices, and some “had it simply, as of it selfe, & were therefore 
named Custodes pacis, Wardeins, or Conservators of the Peace.”205  Titles and 
procedures might change, but the office of keeping the peace has always been in 
accord with the common law.   
The office is also obliged to God.  According to Lambard, Parliament 
stipulates that those chosen to be justice be men who “love & feare God aright.” 206  
For Lambard, the oaths that justices swear upon their induction signify this deep 
commitment.  Lambard and Fitzherbert both provide the text of the oath of office.  
Fitzherbert, however, prefaces it by explaining merely that “by this oath it ppereth 
that they ought to do al things appertaininge to the office of justicers of the peac ,” 
and he goes on to list such duties as holding quarter sessions.207  Lambard, however, 
emphasizes that “such as occupie Judicial places, ought to take heede what they doe, 
knowing (as Jehosaphat saide) that they exercise not the judgements of men onelie, 
but of God himself, whose power, as they doe participate: So he also is present on the 
bench with them.”208  Then he provides the oath that the justices should take, since  
… it hath beene always the policie of Christian laws, to appoint meete forms 
of Religious attestations (or Othes) for such Officers to take: meaning thereby, 
not onlie to set God continually before their eyes (whome by suche Othe, they 
take to witnesse of their promise, & call for revenge of their falsehood:) but 
also to threaten them (as it were) with temporall paines provided against 
corrupt dealings, & withal, to strengthen their minds, and arme their courages, 
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against the force of humaine affections, whiche otherwise might allure & draw 
them out of the way.209 
While threatened with “temporall paines” should he fail to fulfill his duties, the 
justice ultimately is deputized by a higher authority than even the monarch.   
When he cites the statute that “willed” that justices must be sworn, Lambard 
situates the oath within a Parliamentary, as well as a godly, context.210  The oath 
reminds each justice that to act as a godly judge on earth is to act primarily on behalf 
of the commonwealth.  It directs the justice according to the following form: “Ye 
shall swear, that as Iustice of the peace in the countie of Kent, in all Articles in the 
Queenes Commission to you directed, yee shall doe egall right to the poore, and to 
the rich, after your cunning, wit, and power, and after the laws and customes of the 
Realme, and Statutes thereof made….”211  Lambard notes that he has updated the oath 
from that provided in Fitzherbert’s work, emphasizing its currency.  This oath and its 
obligations are so important that Lambard has come up with a verse “for memories 
sake”: 
Do equall right to rich & poore, as wit & lawe extends: 
Give none advise in anie cause, that you before depends: 
Your Sessions hold, as Statutes bid: The forfeites that befall, 
See entred well, and then estreate them to the Cheaquer all: 
Receive no fee, but that is given by Queene, good use, or right: 
Ne send precept to partie selfe, but to indifferent wight.212  
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Lambard’s mnemonic device neatly encapsulates that while the justice receives fees 
from the monarch, he acts in the best interests of all subjects.   
When Lambard does cite monarchical authority, he refers to the authority of 
the king-in-parliament.  Lambard recounts the “first ordaining of the Wardeins and 
Iustices of the Peace, by Statute Lawe.”213  While originally justices were elected by 
the people, after Edward II’s deposition, Queen Isabel sought the aid of Parliament to 
“represse all intention of uproar and force.”214  Only Parliamentary statute could 
authorize the monarch to appoint justices.  Lambard is careful, too, to show that the 
monarch is capable of misconstruing the statutes.  Apparently Edward III for many 
years had appointed several men to be wardens jointly over several shires, rather than 
a separate warden for each shire.  Lambard grants that “this mighte be warranted after 
18.E.3 (as I suppose) out of the Construction of the worde Countie used plurally in 
the Statute 18.E.3. Stat.2.ca.2,” especially in contrast to earlier laws, where the word 
is used in the singular.215  However, he then reports, “Parliament (34.E.3.ca.1) 
restored the proper sense of those lawes.”216  For Lambard, the monarch interprets but 
does not author the law; the power to clarify the law rests with the representativ  
assembly. 
Lambard outlines the monarch’s powers, but he also points to the limitations 
of those powers.  According to Lambard,  
From the King (who is the head of justice) ought to flow all auctoritie to the 
inferiour and subalterne Justices.  And upon this reason, it seemeth that the 
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said Statutes (18.E.3.ca.2 and 34.E.3.ca.1) did ordaine, that the Wardeins of 
the Peace in each Countie should be assigned by the Kings Commission, that 
it might thereby appeare that they received their whole authoritie and power, 
as it were by his owne hande and deliverie.217   
Lambard’s “ought” acknowledges the difference between theory and reality; he 
elaborates by explaining that eventually, church officials usurped this power of 
appointment.  Eventually, King Henry VIII is forced to resort to Parliament again “to 
restore unto the Crowne hir antient right in his behalfe.”218  While the statute decrees 
that “no person whatsoever, should have any power to make Iustices of the Peace, but 
that they should be made by letters patents under the Kings great seale, in the name 
and by the auctoritie of the King and his heires,” Lambard observes parenthetically 
that there are exceptions.219  Lambard also clarifies that generally, justices are 
“ordained by the meane of the greate Seale, and ministerie of the L. Chauncelour.”220  
The delegation of appointments once again calls to mind Patrick Collinson’s 
assessment of Elizabethan England as a monarchical republic; while “everything 
which was done, publicly and by due legal authority, was in a sense done by the 
monarch,” at the same time, the monarch cannot personally attend to all matters.221   
 Even as he specifies the exclusive personal nature of officeholding— 
only those who are virtuous, knowledgeable, and sufficiently wealthy should hold 
office—Lambard emphasizes its inclusive political nature.222   Not just the king but 
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the king-in-parliament selects justices: “In the choice of the Wardeins and Iustices of 
the Peace, the Statute lawes have respecte to the manners and ability (or livelih ode) 
of them all, and to the skil and learning of suche as are Speciallie Selected, and 
therefore named of the Quorum.  For, Gardeins of the Peace ought to bee good men 
and lawfull, no maintainers of evil….”223  From time to time, new statutes are 
“enacted,” “ordered,” “published” in Parliament, in order to counter corruption in the 
nominating procedures.224 And Lambard reiterates at the end of the chapter that  
our Parliaments, (entending to make the Iustice of Peace an able judge) doe 
require that he come furnished with three of the principall ornamentes of a 
Iudge, that is to say, with Iustice, Wisdome, and Fortitude, for to that summe 
the words, Good, Learned, Valiant, do wel amounte.  And above all, that he 
love & feare God aright, without whiche he can not bee accounted Good at 
all.225 
Even though the justice’s authority “ought to flow” from the king, he represents the 
authority of Parliament.    
 To the extent that Lambard buttresses the officeholder’s authority, in this 
zero-sum arrangement, he undermines the monarch’s.  Fitzherbert, whose manual 
begins by printing the commission and an exposition of it, since “they be constituted 
and made Justicers by the kinges commission,” emphasizes that the commission 
signifies monarchical power.226  Lambard, for his part, clarifies that there are “Two 
fountains of the power of Iustices of the Peace”: “theyr Commission, and the 
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Statutes.” 227  He points to changes that have been made to the commission.228  He 
warns the reader that some statutes have been “repealed by new Actes of our time 
provided in that behalf, and that therefore they are vainely rehearsed in the 
Commission at this day.”229  He is not happy with the commission’s wording, since 
“greater power seemeth to be given by the letter of the Commission, than is ment by 
the author of the Commission.”230  He concludes by pointing out that the 
commission’s handling of the quorum, once again, “doth make muche relation to the 
saide Statutes that are not now at all.”231  Lambard insists that “it were convenient to 
reforme it now also for [these] divers imperfections that do yet remaine in it.”232  By 
criticizing, he also argues implicitly that those who are not members of Parliament or 
the Privy Council have valid counsel to offer.                           
For Lambard, the monarch herself is an officeholder charged by the common 
law with keeping the peace.233  Lambard provides a list of such officers; some had 
jurisdiction over the whole realm, and some over a particular region.234  He 
differentiates between the keeper of the peace and “a Duke, Earle, or Baron,” wh  
“bee no conservators of the Peace, because those be no titles of Office, but of dignitie 
onelie.”235  He cites, as an example, the jurisdiction of the Queen: “The Queenes 
Majestie then is, by hir office & dignitie royall, the principall conservator of the peace 
within hir Dominions, and may give authoritie to others, to see the peace kept, and to 
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punish such as that break the same.”236  As an officeholder, the monarch, too, is 
subject to the law.  He has earlier noted that the monarch swears an oath upon 
accession:  
the Queene at hir Coronation, she sweareth, servare Ecclesia Dei, Cleri & 
Populi, pacem ex integro: the meaning whereof is, (as I suppose) that she will 
maintain eche degree and estate of hir Subjects, as well Ecclesiasticall  
Temporall, (for Populus comprehendeth all the laitie) according to their 
several customes, lawes, and priviledges.237 
Like all other officeholders, the monarch holds office to serve the commonwealth.  
While Lambard acknowledges the importance of the Queen’s office, he insists that i 
is, still, just another office.    
 In defining the justice’s jurisdiction, Lambard endows the justice with 
authority on a par with the monarch.  He holds that  
This Iurisdiction of theirs is exercised, for the most part (if not altogether) 
aboute those causes which be in a maner the same that the Civil Lawyers do 
call, Iudicia publica, partely because the Prince (who representeth the head of 
the common wealth) hath interest in the most of them, as wel as that private 
person which is immediately offended, and partely, because they are not 
commonly tried by suche Action as other Civil and Private causes are, but 
rather by Criminall and Publique Accusation, Information, or Presentment.238 
Here, Lambard utilizes the scholarship of the civil lawyers.  Roman law distinguished 
between public and private law, the first concerning affairs of state and the second 
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involving the concerns of individuals, such as property disputes.239  English common 
law did not so differentiate; in fact, Lambard’s Eirenarcha is the only contemporary 
legal work even to mention public and private in relation to the common law.240  
Treating public law could be controversial.  Of Edward Coke’s later Institutes (works 
that codified English law), only the first, on matters of private law, was published 
initially.  Upon finding out that Coke had dared to treat public matters in subsequent 
volumes, King Charles I suppressed them.241  And the right to address public, or state, 
matters had been an issue in the Parliamentary disputes over free speech in the 1570s, 
when the monarch prohibited Parlimentary discussion of the succession, religious 
issues, and foreign affairs.  Peter Wentworth had defended his opinions on the 
grounds that he offered them as a public councilor, and not as a private man, in the 
interest of the public weal.242  Lambard establishes the justice’s concern with criminal 
affairs, but he also claims for the justice an official avenue for participation in the 
polity. 
 Lambard can make such a claim because the justice’s obligations had a 
religious as well as an administrative and judicial dimension.  A criminal act w s not 
just a crime; it was a sin.243  According to Cynthia Herrup, criminal behavior 
offended the particular individual involved, but it also transgressed the injunctions of 
“God, king, and community.”244  Thus crime was a public as well as a private matter.  
Prosecution undertaken by justices was understood to be on behalf of the monarch: 
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“It was the king who stood as the symbolic victim, and who had to be revenged.”245  
While the Prince might be symbolically involved, as God’s deputy on earth, 
Lambard’s justice is responsible primarily to the law.  The law allows Lambard’s 
justice the power of coercion:  “This punishment then, is an orderly execution of a 
lawfull iudgement, layed upon an offendour, by the minister of the Lawe….”246  And, 
for Lambard, punishment serves the commonwealth as a whole.  It “amends” the 
criminal, it sets an example, it restores the dignity of the offended, and, in the case of 
capital punishment, it removes the threat of the evil-doer.247  While the justice of the 
peace is deputized by the king, he no less than the king enacts justice for the subject.   
 The justice’s status as a judge of record initially indicates his obligation to the 
monarch, but Lambard stresses the justice’s obligation to other subjects as well.  The 
courts of record were those courts that kept records of their proceedings; as Lambard 
expresses it, “they shall be trusted in the reporte of causes happening before them.”248  
Records served an important financial purpose; they allowed the magistrates to exact 
payment of fines and fees.249  Lambard’s justice “maye take a Recognisance for the 
Peace … which none can do, but a Iudge of Recorde, because the acknowledging of 
the sum, is to remaine as a matter of Recorde.”250  Being a judge of record augments 
the justice’s standing:  
I maketh not a little, both for maintenance of the Peace, and for the credite of 
the Iustices thereof, that they are numbred amongst the Iudges of Recorde for, 
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on the one side evil doers wil be afraid, when they shall see Memorialles of 
their wickednesse before their eies, and on the other side, the proceedings of 
those Iustices shall be so much the more reverenced & let by, as it shall 
appeare that their endevours are countenanced with the favour of authoritie.251   
Lambard later asserts that “greate cause hathe the Iustice of Peace therefore, to take 
diligente heede, that he abuse not this credite, either to ye oppressing of any subject,
by making an untrue Recorde, or to the defrauding of the Prince, by suppressing anye 
true Record.”252  Lambard’s justice owes it to both subject and prince to avoid 
cheating either.     
 While the records were important for financial reasons, they were also 
important in terms of future legal decisions.  These records provided precedents: 
“One man may affyrme a thing, and another may deny it, but if a Record once saye 
the worde, no man shall be received to Averrre (or speake) against it.”253  The 
justice’s “Recorde or testimonie is made in some case of greater force and value than 
an Enditement by the oath of twelve men, for his Record … shal conclude the partie 
so, that he shal not be admitted to Traverse or gainsay it by 21.H.6.5 Fitzh. Fol. 18.6 
& upon the statute 15.R.2.ca.2. 11.H.7.ca.15. & 33.H.8.c.6.”254  In spite of the 
common lawyers’ perception of the common law as immemorial (and thus 
unchanging), J. H. Baker argues that during the sixteenth century, lawyers 
increasingly relied on “jurisprudence,” or “judge-made law,” over “doctrine,” or 
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“common learning.”255  When deciding cases, judges looked to records and reports 
for precedents, rather than relying on reason, or their knowledge of common law.  
Lambard’s perspective reflects this shift; he cites the authority of Bracton: “If men 
shoulde bee admitted to deny the enrolled actes of the Court, then would there never 
bee any ende of controversies.”256  When Lambard cautions against oppressing 
subjects and defrauding the Prince, he refers to financial matters, but the warning 
might extend to the justice’s role in establishing legal precedents, too.     
Lambard also associates justices with the making of the law by granting them 
discretion.  While, on the one hand, the commission “bindeth [justices] faste with the 
chaines of the Lawes, customes, ordinances, and Statutes,”257 on the other hand,   
Our latter laws of Parliament, although they also endevour (for the most parte) 
to hold the same course, yet forasmuche as everie considerable circumstance 
can not be foreseene at the time of the making of the Lawe, they doe many 
times leave to be supplied by the discretion of the Executioner of the Lawe, 
that thing which was not conveniently comprehended before hand, by the 
wisedom of the maker of the Law.258   
Justices should not abuse this power of discretion, “for no way better shall the 
Discretion of a Iustice of the Peace appeare, than if he (remembering that he is Lex 
loquens) do containe himself within the lifts of law, and (being soberly wise) do not 
use his owne Discretion, but onely where both the law permitteth, and the present 
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case requireth it.”259  Even while cautioning the justice to remain within the law, 
Lambard designates him a speaker of the law, a position that King James himselflater 
wanted to claim: “‘Rex est lex loquens.’”  260  Coke responded in his Institutes that 
“‘ Judex est lex loquens.’” 261  For Coke, the law is made by “‘the very true resolutions, 
sentences, and judgments of the reverend judges and sages of the law themselves, 
who for their authority, wisdom, learning, and experience are to be honored, 
reverenced, and believed.’”262  For Lambard and Coke alike, the judges authored the 
law; the monarch was subject to it.      
As Lambard’s concern about justices abusing their discretion indicates, he 
was broadly concerned with subjects’ performance of their offices.  As he notes, the 
commission itself charges justices “to be diligentlye intendant aboute the execution of 
the premisses.”263  But, Lambard laments, “howe negligentlie many of them performe 
it, I am afraide it is too manifeste, whylest ambitiouslie seeking the name and power 
to rule, they take smal care of doing their duetiful service that belongeth therunto.”264  
As a justice himself, he exhorted jurors to be more conscientious.265  Retha Warnicke 
concludes that “in none of these exhortations did he emphasise national affairs.”266  
Lambard might not have mentioned specific events, but the commonweal was alway
on his mind.  Indeed, for Lambard, holding office is more than a duty to the 
commonwealth, it is a critical site for participation in the polity.   
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Lambard’s title for his manual indicates his understanding of this polity.  
Eirenarcha hearkens back to “eyre,” the name of the system of itinerant judges that 
had developed by the twelfth century.  The eyres became so powerful, however, that 
they were eliminated in the fourteenth century.267  When Lambard legitimizes the 
justice’s office, he reconfigures the chain of authority.  Rather than a vertical 
hierarchy, one in which God’s authority is vested in the monarch, and the monarch’s 
authority is vested in the officeholder, Lambard depicts a society in which God’s
authority is vested in monarch and subject alike as ministers of God’s law.  In doing 
so, he contributes significantly to the discourse of officeholding.  By defining the 
officeholder’s obligations, Lambard was imagining the officeholder’s potential to 
transform governors and government.
                                                




Chapter 2: Promising Justice 
These, and many other Iudiciall officers in our law, be called Iustices (per 
Metonymiam subiecti) because they doe (or should doe) law and Iustice.268 
 
In 1931, Leslie Hotson argued that Shakespeare created The Merry Wives of 
Windsor’s Justice Shallow as a bit of personal revenge.  Hotson recorded his search 
through the Public Records Office in Shakespeare versus Shallow.  He initially turned 
to the PRO in the hopes of gleaning further information about Shakespeare’s life; he 
notes that he focused on “petitions for sureties of the peace” in the rolls of the 
Queen’s Bench. 269  His research eventually revealed that in 1596, a “William Wayte 
craves sureties of the peace against William Shakspeare, Francis Lagley, Dorothy 
Soer wife of John Soer, and Anne Lee, for fear of death, and so forth.”270  After 
further research implicated Wayte’s stepfather, William Gardiner, a justice of the 
peace, Hotson concluded that Gardiner had abused his powers as justice in an attempt 
to get revenge on Francis Langley.  After yet more research, Hotson determin d that 
Gardiner was indeed, as Langley apparently declared, “‘a false knave, a false
forsworn knave, and a perjured knave.’”271  As a result, Hotson argued, Shakespeare 
got his revenge in the best way he knew how, through poetic justice.  By lampooning 
Gardiner, Shakespeare could offer up an insult that would long outlive whatever 
material wealth Gardiner had gained in a lifetime of “greed, usury, fraud, cruelty, and 
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perjury.”272  According to Hotson, “Shakespeare is here revealed for the first time as a 
master of personal satire, taking with devastating humour a satisfactory revenge for 
himself, his associates of the theatre, and Gardiner’s victims in Southwark.”273  
 In his 2000 Arden edition of Merry Wives, Giorgio Melchiori disputes 
Hotson’s claim.  He notes that “the family connection between Shallow and Slender 
is never stated in unequivocal terms … and in 2 Henry IV there is no mention of 
Shallow’s family or relations, therefore there is no reason to believe that these wo 
represent the litigants in the legal case.”274  Still, Melchiori’s blanket dismissal of 
Hotson’s argument has no bearing whatsoever on Hotson’s basic research: 
Shakespeare evidently was familiar with the ways in which officeholders 
administered the law.275  And Merry Wives’s Shallow is, among other things, an 
officeholder.  Indeed, consideration of two contemporary plays – Anthony Munday’s 
The Downfall of Robert, Earl of Huntington a d Ben Jonson’s Every Man in His 
Humor – reveals that Shallow’s role goes well beyond mere caricature.  All three of 
these plays (c. 1597-98), evaluate the significance of justices of the peace and of 
office itself.  Their dramatists juxtapose officeholding with quasi-feudal chivalric 
communities, exploring officeholding as an alternative avenue for service by loyal 
subjects. 
These plays were written when various pressures were being brought to bear 
upon the justice’s office.  As is clear from my discussion of the officeholding 
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manuals, the justice’s office had been strengthened by the Tudors in an effort to 
centralize power.  Justices, like all subjects, were expected to be loyal, and they in
particular were charged with carrying out the orders of central government.  But by 
the late sixteenth-century, central authorities were voicing concerns over the justices’ 
performance of their duties.  Lord Keepers from Nicholas Bacon in 1565 to Thomas 
Egerton in 1602 worried that many justices were only interested in the office for their 
own private gain; Bacon criticized those “‘drones’” who only wanted “‘to keepe the 
name and place of a Justyce … for reputation’s sake.’”276  Members of the Privy 
Council had reservations about the education and capabilities of local justices, urging 
them in 1590 to reserve judgment in the Quarter Sessions on ambiguous cases and 
instead wait for the Assizes.277  In 1609, the Privy Council concluded that so many 
justices were incompetent that “‘it is high time to prevent the growing evils which 
may ensue for lack of good distribution in causes that concern public services which 
are often carried so confusedly or executed so remissly as the vulgar sort of people
will in time get a custom of disobedience.’”278  In some instances the Privy Council 
reprimanded justices for being lax about enforcing hunting and gaming laws.279  Star 
Chamber heard cases concerning failure to perform duties or abuse of office; those 
convicted could be fined, censured, or dismissed from office.280   
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Certainly some of these complaints were due to negligent or corrupt justices, 
but some of them must have been occasioned by uncertainty and confusion on the 
justices’ part over what exactly the office’s duties entailed.  Or perhaps justices were 
re-defining what it meant to be a justice.  According to Lambard, justices were so 
named because they “doe (or should doe) lawe and Iustice.”281  But to “do justice” is 
a broad and vague charge.  As noted in the preceding chapter, the justice’s office 
entailed a combination of administrative and judicial responsibilities, and 
contemporary justices appear to have felt overwhelmed by their duties.  In respons  to 
complaints that there were too many justices, Lambard questioned: “how many 
Iustices (thinke you) may now suffise (without breaking their backes) to beare so 
many, not loades, but Stackes of Statutes, that have since that time bene laide uppon 
them?”282  The very proliferation of manuals was an attempt to deal with this increase 
in responsibilities, as Lambard made clear in his dedicatory epistle when he noted that 
his friends had persuaded him that “the more parte of the Iustices of the Peace as this 
day had neede of some helpe in writing for their better conduict in that office.”283  
There is also evidence that in some cases, justices and juries chose not to enforce laws 
that they deemed unfair.284       
Does a justice of the peace, then, do justice on behalf of the monarch, the 
subject, or “justice” itself?  If one is charged with doing justice, what is justice?  The 
very vagaries of the term itself were further complicated by the fact th t over the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the identity of those who were called to do justice
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was shifting.  Under the Tudors, knights who traditionally had been men of the sword 
took on judicial and administrative duties, serving as justices and members of 
Parliament.285  They were initially called to be justices because they had the might 
and the arms to enforce the law, not necessarily because they had any particular 
knowledge of it.286  But Mervyn James has argued that while the concept of honor 
remained important in early modern English politics, what he calls the “honour 
community” broadened to include not only warriors but lawyers, merchants, and 
officeholders.287  For James, there was a gradual shift from a community where honor 
meant “‘faithfulness’ to lords and friends” and which resorted to battle to resolve 
conflicts, to a community in which honor was expressed in civil service.288 
For both James and Arthur Ferguson, Sir Thomas Elyot’s The Boke of the 
Governor was instrumental in this “transvaluation,” according to which service 
previously understood in terms of chivalric values came to be understood in terms of 
commonwealth sentiments.289  While Elyot is concerned with the knight’s education, 
he emphasizes the importance of learning and wisdom as well as battle skills.290  
Defining the concept of justice is an important aspect of Elyot’s transvaluation.  In 
The Boke Named the Governor (1531), Elyot defines justice as “a wille perpetuall and 
constaunt, whiche gyveth to every man his right.”  It is so “necessary and expeient 
for the governour of a publike weale, that without it none other virtue maybe be 
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commendable.”291  For Elyot, “that whiche in latyne is called Fides, is a parte of 
justice….”292  Allowing that the terms faith, credence, trust, and loyalty are 
interchangeable for the same virtue, he explains that different relationships call for 
the use of the different terms.293  Faith is used to describe one’s relationship with 
God, while “from the subjecte or servaunt to the soverayne or maister it is proprely 
named fidelitie, and in a frenche terme loyaltie.”294  Elyot then laments the demise of 
this virtue, noting that it is “so neglected throughout christendome, that neither 
regarde of religion or honour, solemne othes or terrible cursis can cause hit to be 
observed.”295   
Elyot, then, uses the vocabulary of chivalry to describe the commonwealth, in 
particular the judicial system.  The demise of faith is problematic for the individual, 
but he also wonders, “O what publike weale shulde we hope to have there, where 
lacketh fidelitie?  Whiche as Tullie saieth is the foundation of justyce.”296  He exhorts 
his peers to be loyal to their sovereign, citing the example of David, who refused to 
assassinate Saul when he had the chance.297  Elyot also addresses “that parte of 
fidelitie, which concerneth the kepyinge of promise or covenauntes.”298  He laments 
the numbers of men breaking promises and taking oaths lightly, mentioning 
specifically the implications for the judicial system: 
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In judiciall causes, be they of never so light importunce, they that be no 
parties but straungers, I do meane witnesses and jurates, whiche shall procede 
in the trial, do make no lasse othe, but openly do renounce the helpe of God 
and his sayntes, and the benefite of his passion, if they say nat true, as ferre 
furthe as they knowe.  How evill that is observed, where the one partie in 
degree ferre exceed the other, or where hope of rewarde or affection taketh 
place, no man is ignoraunt sens it is every yere more commune harvist.  Alas 
what hope shall we have of any publike weale, where such a pestilence 
reigneth?299   
Elyot transvalues personal loyalty into the sorts of covenantal bonds that would 
provide a basis for institutions throughout the commonwealth. 
Markku Peltonen reads Elyot’s Boke of the Governour, as well as the works of 
other humanists such as Thomas Starkey, focusing on prevalent concerns regarding 
the monarch and the monarchy.  Even as they were redefining the subject’s role in the 
polity, these treatises were redefining and delimiting the monarch’s role. Peltonen 
observes that tracts of the 1570s and 1580s were printed amid disputes over 
Parliament’s place in advising the monarch, citing Peter Wentworth’s claim th t he 
spoke in Parliament not as a “‘private person’” but instead as “‘publique and a 
councellor to the whole.’”300  The same topics recur under Queen Elizabeth’s reign, 
when succession anxieties were mounting.  Two tracts published in England in the 
late 1590s advocate a mixed constitution.301  Both The Counsellor (1598), a 
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translation of a work by Laurentius Grimalius Goslicius, and Gasparo Contarini’s De 
Magistratibus et republica Venetorum (1599), as translated by Lewes Lewkenor, 
insist on the virtue of the vita activa.302  Goslicius, citing Cicero, theorizes that a 
perfect government “‘was governed by a king, a Senate, and consent of the 
people.’”303   
Upon King James’ accession to the throne, the role of the subject in public life 
again became a topic of debate.304  Absolutist claims elevated the monarch and, 
correspondingly, limited the subject’s role.305  As William Willymat argued in 1604, 
subjects were not to occupy themselves with public matters or office; they had “‘only 
each of them his owne private busines according as his owne place, function, and 
calling requireth.’”306  George Meriton, preaching before James, argued against the 
vita activa: “Yet to be a Mayor of a Towne or Citty, or a Iustice of Peace in the 
Countrey (I might goe higher) cannot sort so well with noble estate, as Priesthood 
may: heere-in may Nobles live, and devote them-selves unto Gods service without 
disparidgement.”307  Others, however, such as John Brinsley, who translated anew the 
first book of Cicero’s De officiis for publication in 1616, countered that “‘the life of 
those who apply themselves to government, for the good of the commonwealth, or to 
achive great maters: for the same, is more profitable to mankinde, and also more fit 
for attayning fame and honour.’”308 
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Brinsley joined a tradition of humanists who drew on classical republican 
thought to counter arguments against the subject’s participation in the polity.309  
Eager to reconcile the vita activa with the vita contemplativa, they deemed otium, 
learning, a useful tool for negotium, not an end in itself.310  As Gabriel Harvey 
observed, “‘all theory is puerile, without manly practice.’”311  Writers such as 
Thomas Baynes weighed the respective merits of the contemplative life and the active 
life, concluding that ultimately a man’s life was meant to be dedicated to “‘the only 
use and behoofe of his country.’”312  In turn, these accounts were connected to 
discussions of virtue and of nobility.  What it was that constituted or conferred 
nobility was disputed fervently.  While some, such as John Foord, argued that nobility 
descended from “‘ancient riches and vertue,’” others held that nobility required more 
than lineage and wealth.313  Thomas Rogers, for instance, contended in 1576 that 
“‘true is that sentence of Cicero, Noble men, except they be vigilant, honest, valiant, 
and mercifull (notwithstanding their byrth) must needes geve place unto them, which 
are adorned with those goodly vertues.’”314  True nobility consisted not only in the 
possession of these virtues but in their use for the benefit of the commonwealth, 
whether through military prowess or governing.315   
Tracts such as John Barston’s Safegarde of Societie (1576), Richard Beacon’s 
Solon his follie, and Henry Crosse’s Vertues Commonwealth (1603) emphasized the 
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importance of virtue in the service of a healthy commonwealth.316  In Vertues 
Commonwealth, Crosse emphasizes the “diligent education & training up [of] youth 
in discipline, wherby a universall good is attained; for this is the maine pillar that 
holdeth up & underprops the government, without which no Common-wealth could 
stand & peaceably continue.”317  He attributes the “flourishing state” of the Romans, 
Athenians, and “other dominions” to virtue, since “where Vertue is wanting in a 
generall government, that Common wealth is wholly overthrown.”318  Crosse 
specifies that virtue is associated with man: “The Stoikes, call Vice and Vertue, 
Animalia, living creatures, because by them a man is discerned, for in respect of 
Vertue, a man is said to be a man, which is the Eytmologie of the word, and in respect 
of Vice, to be a beast, because he wanteth those faculties, and demensions, onely 
proper to a vertuous and good man.”319     
Justice, one of the four cardinal virtues (temperance, prudence, justice, and 
fortitude) was a standard component of these discussions, if to varying degrees.  
Barston listed the cardinal virtues, but underscored virtue in general, observing that 
“‘all that may bee called honest, preceedeth from one of these foure.’”320  Crosse, like 
Barston, primarily discusses the general importance of virtue and vice.  But he does 
specify that “to prosecute my intent, which is to handle the morrall Vertues, and lay 
open the parts of humanitie, it wil not be amisse to touch by the way, the foure chiefe 
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and principall Vertues, called cardinall Vertues, as Prudence, Iustice, Fortitude, and 
Temperance….”321  Defining justice, he observes that  
Iustice, is a vertue that giveth to everyman his owne, the first and principall 
part whereof is, and ever was, to doo God that honour which is due to his 
divine maiestie, consisting in feare, love, & reverence, for as Iustice….will 
equally render to every man his owne, & bring discarding things to an 
equalitie, by considering the difference betweene them, so much more and 
most of all, it is most iust, to love God, of whom wee have all that we have, 
and being perished by originall corruption, were eftsoones recovered, by the 
suffereings of his son….322 
For Crosse, justice is a virtue that men have and it is also something that men do to 
restore right relations between men and with God.      
 Justice itself—what exactly it was, who was supposed to execute it, and how 
it was to be executed—remained a cause for concern decades after Elyot raised his 
reservations.  Some contemporary theorists defined justice in relation to equity and 
mercy.323  Others, like Barnabe Barnes, emphasized justice as one of the cardinal 
virtues needed for good governance.  Barnes’s Foure books of offices (1606) 
correlates the virtues with positions in the polity.  In his preface, Barnes clarifies that 
“by these foure are all blessed Monarchies, Kingdomes, Commonweales, and policies 
susteined, governed, directed and protected, that is by Temperance, Prudence, Iustice 
and Fortitude, shadowed as I said in the Treasurer, Counsellour, Iudge, and 
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Souldier….”324  In the book on justice, Barnes cites Cicero, declaring justice to be 
“Omnium virtutum domina & Regina: The Lady and Queene of all other vertues.”325  
He defines justice as “A perpetuall and assured will to give every man his due.  And 
derived as I suppose from Ius, which is right, tanquam Ius stans, & immobile, veliuris 
statio: As a sure, immoveable, or implanted right being the same in effect with the 
definitions of iustice.”326  Barnes elaborates by providing information related to 
jurisdiction, such as laws, edicts, and customs.   
Barnes subsequently devotes pages to describing the ideal judge, associating 
justicial virtue with this particular officeholder.  He argues that a judge needs gravity 
of mind, experience, and constancy, 
so that by the iustice of his heart, which ministreth wisedome and gravitie to 
his head; and by the severe and precise prudence of his head, which 
inblazoned in a stedfast countenance a stout maiestie withal; and by the 
comely grace of his countenance which admirably shadoweth all in a decent 
austeritie, there may be due reverence and feare drawene to the person of a 
Iudge on every side about him….327 
For Barnes, an effective judge must literally embody justice, “for if gravitie should 
not appeare in all his iudgements, then shall he be suspected of a partiall & foolish 
lentitude: which opinion (when it is once vulgarly conceived) will prejudice him 
either in his reputation, or in administration of the Lawes.”328  At the end of the book, 
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he lists those who have embodied these characteristics, including the writers of tracts 
on law such as Littleton, Fitzherbert and Plowdon, as well as notable judges, 
including Bacon, Bromley, Egerton , and Popham.329  Such men serve as examples 
for all others who have the responsibility of judging, since they have “taken great 
paines for the comfort and benefit of this Common-wealth….”330   
 For John Cowell, who is primarily concerned with asserting the monarch’s 
sovereignty, defining justice becomes a way to limit the officeholder’s power.  Justice 
is above all associated with the officeholder and with the officeholder’s relationship 
to the monarch: “Iustice (Iusticiarius) is a French word, and signifieth him, that is 
deputed by the king, to do right by way of iudgement.” 331  Citing Glanville, Cowell 
explains that the justice is called justice and not “Iudex” because “in auncient time the 
latine word for him was (Iusticia) and not (Iusticiarius)”; and, he says, he notes this 
in particular because “men of this function should hereby consider, that they are or 
ought to be, not (Iustis) in their iudgements, but in abstract (ipso iusticia). How be it I 
hould it well, if they performe their office in concreto.”  332  Cowell esteems justices 
less as judges and more as administrators bound to execute the orders of the monarch.  
He explains that “Another reason why they are called Iusticiarius with us and not 
Iudices, is, because they have their authority by deputation, as Delegates to the king, 
and not intro magistratus; and therefore cannot depute others in their steed.”333  In 
this respect, he differentiates between the justices and some other officeholders: “for 
the Chanceller, Marshall, Admirall, and such like are not called Iusticiarii but 
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Iudices.”334  For Cowell, the justice of the peace represents justice on earth, but only 
as the monarch’s deputy: “Iustices of peace (Iusticiarii ad pacem) are they that are 
appointed by the kinges commission, with others, to attend the peace in the County 
where they dwell….”335     
Hence, even as holding office offered the warrior class an alternative way to 
achieve virtue and honor in early modern England, it became a site of contest, as 
subjects by turns defended monarchical prerogative and defended against it.  
Meanwhile, chivalric values did not quite disappear.  While historians dispute the 
degree to which chivalry remained influential in Elizabethan and Jacobean England, 
they all acknowledge its values and vocabulary persisted.336  Men could still attain 
honor through military accomplishments.  In a 1606 sermon, George Meriton asserted 
that poor members of the nobility might “give them-selves unto Chevalry, and leade a 
martiall life: for it is a peece of happiness to a country, (if there can be happines in 
war) when as Captaines are gentlemen, and gentlemen Captaines.”337  For his part, Sir 
Robert Naunton categorized the Elizabethan “Servants of her State” according to their
roles as warriors or counselors.338  According to Naunton, men such as Sir Nicholas 
Bacon and Thomas Radcliff, Earl of Sussex were either togati or militia.339  William 
Cecil, Lord Burleigh, “this great Instrument of State,” Naunton ranked “amongst the 
Togati, for he had not to do with the sword, more then as the great pay-master, and 
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Contriver of the Warre, which shortly followed.”340  For his part, Thomas Radcliff, 
Earl of Sussex, “was indeed one of the Queens Martialists, and did very good service
in Ireland.” 341   
The early modern English nobility, then, might still be looking back to the 
most traditional model for secular service.342  Chivalry was historically connected 
with the aristocracy and with martial exercises.343  The term itself derives from the 
French chevalrie, indicating the equestrian skills that only the aristocracy could afford 
to attain.344  Its code emphasized valor and lineage over virtue.345  Its Elizabethan 
revival included pageants and tournaments in which the likes of Sir Philip Sidney and 
Robert Devereux, the second Earl of Essex, could simultaneously assert their loyalty 
to Elizabeth and their masculine independence.346  Literary works by Sidney and 
Edmund Spenser contributed to the glorification of the code of chivalry.347  The Earl 
of Essex, for his part, was so popular that in 1600, engravings were sold that depicted 
him on horseback, with lists of his honors and poetry praising him.348  His putative 
magnanimity, courage, courtesy, and prowess were all chivalric ideals.349  Charged 
with protecting their sovereign and poor subjects, knights were said to champion 
loyalty and justice.  Hence, brotherhoods or orders of knights, like the Order of the 
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Garter, encouraged loyalty to the sovereign.350  But this premium on loyalty was 
complemented by a commitment to justice.  The sword given to the knight Saladin in 
the Ordene de chevalerie has “two sharp edges … to remind the new knight that 
justice and loyalty must go together.”351  Serving justice and keeping the law were no 
less a knight’s responsibility than martial defense of the realm.   
But for some, the chivalric revival had deeper or darker undercurrents.  This 
community of honor obeyed its own law, above the laws of the land.352  While 
Naunton celebrates the achievements of Elizabeth’s militia, he also makes it clear that 
these men were driven by pride and desire for glory.  Elizabeth’s courtiers’ ambitions 
and rivalries were no secret.  Naunton remarks on favorites who slipped overseas 
“without licence…so predominant were their thoughts and hopes of honor growing in 
them….”353  He tells the story of Mountjoy, whom the Queen called home by 
messenger after he had “stoln away” to battle without her permission.354  The 
Elizabethan knight might “degenerate into the reckless arrogance of the miles 
gloriosus.”355  Richard McCoy argues that rechivalrization revealed tension between 
the nobility’s need to show their loyalty to the monarch and their desire to maintain 
their positions of power.  He cites Essex’s research into the powerful feudal offices o  
earl marshal and constable; according to custom, the constable could arrest the 
monarch.356  Essex, of course, is an extreme, but the chivalric revival could be 
subversive in other ways.  Nobles rejected James’s peace negotiations and headed off 
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to fight in European wars.357  The propensity for dueling that arose in the latter half of 
the sixteenth century was another expression of undisciplined noble ego.358  Dueling 
was “extralegal and potentially subversive of royal authority.”359  According to Roger 
Manning, dueling provided a means for the nobility to “regulate aristocratic st us” 
instead of the monarch.360  Ironically, those who criticized dueling invoked the code 
of chivalry, arguing that the nobility bore arms only to defend the realm and the weak 
and poor.361  But honor readily trumped justice.   
Justice, then, its place in the polity and its relation to, for instance, the code of 
chivalry, pertained to men both high and low in the commonwealth.  In The Merry 
Wives of Windsor, Every Man in His Humor, and The Downfall of Robert, Earl of 
Huntingdon, Shakespeare, Jonson, and Munday join the debate by focusing in 
particular on the justice of the peace’s office as a site for virtuous civic part i tion.  
George W. Keeton explains that in Merry Wives, Shakespeare “was intending to 
caricature justices in general, and more particularly, country justices.  These were 
stock figures of ridicule upon the Elizabethan stage, and they remained so for long 
afterwards.”362  But rather than accept that all dramatists were engaged in caricaturing 
bumbling or corrupt justices, whether specific individuals or the category as a whole,
I will argue that dramatists were engaged in a broader interrogation of what exactly 
the office of justice of the peace could represent.  As we have seen in chapter 1, by 
defining the justice’s duties and the foundation for his authority, the authors of the 
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officeholding manuals sought to delineate what it meant to “doe justice.”  But in 
doing so, they were also expanding the concept of the subject’s duty and of office.   
The dramatists, too, were exploring what it meant to do justice.  Spenser had 
of course already given England knights like Artegall, an embodiment of justice.  
When they juxtaposed officeholding with quasi-feudal and chivalric models of 
service, Munday, Shakespeare, and Jonson were also reacting to the Elizabethan ethos 
of service implicit in the revival of the chivalric code, complete with knights queting 
for personal honor and distributing justice by force, according to personal loyalties.  
The dramatists, however, put forward (if not quite center stage) the new paradigm of 
service that was officeholding.  And to this, they counterpose the values of the old 
honor community even as they point to its deleterious effects. 
Anthony Munday’s The Downfall of Robert, Earl of Huntingdon criticizes 
justice awarded according to loyalty.  Munday’s play has been considered primarily 
in terms of genre and its relationship to the Robin Hood legend; it stands out in part 
due to Munday’s elevation of Robin Hood from yeoman to the Earl of Huntington.363  
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I believe that this gentrification is significant partly due to the merging of two 
traditions that were not typically combined.  Maurice Keen notes that “the champion 
of chivalry and the outlaw never met face to face in medieval story, though they 
adventured in the same forests.”364  Gentrifying Robin places him and the other 
characters in a quasi-feudal chivalric relationship; King Richard replaces King Arthur 
as the king to whom loyalty is owed.  Munday also incorporates the corrupt officials 
of the outlaw ballads.365  While his Justice Warman is a somewhat marginal 
character, he plays a key role in that he colludes with the Prior of York to outlaw 
Robert, Earl of Huntington (who then assumes the identity of Robin Hood).  Warman 
does not remain a justice for long; for his “good will and furtherance” (145) in these 
matters, he is rewarded with a bribe, and he is eventually made a sheriff.366  This 
promotion reflects the power dynamics of local officeholders in medieval times; the 
sheriff was more powerful than the justice.367  But the promotion also reflects a heavy 
investment in personal loyalty and its association with justice, or doing justice.  
Throughout the play, characters are rewarded for their loyalty to, or, conversely, 
criticized for their betrayal of, each other.  Justice is subsumed under loyalty. 
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Munday’s characters focus on loyalty and betrayal as much as right and wrong 
or justice and injustice.  After the news that he has been outlawed reaches him at his 
dinner-party, Huntington expresses his disappointment in Warman: 
You from a paltry pen and inkhorn Clarke,  
Bearing a buckram satchell at your belt,  
Unto a Justice place I did preferre, 
Where you did uniustly have my tenants rackt, 
Wasted my treasure, and increast your store. 
       (348-52) 
Warman’s betrayal of Huntington stings as much as his unjust treatment of 
Huntington’s tenants.  Others reproach Warman similarly for his actions.  Little John 
asks him “Is it thy part, thou screenfac’t snotty nose, / To hinder him that gave thee 
all thou hast?” (455-56).  When Warman himself is later banished, his cousin refuses 
to help him, stating that not only is he fearful of being punished for aiding Warman, 
but “your trecheries I hate…. So wolfe-like you pursued / [Huntington] and his 
servants” (2276-82).  His cousin emphasizes the significance of betrayal by equating 
it with blasphemy: “vile ingratitude, / Damnd Judaisme, false wrong, abhorred 
trechery, / Impious wickedesse, wicked impietie” (2282-84).  Warman next sees the 
Jayler, and hopes for help from him, since the Jayler “yesterday / Was at my service 
… / And him I made Jayler of Notingham” (22993-95).  But the Jayler also refuses 
aid, primarily on the grounds that “Warman was a traitor to his Lord” (2315).368  Like 
Huntington himself, the Jayler calls him Judas and asserts that he has “undoone / the 
honourable Robert, Earle of Huntington” (2321-22).     
                                                




Warman is deserving of reprimand, given Huntington’s honorable status and 
Warman’s close relationship to him.  But he is not the only character represented in 
terms of loyalty and betrayal.  Huntington condemns all his guests at the initial 
dinner-party, surmising that they have been bribed, “to be my guests, my faithlesse 
guestes this day, / That your kinde hoste you trothlesse might betray” (364-65).  
Leicester reproaches Prince John later in the play for his lack of loyalty to Richard, 
contrasting him with the “prophane men, following Mahomet” against whom they 
crusaded: “But if ye note, they did their kings their right, / [Unlike] these more than 
heathen, sacrilegious men, / [Who] professing Christ, banish Christs champion hence, 
/ Their lawfull Lord…” (1960-64).   Both Ely and Fitzwater are exiled on trumped up 
charges of treachery.  Prince John sends Ely to Nottingham, decreeing “There as a 
traitor let him be close kept, / And to his triall wee will follow straight” (1154-5 ).  
After scuffling with Prince John over this unjust treatment of Ely, Fitzwater, having 
been deemed a “traitrous wretch” (1230) by the queen, is banished.  Whether accurate 
or not, evaluations of right and wrong, just and unjust behavior are couched in terms 
of loyalty and betrayal.  
 The restoration of justice, enacted at the end with the arrival of the king, is 
equally dependent upon the bonds of loyalty.  Maurice Keen notes that in the 
medieval outlaw ballads, the king is the d us ex machina who arrives on the scene to 
right wrongs.369  While at the end of Munday’s play, King Richard does dispense 
justice, for him this means restoring bonds of loyalty and depending on Huntington.  
Established as a loyal servant of King Richard, Huntington explains that “I would n t 
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for the wide worlds wealth / Incense his Maiestie: but doe my best, / To mitigate his 
wrath, if he be mov’d” (ll. 2642-44).  Richard recognizes this loyalty: “Thanks all, but 
chiefely, Huntington, to thee….True piller of my state” (ll.2705-09).  While Richard 
says he is “sad to see thee so” (l.2712), before he can even begin to rectify matters, 
Huntington urges him to accept certain gifts he has for Richard (l.2719-20).  These 
gifts turn out to be Richard’s own subjects, Fitzwater, Lester, Richmond, and Prince
John, whom Huntington presents as jewels, championing them for their good and 
loyal deeds.  He notes that Lester and Richmond are both “Christes sworne 
champions, / That follow’d Richard in his holy warre” (ll.2734-35).  Although 
Huntington recognizes Prince John’s betrayal, he also assures Richard that “he is now 
no more the man he was, / But duetifull in all respects to you” (ll. 2760-61).  Richard 
acts on Huntington’s recommendation: “Wel good Huntington, / For thy sake 
pardon’d is our brother Iohn, / And welcome to us in all heartie love” (ll. 2763-65).  
Justice here means reconciliation with the king; while it encompasses forgiveness, it 
is contingent upon loyalty or duty to the monarch.  
 Such justice is extended from the Earl even to his former steward.  Warman is 
presumably included in the play’s final reconciliation between monarch and subjects, 
since earlier he had been reconciled with Huntington.  After being exiled, Warman 
wanders the forest, eventually concluding that he must hang himself, since “As Iudas 
did, so I intend to doe / For I have done already as he did: his master he betraid: so I 
have mine” (ll.2407-09).  But the forgiving Fitzwater and Marian are determined to 
stop him, and they find Robin Hood, who urges Warman to “Cast from thy necke that 




favour as thou ever didst” (ll. 2474-76).  Ely reassures Warman of Robin Hood’s 
fidelity: “Warman, be comforted, rise and amend. / On my word Robin Hoode will be 
thy friend” (ll.2479-80).  Nonetheless the play’s comic reconciliations are 
undermined in the end.  Skelton and Sir John Eltham discuss the “matters tragicall” 
that the king can expect to see (ll.2788).  They plan a sequel in order to recount 
“many a sad accident” (ll. 2790), including “the death of Robin, and his murderers” 
(ll.2825).  Loyalty in and of itself is not a bad quality, but as Munday recognizes, 
substituting loyalty for judgment impedes justice.   
In The Merry Wives of Windsor, Shakespeare is also concerned with how and 
how not to do justice.  His comedy opens with Justice Robert Shallow’s pursuit of 
Falstaff, who has, according to Shallow, “beaten my men, killed my deer and broke 
open my lodge” (1.1.104-05).370  Shallow aims to play the part of the d us ex 
machina, dispensing the king’s justice.  However, when the characters reunite on 
stage for the comedic resolution, Shallow is absent.  Scholars have noted the way in 
which the play fails to follow up on Shallow’s dispute with Falstaff, calling it an 
“inconsistency” or “loose end.”371  Why, we are left wondering, does Justice Shallow 
disappear; indeed, why is he present at the start?  Scholars have argued that 
Shakespeare is concerned with how communities provide social justice instead of 
resorting to legal justice.372  If so, he also provides insight into how systems of justice 
fail, and reveals his apprehension about the contemporary Elizabethan 
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rechivalrization.  Shallow is an inept justice, but not just because he is shallow.  
Rosemary Kegl has argued that Shallow fails in his office because he cannot
negotiate the justice’s “dual alliance” to both his local community and the central 
government.373  I will argue that Shallow is an ineffective justice because he thinks of 
office in chivalric terms.  Eager to be a knight, Shallow conducts himself as a justice 
according to the ethos of chivalry.  Because he is primarily concerned with personal 
honor, he prefers to handle justice by the sword.   
In the opening scene, Shakespeare highlights the distinct political identities of 
Shallow and Falstaff, and the revisions made to the play amplify these distinctions.374  
While Q 1602 and F 1623 both begin with Shallow threatening to take his complaints 
to the Star Chamber, F 1623 adds about 25 lines that emphasize Shallow’s status as a 
justice of the peace.375  “In the County of Gloucester,” Shallow is the “Justice of the 
Peace and Coram” (1.1.3-5).  Not only that, but he is “Cust-a-lorum,” according to 
Shallow, and “Rato lorum, too,” according to Slender (1.1.6-7).  These quibbles 
identify Shallow as an important justice; as a member of the “coram,” or quorum, 
Shallow has the prestige to constitute the bench.  As “Cust-a-lorum” and “Rato 
lorum,” or custos rotulorum, Shallow is his county’s keeper of the rolls, a judge of 
record.376  Meanwhile, Falstaff is identified as a (somewhat degenerate) knight.  
There is no doubt that Shakespeare aims to distinguish between Shallow and 
Falstaff’s socio-political status.    
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Although Shakespeare painstakingly alludes to Shallow’s institutional 
authority in the beginning, Shallow neither dispenses justice nor keeps the peace.  
Entitled a justice of the peace, he is associated throughout the play with knighthood 
and chivalry.  Shallow claims nobility by virtue of his lineage, emphasizing his coat 
of arms rather than his service to the commonwealth.  He initially identifies himself 
as “Robert Shallow esquire” (1.1.3); and Slender declares that Shallow is “a 
gentleman born, master parson, who writes himself Armigero, in any bill, warrant, 
quittance, or obligation” (1.1.7-9).   Shallow concurs, asserting that he has “done [so] 
any time these three hundred years” (1.1.10-11).  As Kegl points out, in declaring that 
he is “Armigero,” or armigerous, Shallow proudly places his family’s heritage in the 
context of service to knights.377  Slender continues in this vein, saying that Shallow’s 
family “may give the dozen white luces in their coat,” and Shallow affirms that “it is 
an old coat” (1.1.14-15).  Rather than asserting Shallow’s expertise in legal matters, 
as Slender’s mention of “any bill, warrant, quittance, or obligation” might suggest, 
they focus on his coat of arms.  In noting that Shallow’s family may have up to 
twelve luces, or pike-fish, on their coat of arms, Slender is not only asserting 
Shallow’s nobility, he demonstrates his knowledge—or perhaps his pretense to 
knowledge—of heraldry. 
Shallow’s very complaint should further establish his authority as a justice of 
the peace, as he acts on behalf of not only his own interests but also upholding laws 
that protected the monarch’s interests.  As Jeffrey Theis has noted, Falstaff is guilty 
of poaching.378  And as Theis notes, Shallow threatens to take Falstaff before the 
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“Council,” presumably the Privy Council in Star Chamber, on the grounds that “it is a 
riot” (1.1.31).379  Shallow would be able to prosecute Falstaff’s offense before Star 
Chamber as a riot because poachers usually hunted in groups, and groups of more 
than three persons could be considered a riot.380  As Roger Manning notes, subversive 
subjects were said to use hunting parties to cloak insurrection (hence, more restrictive 
game laws were typically enacted after popular rebellions).381  In another way as well, 
Shallow’s complaint ought to establish his authority as a justice, that is, as the 
representative of the monarch’s interests.  Forest and game laws in medieval and 
early modern England established boundaries for royal and private deer parks; they 
also regulated who was allowed to hunt.382  In establishing these boundaries, 
monarchs asserted both dominion and prerogative, affirming royal jurisdiction over 
both property and social behavior.383   
Of course, what we in fact see is that Shallow prosecutes his complaint 
according to chivalric traditions.  He enters in a combative mood, asserting that he 
will best Falstaff: “If he were twenty Sir John Falstaffs, he shall not abuse Robert 
Shallow esquire” (1.1.2-3).  When Page indicates that Falstaff has confessed, Shallow 
is not satisfied: “If it be confessed, it is not redressed….He hath wronged me, indeed 
he hath…Believe me: Robert Shallow saith he is wronged” (1.1.96-100).  Shallow is 
busy trying to right wrongs; Falstaff, however, is thinking about the law.  By 
confessing, he reduces the charge from a felony to a misdemeanor, automatically 
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reducing the punishment.384  Having heard Falstaff’s confession, Shallow initially 
insists that the case be taken to higher authorities: “The Council shall know this” 
(1.1.110).  Falstaff recommends instead that Shallow keep the incident “in counsel; 
[otherwise] you’ll be laughed at” (1.1.111-12).  Falstaff shrewdly recognizes that 
Shallow’s reputation is worth more to him than a judgment from the Privy Council.  
Unsurprisingly, Shallow desists, apparently more concerned about maintaining his 
status than performing the duties of office.    
That Shallow wants to settle matters by the sword (“ha, o’my life, if I were 
young again, the sword should end it”—1.1.36-37) is appropriate given that poaching 
and raids on hunting lodges were often interpreted as challenges to a duel.385  Shallow 
is also one of the main participants in the jest involving Evans and Caius, 
encouraging them to duel.  His exchange with the two of them further reveals 
Shallow’s ambivalent relationship to his office and his preference for the role of a 
knight.  When Caius complains that Evans has yet to show up, Shallow points out to 
Caius that this is not a bad thing: “He is the wiser man, Master Doctor:  he is a curer 
of souls and you a curer of bodies.  If you should fight, you go against the hair of 
your professions.  Is it not true, Master Page?” (2.3.34-37).  Page, however, reminds 
Shallow that he himself has “been a great fighter, though now a man of peace” 
(2.3.38-39).  Shallow confesses to Page that he still longs to fight at times: 
“Bodykins, Master Page, though I now be old, and of the peace, if I see a sword out, 
my finger itches to make one.  Though we are justices and doctors and churchmen, 
Master Page, we have some salt of our youth in us—we are the sons of women, 
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Master Page” (2.3.40-44).  Constrained by his office, Shallow would rather be an 
Essex or a Sidney.  The Host of the inn picks up on this, nicknaming him “Cavaliero 
Justice” (2.1.176, 180).386 
 While on the one hand, the jest is only a practical joke, and all in fun, on the 
other hand, Shakespeare indicates the potentially serious repercussions of neglecting 
or exploiting one’s duty to the commonweal.  Although Shallow at one point appears 
to try to stop the duel, telling Caius “I am come to fetch you home.  I am sworn of the 
peace…. You must go with me, Master Doctor” (2.3.47-51), this is only part of the 
ruse, setting up a believable situation for Caius.  Shallow is entertained throughout 
the plot, pleased even with the Host’s resolution:  “Afore God, a mad host.  Follow, 
gentlemen, follow” (3.1.101-02).  When the Host invites them to continue the 
entertainment with a drink, however, Caius and Evans reveal that they do not 
appreciate being the butt of a community joke.  Evans proposes that they “knog our 
prains together to be revenge on this same scall, scurvy, cogging companion, the host 
of the Garter” (3.1.107-09).  While it was just a joke, abuse of the charge to keep the 
peace has led to a resolve for revenge—for the satisfaction of private desire over the 
public weal—which eventually is associated with the theft of the Host’s horses 
(3.3.222-6, 4.5.78-86), a crime punishable by death.387   
Similarly, as Kegl notes, Shallow’s failure to prosecute Falstaff allows 
Falstaff to threaten the common peace of Windsor.388  Moreover, Shallow’s own 
efforts to arrange a marriage between Slender and Anne Page mirror Falstaff’s 
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attempts to profit from the wives of Windsor.  While he asks Slender how he feels 
about Anne, Shallow ignores Slender’s confession that he does not “affection the 
‘oman” (1.1.211).  Slender, for his part, will do as Shallow asks, since “he’s a Justice 
of Peace in his country” (1.1.202).  He will “marry [Anne], sir, at your request” 
(1.1.229).  Just as Falstaff misinterprets the wives’ words and gestures, Shallow 
interprets the words of Slender to suit his own will, assuming that Slender “meant 
well” (1.1.239).  Shallow may exit the play because he has succeeded in his quest to 
become a knight, but for the play’s purposes that slot has already been filled.  We 
might say that Shallow is absorbed into Falstaff.              
 The masque-like punishment of Falstaff further reveals Shakespeare’s 
apprehensions about the influence of chivalry on Elizabethan culture.389  Scholars 
have argued that the wives effect justice in the play, arranging the charade that 
eventually leads to Falstaff’s undoing.390  But almost all the members of the 
community are involved in Falstaff’s last trial.  What is more important is that the 
masque itself parodies English traditions, mimicking customary English methods of 
apprehending criminals and of finding evidence of guilt.  It depicts a hue and cry, a 
searching of a suspected criminal’s house.  Quickly, as the Queen of Fairies, order  
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the other fairies to “attend your office and your quality” (5.5.39-40) in the castle, nd 
they respond by searching for domestic crime:  “Cricket, to Windsor chimneys shalt 
thou leap: / Where fires thou find’st unraked and hearths unswept, / There pinch the 
maids as blue as bilberry – / Our radiant queen hates sluts and sluttery” (5.5.43-46).  
But Cynthia Herrup describes the hue and cry as a declining practice, one that was 
being replaced by the issuing of a formal warrant.  She notes that responsibility was 
shifting from the community to the officeholder.391  Shallow, complicit in the masque 
through his encouragement of Slender, evades his responsibility as an officeholder.    
   When he invokes the Knights of the Garter, Shakespeare appears to salute this 
honorary order and its head, Queen Elizabeth.  Frances Yates notes that under 
Elizabeth, the Order “had been made a vehicle for the glorification of the national 
monarchy established by the Tudors.”392  Peter Erickson argues that “as a pastoral 
environment, Windsor provides a green world for the masque celebrating the Garter 
ideal of aristocratic chivalry.”393  He finds that the chivalric Order’s emphasis on 
unifying aristocratic classes dovetails with the play’s emphasis on unity in the 
community, affirming the hierarchy of class.394  But Shakespeare undermines the 
tribute by associating the Order with disorder in the Queen’s palace.  Quickly orders 
the fairies to “scour / With juice of balm and every precious flower” the “several 
chairs of Order” (5.5.61-62).  The fairies, like the Knights of the Order, are cast as 
keepers of order and keepers of custom:  “And nightly, meadow-fairies, look you 
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sing, / Like to the Garter compass, in a ring” (5.5.65-66).  But it is also suggested tha  
this is merely ornamental or decorative:  
 And Honi soit qui mal y pense write 
 In em’rald tufts, flowers purple, blue and white, 
 Like sapphire, pearl and rich embroidery, 
 Buckled below fair knighthood’s bending knee: 
 Fairies use flowers for their charactery. 
       (5.5.69-73) 
Finally, Quickly orders the “ordeal by fire” once the fairies recognize the human in 
their midst:   
With trial fire touch me his finger end:  
If he be chaste, the flame will back descend  
And turn him to no pain; but if he start,  
It is the flesh of a corrupted heart. 
 (5.584-87).   
Shakespeare parodies archaic ways of testing a suspect’s guilt.  Rather than 
celebrating the Order of the Garter and the Queen, Shakespeare mocks the early 
modern English esteem for chivalry as a regressive force in the quest for jusice.    
In Every Man In His Humor, Ben Jonson, too, considers the relations among 
chivalry, the justice’s office, and justice itself.  Since both Merry Wives and Every 
Man In feature jealous husbands and young lovers who use trickery to arrange a 




For many, Jonson and Shakespeare were both writing comedies of humor.395  Be that 
as it may be, both plays unmistakably align chivalry with officeholding.  Like 
Falstaff, Captain Bobadill is a descendent of the mil s gloriosus tradition,396 a 
caricature of the Elizabethan militia.  Justice Shallow could arguably also fit into this 
tradition.  Jonson’s Justice Clement, it must be said, does not; although he has his 
moment when he turns to the sword.  Either way, in the last scene of the play, he is 
the key to the restoration of order.  The turn to the law in the person of Justice 
Clement contrasts sharply with the play’s beginning, when characters are concerned 
primarily with establishing their gentility.  In Every Man In, chivalry yields to civic 
officeholding and justice and reconciliation are finally effected through the 
officeholder; however, Jonson challenges not only contemporary theories of justice
but of governance as well.  We might keep in mind the two ways of relating virtue to 
governance elucidated by Quentin Skinner: that the virtue of governors is preeminent 
and that institutions able to withstand corruption are key to successful governance.397  
Skeptical of relying on virtuous men, Jonson points instead to the institutional nature 
of office as the most promising avenue for effecting justice.  
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Like Merry Wives, Jonson’s play underwent significant revisions.  Although 
we cannot be certain of exactly when these revisions occurred, and although they 
certainly served different purposes, the revisions underscore Jonson’s interest i th  
English justice of the peace.398  When Jonson changed the play’s setting from Italy to 
England, he also changed the title of the primary agent of peace and comedy in the 
play—Clement’s.  In the Q version, characters address Clement as “Master Doc o ” 
(3.3.98; 3.3.105-06; 3.3.113); when Lorenzo, Jr. asks about “Doctor Clement” 
(3.2.42), Prospero responds “He is the gonfaloniere of the state here, an excellent rare 
civilian, and a great scholar” (3.2.44-45).399  Q’s Clement is a “Doctor,” a Florentine 
civil lawyer and a magistrate.  In F’s London, Clement “is a city magistr te, a justice 
here, an excellent good lawyer and a great scholar” (3.2.251-52).  Now a member of 
the local bureaucracy with a background in common law, Clement is charged with 
“keeping the king’s peace.” 
Before introducing Clement, however, Jonson introduces the indisputable 
target of his satire.  As J.W. Lever notes, Jonson relentlessly mocks social 
climbers.400  Captain Bobadill and other characters are obsessed with their status as 
gentlemen.  Through these characters, Jonson denigrates superficial claims to 
nobility.  Stephen is preoccupied with learning about hunting and hawking, since a 
man “is for no gallant’s company without’em” (1.1.43-44).  Bobadill, in turn, is 
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reluctant to let others know that he lodges with Cob, a lowly water-carrier; his instinct 
that others’ perception of him will suffer is validated by Matthew’s reaction.  
Matthew is shocked that “a gentleman of [Bobadill’s] havings,” would lodge with 
Cob (1.3.55).  Cob himself is obsessed with lineage; he asserts to Matthew that he 
comes from “an ancient lineage, and a princely.  Mine ance’try came from a king’s 
belly, no worse man; and yet no man neither…but Herring, the King of fish—from 
his belly I proceed—one o’ the monarchs o’the world, I assure you” (1.3.9-13).  Cob 
knows of his pedigree from “the harrots’ books” (1.3.15).  If one cannot afford the 
lodgings of a gentleman or cannot brag about his family’s mention in the books of 
heraldry, he can at least look the part.  When Matthew praises Bobadill’s boot, 
Bobadill acknowledges the compliment, replying that “it’s the fashion gentlemen now 
use” (1.3.159).  While Bobadill and the other characters believe they are establishing 
their honorable nature, they merely confirm that they are deluded by the trappings of 
gentility. 
Matthew and Stephen are harmless gulls.  Captain Bobadill, as a farcical 
version of the Elizabethan knights, is also without bite; but his very lack of substance 
enables Jonson to establish the chivalric code’s shallowness.  As Leonard F. Dean 
puts it, Bobadill’s words and actions are “part of a self-confident and self-delude 
duet between the expository fantasy of the military planner and the equally mad 
remnants of chivalry.”401  He presents himself to others as an accomplished member 
of the militia, but he is consumed with appearances.  He is what some of Jonson’s 
contempories would have termed a “carpet knight.”402  When Matthew reports that 
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Downright has threatened to “cudgel” Matthew, Bobadill is outraged, declaring that 
“an’t were my case now, I should send him a ch rtel [challenge] presently” (1.3.189-
90).  Imagining himself an expert on fencing, he coaches Matthew.  Bodadill is 
particularly concerned with appearances, and he instructs Matthew to “twine your 
body more about, that you may fall to a more sweet, comely, gentlemanlike guard”
(1.3.210-11).  Bobadill flaunts his knowledge of dueling vocabulary:  “The best-
practic’d gallants of the time name it the passada; a most desperate thrust, believe it!” 
(1.3.222-23).  When recounting his valor in battle, Bobadill compares his own sword 
to those of famous knights: “[The blade] is the most fortunate weapon that ever rid on 
poor gentleman’s thigh: shall I tell you, sir? You talk of Morglay, Excalibur, 
Durindana or so.  Tut, I lend no credit to that is fabled of ‘em; I know the virtue of 
mine own, and therefore I dare the boldlier maintain it” (3.1.140-44).  While Matthew 
and Stephen are impressed, Edward is dubious, wondering “But was it possible?” 
(3.1.122) and whether Bobadill could do “all this, Captain, without hurting your 
blade?” (3.1.137-38).   
For Bobadill, force is the way to resolve personal conflict; he assumes 
Matthew will duel with Downright.  He also promises to demonstrate his loyalty to 
Queen and country through arms.  He explains how he would “undertake, upon this 
poor head and life, for the public benefit of the state, not only to spare the entire lives 
of her subjects, in general, but to save the one half, nay, three parts of her yearly 
charge in holding war, and against what enemy soever” (4.5.62-66).   He envisions 
training nineteen other men with his expertise in fencing; they “would come into the 




enemy; they could not, in their honor, refuse us.  Well, we would kill them; challenge 
twenty more, kill them….” (4.5.75-79).   Of course, this scheme has never been put to 
the test, but only, according to Bobadill, because he remains unknown to the Queen 
(4.5.59-61).  Not that his lack of recognition keeps him from persistently equating 
civil service and manhood with battle: “And this will I venture my poor 
gentlemanlike carcase to perform—provided there be no treason practic’d upon us—
by fair and discreet manhood; that is, civilly, by the sword” (4.5.86-87). 
This great pretender to gentilesse, this valiant soldier, turns out to be a 
pseudo-knight who pays only lip-service to chivalric ideals.  Immediately after he 
boasts that he would fearlessly serve his Queen and his country, he claims he is ready
to confront Downright (4.5.93-95).  However, when Downright challenges him, 
Bobadill takes refuge in exemption under the law.  He informs Downright that “I 
never thought on it till now: body of me, I had a warrant of the peace served on me 
even now, as I came along, by a water-bearer” (4.5.113-15).  When Downright 
thrashes him, Bobadill tries to justify his refusal to fight by declaring that leg lly he 
could not fight:  “Well, gentlemen, bear witness, I was bound to the peace, by this 
good day” (4.5.122-23).  But Ed Kno’well refuses to let him cloak his cowardliness: 
“No, faith, it’s an ill day, Captain; never reckon it other. But, say you were bound to 
the peace, the law allows you to defend yourself:  that’ll prove but a poor excuse” 
(4.5.124-26).  Bobadill’s turn to a rhetoric of law to justify himself exposes the 
emptiness of the rhetoric of chivalry.         
Perhaps instead of being considered a pretender to gentilesse, Bobadill should 




will say.  Bobadill claims that they will consider it to be “a kind of gross battery us’d, 
laid on strongly, borne most patiently; and that’s all” (4.7.6-7).  Matthew won’t let go 
of the subject, wondering “would any man have offer’d it in Venice, as you say?” 
(4.7.8).  Since in Q, the comparison is between Venice and Florence, F’s revisions 
suggest that the elegy for nobility and gentility that Bobadill utters is specific to 
London:  “Tut, I assure you, no:  you shall have there your Nobilis, your Gentilezza, 
come in bravely upon your reverse, stand you close, stand you firm, stand you 
fair….thrust with brave steel, defy your base wood!  But wherefore do I awake this 
remembrance?  I was fascinated, by Jupiter, fascinated; but I will be unwitch’d, and 
reveng’d by law” (4.7.9-15).  While “Gentilezza” may be alive and well in Venice, it 
is merely a “remembrance” in England.  Chivalric ideals no longer pertain; as 
Matthew aptly asks, “Is’t not best to get a warrant, and have him arrested and brought 
before Justice Clement?” (4.7.16-17).           
 The warrant exposes the empty promises of chivalry.  As Russ McDonald and 
Jonas Barish have noted, Matthew and Stephen are most impressed by Bobadill’s 
oaths.403  When Stephen listens to Bobadill recount his adventures, he laments in an 
aside that he “had as lief as an angel I could swear as well as that gentleman” 
(3.1.114-15).  But while both McDonald and Barish have considered Bobadill’s oaths 
in light of his linguistic extravagance, they can also be considered in terms of the 
“mad remnants” of chivalry.  Bobadill often swears by his status as a soldier an  as a 
gentleman; in conversation with Matthew, he swears “by the heart of valor in me” 
(1.3.124), “as I am a gentleman” (1.3.135), and “as I am a gentleman and a soldier” 
(1.3.172-73).  He also swears by the patron saint of English chivalry: “by Saint 
                                                




George” (1.3.170; 3.1.118).404  As Maurice Keen has shown, taking vows became a 
ritual of chivalry; knights swore to perform great feats in tournaments or in battle and 
to honor their ladies.405  The vows were not just ceremonial; a common device used to 
represent a knight’s vow was a prisoner’s chain, an emblem of the binding promise 
the knight had made.406  Bobadill’s swearing is a corruption of a knight’s vow.  For 
Sir Thomas Elyot, oaths had become empty:  “Alas what hope shall we have of any 
publike weale, where such a pestilence reigneth?  Dothe nat Saloman saye: Aman 
moche sweringe shall be filled with iniquitie, and the plage shall nat departe from his 
house?  O mercifull God, howe many men be in this realme, which be horrible 
swerers, and commune jurates perjured?”407  He laments that promises are made 
lightheartedly: “And amonge christen men it is so neglected: that hit is more often 
tymes broken than kept.”408  While the gulls are impressed with Bobadill’s swearing, 
his oaths really represent the superficiality of his commitment.  He, like the other 
characters, must turn to a warrant to guarantee justice. 
In Bobadill, Jonson depicts the emptiness of justice dependent upon force and 
superficial appearances.  Justice Clement represents an alternative.  Whil  Lever calls 
him a “random deus ex machina,” appearing at the end to judge the other characters’ 
actions, his arrival is not the least bit random.409  Characters are always either heading 
to Justice Clement’s house or sending someone there.  Whatever the geographical 
center of the city might be, in terms of the action of the play, Clement’s house, and 
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Clement himself, are crucial.  It makes sense, then, that in the last act, every character 
assembles to await justice at his house.  After all, here is a man who displays good 
judgment, wit, and mercy.410  And yet, even with regard to Clement, Jonson betrays 
ambivalence: it is not simply the man, but his office and its procedures that explain 
his effectiveness.   
Jonson starkly contrasts Bobadill and Clement when they meet late in the 
play.  On the one hand, this scene indicates Clement’s courage, suggesting that 
justices had something to learn from chivalry.  On the other hand, the scene suggests 
that Clement is not always as forgiving as his name would suggest.   When his 
servant announces that a soldier wishes to speak with him, Clement is alarmed: “A 
soldier?  Take down my armor, my sword, quickly.  A soldier speak with me!  Why, 
when, knaves?  Come on, come on, hold my cap there, so; give me my gorget, my 
sword; stand by, I will end your matters anon” (5.1.43-47).  But as soon as Bobadill 
complains that he has been “uncivilly wrong’d and beaten,” (5.1.55), which Bobadill 
finds particularly egregious since he is “a man in no sort given to this filthy humour 
of quarreling” (5.1.57), Clement realizes that he need not be worried.  He mocks 
Bobadill: “Is this the soldier?  Here, take my armor off quickly, ‘twill make him
swoon, I fear; he is not fit to look on’t, that will put up a blow” (5.1.62-64).  Unlike 
Bobadill, Clement fearlessly faces danger.  But mercy does not necessarily 
accompany this courage.  Clement exiles Bobadill at the end of the play, since 
Bobadill is only a “sign o’ the soldier” and “so false” (5.1.241-42).  He leaves 
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Bobadill with only the prayer that “we may be so merry within as to forgive or forget 
you when we come out” (5.1.245-47). 
Clement’s judgment, courage, and wit do enable him to serve justice better 
than others, but this does not make him an ideal.  Whereas many of the play’s 
characters, including Bobadill, are easily gulled, Clement is quick to recognize that 
mischief is afoot.  The English justice was charged with hearing evidence and 
assessing character, so Clement begins his interrogation.411  When Dame Kitely 
informs him that “my brother Wellbred told me that Cob’s house was a suspected 
place” (5.1.16-17), Clement wryly responds, “So it appears, methinks” (5.1.18).  
After hearing a bit more of Wellbred’s involvement in the matter, Clement quickly 
concludes that “this is a mere trick, a device; you are gull’d in this most gr sly, all” 
(5.1.32-33).  Clement’s astuteness and concern for all is in contrast to other 
characters’ self-centeredness; seeing that Tib, Cob’s wife, was beaten unfairly, he 
sympathizes with her:  “Alas, poor wench, wert thou beaten for this?” (5.1.33-34).  
Nevertheless, this “ excellent good lawyer and a great scholar” (3.2.252) can be 
capricious.  Ned remarks that “they say he will commit a man for taking the wall of 
his horse” (3.2.258-59), and Wellbred rejoins with “ay, or wearing his cloak of one 
shoulder, or serving of God; anything indeed, if it come in the way of his humour” 
(3.2.260-61).         
It is Clement’s warrant, more than his humour or his virtue, that distinguishes 
his office.  As has been noted, Bobadill turns to the warrant as the most effective way 
to get justice.  Angry with Bobadill for beating him, Cob, too, seeks out Clement.  He 
tells Clement that he is a “poor neighbor” of Clement’s, “come to crave the peacof 
                                                




your worship” (3.3.62-73).  Cob’s request establishes Clement as the purveyor of 
local justice, but it also suggests the need for precision in language and legal 
procedure.  Clement merrily responds:  “Of me, knave?  Peace of me, knave?  Did I 
e’er hurt thee? Or threaten thee?  Or wrong thee, ha?” (3.3.74-75).  Cob then clarifies
that he wants “your worship’s warrant for one that has wrong’d me, sir” (3.3.76-77).  
A subsequent scene highlights the importance of the warrant itself, the actual piece of 
paper with writing on it.  Cob has returned home and gloats to his wife Tib that he 
will now be able to get even with Captain Bobadill.  He emphasizes the material 
aspect of the warrant:  “I have it here in black and white, for his black and blue: shall 
pay him” (4.2.17-18).  Cob is actually ambivalent about Clement himself; he 
appreciates Clement’s actions, calling him the “The honestest old brave Trojan in 
London!” and noting that he does “honor the very flea of his dog” (4.2.19-20).  But 
he also wishes a “plague on him” since Clement’s jests “put me once in a villainous 
filthy fear” (4.2.20-21).  Although Cob has reservations about the officeholder, he 
trusts the warrant itself, believing in the procedures that the office authorizes. 
Even though Clement jests with Cob about the warrant, he takes warrants very 
seriously indeed, and so does Jonson.412  Bobadill’s oaths represent the empty vows 
of chivalry, but warrants represent the English judicial system’s answer to a 
conundrum posed by Sir Thomas Elyot regarding an effective legal method to bind 
men to their promises.  Elyot had wondered:  
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And nat onely sealynge (whiche Seneca disdained, that it shulde be more sette 
by than soules) is uneth sufficient: but also it is nowe come into suche a 
generall contempt, that all the lerned men in the laws of this realme, whiche 
be also men of great wisedome: can nat with all their study devise so 
sufficient an instrument, to bynde a man to his promise or covenaunt.413     
According to William Lambard, warrants arose because men valued their property 
enough to guarantee that they would keep their promises.  In Eire archa, Lambard 
addresses the warrant’s importance relative to keeping the peace.  He first clarifies 
that one of a justice’s principal responsibilities in keeping the peace is “by taking 
Suertie for the keeping of [the peace].”  He observes that the surety, an assurance that 
one person will not harm another, originated with the “auntient Normans.”414  The 
Normans, however, were content with an oath and a handshake; in England, in latter 
days, however, “our Governours, knowing that evill men be more restrained by losse 
of goods, than by conscience of an oath, have used to take sure bonds, and that to the 
Prince, for the securitie of such as be in feare.”415 Lambard defines surety as “An 
acknowledging of a bond to the Prince, taken by a Judge of Recorde, for the keeping 
of the peace.”416     
Lambard goes on to say that a justice may “command [the surety], either as a 
Minister when hee is willed to do it by a higher auctoritie: or as a Judge when he doth 
it of his owne power derived from his Commission.”  The justice may “by vertue of 
his Office and as he is a Judge, commaunde this Suertie to be founde, and that either 
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of his owne motion and discreation, or else at the requeste and prayer of another.”417  
Lambard also establishes that the “suretie may be enjoyned … either by Word, or by 
Writing under Seale.”  As long as all involved parties are present, the justice can 
verbally order an arrest.  However, “if eyther the Officer, Servant, or Party be absent, 
then it is requisite to make a Warrant (or Precept) in writing.”418  According to 
Lambard, “a sworne and known Officer needeth not to shew this Warrant, when he 
doth serve it upon a man. 8E.4.14 & 20.H.7.13&c. for his Office doth after a sort 
auctorise him.  But if the Justice wil set his Servant to serve it, ye servant must shewe 
the Warrrant (if ye party demaunde it) and otherwise the party may make resistance, 
8.E.4.14.”419  Proper procedures must be followed; Lambard notes that “if a Bailife 
do arrest a man for the peace, before that he have any Warrant, & then afterward do 
procure a Warrant for it, this is unlawfully done.”420   
Cob is relieved to get his warrant from Clement and Bobadill seeks Clement 
in order to get his.  Brainworm’s escapades, however, call into question the warrant’s 
promise.  While Jonson endorses the authority of Clement’s office, Brainworm 
reminds us that one cannot necessarily rely on governors themselves.  Motivated by 
the fees, he agrees to serve an unauthorized warrant on Downright, deciding to “pawn 
this cloak of the Justice’s man’s at the broker’s for a varlet’s suit, and be the varlet 
myself; and get either more pawns, or more money of Downright for the arrest” 
(4.7.69-72).  Brainworm next enters as a “city sergeant,” musing that “of all my 
disguises yet, now am I most like myself, being in this serjeant’s gown.  A man of my 
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present profession never counterfeits, till he lays hold upon a debtor and says he rests 
him, for then he brings to him all manner of unrest” (4.9.1-4).  Brainworm associates 
officeholders with deception, dissembling, hypocrisy.  Clement himself has earlier 
recognized the role that costume plays in office, assuring the worried Kno’well that 
his “cares are nothing: they are like my cap, soon put on, and as soon put off” 
(3.3.131-32).  Anyone, it seems, can be an officeholder, provided that he has the right 
uniform.    
But if the robes of office lend authority, they do not sustain it.  When Matthew 
and Bobadill spy Brainworm, they identify him by his costume: “See, I think yonder 
is the varlet, by his gown” (4.9.9), and he plays along.  But when Brainworm attempts 
to arrest “Downright,” all are taught – or should be taught – a lesson about naively 
trusting that clothes make the man.  It is not Downright who has entered, but Stephen, 
wearing Downright’s cloak.  As Bobadill realizes, “he wears such a cloak, and that 
deceived us” (4.9.28).  It is the cloak that leads to Brainworm’s discovery, as 
Downright in turn demands Stephen’s arrest and immediate justice: “Officer, I’ll go 
with thee to the Justice’s; bring him along” (4.9.50).  Brainworm, wishing to avoid 
Justice Clement, attempts to worm his way out of the fix he has gotten himself into by 
relying on a promise.  He assures Downright that “I’ll take your word; and this 
gentleman’s, too, for his appearance” (4.9.53-54).  But Downright is not as trusting as 
Matthew and Bobadill, insisting that “I’ll ha’ no words taken.  Bring him along” 
(4.9.55).  Downright prevails, and Brainworm’s exposure follows in short order.     
 Brainworm’s initial success in deceiving the other characters suggests that he 




matters right, Justice Clement emphasizes the validity of the warrant as long as it is 
procured and served properly.  When his servant brings word that “There’s one of the 
varlets of the city, sir, has brought two gentlemen here, one upon your worship’s 
warrant” (5.1.67-68), Clement is taken aback:  “My warrant?” (5.1.69).  He first asks 
Bobadill if he had Clement’s “warrant for this gentleman’s apprehension” (5.1.87-
88), and when Bobadill replies in the affirmative, he wonders “where had you it?” 
(5.1.90).  When Bobadill replies that he got it from Clement’s clerk, Clement 
expresses disbelief: “That’s well, an’ my clerk can make warrants, and my hand not at 
‘em!” (5.1. 92-93).  He wonders, “Where is the warrant?  Officer, have you it?” 
(5.1.93).  Like Cob, Clement emphasizes the document itself, wanting to “see it here 
in black and white” (4.2.17).   
No one, of course, can produce the warrant.  Clement is no less astounded that 
Downright is unaware of another point of process:  “Why, Master Downright, are you 
such a novice, to be serv’d, and never see the warrant?” (5.1.96-97).  When 
Downright replies that Brainworm didn’t actually serve the warrant, but merely “said 
he must serve it” (5.1.100), Clement is outraged at the ridiculousness of the scenario.  
He threatens to cut off Brainworm’s legs:  “I must cut off your legs, sirrah: n y, stand 
up, I’ll use you kindly; I must cut off your legs, I say” (5.1.104-05).  Brainworm 
pleads for mercy, but Clement continues in the same vein, insisting that he “must” do 
it, and he “must” also cut off his ears, nose and head (5.1.107-09).  Of course, in due 
time Clement relents, but only after he has turned the tables on Brainworm to make 
his point:  “I said, I must cut off thy legs, and I must cut off thy arms, and I must cut 




warrant; but you did not serve him.  You knave, you slave, you rogue, do you say you 
must?  Sirrah, away with him to the jail; I’ll teach you a trick for your ‘must,’ sir” 
(5.1.114-19).  Brainworm’s main offense in impersonating an officer is his abuse of 
the office’s promise.  For him to tell Downright that he “must” serve the warrant at 
the same time that he lacks authority for it is for him to rely on the “inferred or 
presumed certainty of a fact.”421  It is precisely as it was with Bobadill’s oaths.     
 Bobadill never realizes the delusion in his promises, but Brainworm fully 
acknowledges his transgressions, and he receives a fitting sentence.  When Clem t 
orders him to jail, Brainworm replies, “Nay, sir, if you will commit me, it shall be for 
committing more than this.  I will not lose, by my travail, any grain of my fame, 
certain” (5.1.122-24).  Like Falstaff, he relies on his candor in confession to save him: 
“Nay, excellent Justice, since I have laid myself thus open to you, now stand stro g 
for me; both with your sword and your balance” (5.1.130-32).  After receiving 
Knowell’s pardon, he informs them of his exploits.  Clement ultimately also pardons 
Brainworm, stating that he has “done or assisted to nothing, in my judgment, but 
deserves to be pardon’d for the wit o’the offense” (5.1.173-75).  For McDonald, when 
Clement forgives Brainworm, he enacts Jonson’s own defense of wit.422  But 
undisciplined wit does not go entirely unpunished.423  Clement first requests a cup of 
sack, in order to toast Brainworm; he then declares, “this is my sentence.  – Pledge 
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me” (5.1.172-73).  This is to instruct Brainworm to “become surety for” him, to 
“make oneself responsible for” him.424  He expects Brainworm to uphold his promise. 
For Jonson, the promise of justice is better upheld by the institutional 
processes associated with office than by officers themselves.  Jonson, Munday, and 
Shakespeare were participating in a paradigm shift in the honor community in early 
modern England.  In these plays, they question the ethos of chivalry, a code that was 
reviving in early modern England.  The knight is bound primarily to honor.  His vow, 
susceptible to corruption, has only his own backing.  The justice, too, is fallible.  But 
the justice’s warrant and the office itself were backed by law and legal procedure.  
The bourgeois playwrights aligned themselves with administration and law even as 
they exploited and mocked chivalric fantasies.
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Chapter 3: Keeper of the King’s Conscience 
…whereas all other Justices in our common wealth, are tied to the lawe, and 
may not swerve from it in judgement:  the Chancelor hath in this the kings 
absolute power, to moderate and temper the written law, and subjecteth 
himselfe onely to the lawe of nature and conscience, ordering all things iuxta 
equum & bonum.425 
 
While we have seen that William Lambard described the justice of the peace 
as a “minister of the law,” the lord chancellor also administered the law.426  The 
former was bound to the letter of the law but the latter had the discretion and the 
power to mitigate it.427  He ministered, or served, the spirit of the law.428  As head of 
the Court of Chancery, he was the monarch’s deputy, empowered in his office by 
royal prerogative.  For John Cowell, the lord chancellor is the “cheife man for mater 
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of justice (in private causes especially) next unto the prince.”429  He is second to his 
sovereign, but he is finally answerable “onely to the lawe of nature and 
conscience.”430  Hence his office was a site of conflicting loyalties, where written (or 
positive) law, the laws of nature and conscience, and the monarch’s will were often at 
odds with each other.  Such contention is palpable in Anthony Munday’s Sir Thomas 
More (c. early 1590s) and William Shakespeare and John Fletcher’s H nry VIII 
(1613), two plays that feature the lord chancellor.431  Both plays were written during 
periods of controversy over the royal prerogative, and both plays stage Sir Thomas 
More.   
While it may have been risky to represent the Catholic martyr More, neither 
Sir Thomas More nor Henry VIII dwells on More’s Catholicism.432  Instead, they 
emphasize his office as lord chancellor (and in Munday’s case, More’s humanism).  
More’s faith may have fallen into disrepute, but his office increased in importance 
due to lively religious and political controversies.  The last years of Elizabeth’s reign 
were marked by a rise in divine right rhetoric as the Queen and her ministers sought 
to counter arguments in favor of a Presbyterian form of church government.433  For 
his part, James I was highly invested in jure divino theories, declaring “‘no bishop, no 
king’ … twice in one day at the Hampton Court Conference to discredit Presbyterian 
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influence.”434  In The True Law of Free Monarchies (1598), James grounded 
monarchical authority in God’s will, contending that the monarch was subject only to 
God.435  James had allowed that a “good king will not onely delight to rule his 
subiects by the lawe, but euen will conforme himeselfe in his owne actions thervnto,” 
but he maintained that the monarch was not obligated to subject himself to the law.436 
For those contesting such theories and the expanding prerogative that accompanied 
them, More’s own writings would have been pertinent.  Utopia, for instance, proposes 
that “the construction of a truly Christian political order must rest upon the 
foundation of a just secular one.”437  Dramatists who emphasize More the lord 
chancellor, I will argue, explore this “foundation of a just secular” political order.  
They reveal the extent to which officeholders, as ministers of the law and justice, 
were crucial to a just secular political order.   
Historically, the office of the lord chancellor was vital to the governing of the 
realm.  As head of Chancery, which had evolved in the later Middle Ages as a 
primarily administrative bureau, the lord chancellor oversaw many governmental 
transactions: Chancery issued royal grants of property and office, pardons, 
commissions, treaties, charters, and licenses.438  The lord chancellor was traditionally 
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the keeper of the Great Seal, which was used to authenticate these documents.439  This 
administrative side of Chancery became increasingly detached from the king’s court, 
but the lord chancellor himself did not.440  By the mid-fourteenth century, the lord 
chancellor had become a central member of the monarch’s advisory council.441  
Under Queen Elizabeth, he was a prominent member of the Privy Council, serving as 
the monarch’s, the Parliament’s, and the Privy Council’s go-between.442  He was also 
the Queen’s spokesman in Parliament, and he was deemed Speaker of the House of 
Lords.443  According to Sir Thomas Smith, “Next under the prince [in Parliament] 
sitteth the Chancellor, who is the voyce and orator of the prince.”444  The monarch 
may have been present, but the lord chancellor “answereth in the princes name, as 
apperteyneth” in opening ceremonies.445  The man who held the office of lord 
chancellor was, then, in close contact with the monarch, advising and speaking for her 
in important matters of state.  He was a minister of the law in its executive and 
legislative senses.  But by Queen Elizabeth’s reign, his administration of the law had 
become primarily judicial.446     
By virtue of his role on the king’s Privy Council, the lord chancellor came to 
preside over Star Chamber and the Court of Chancery.447  Originally inseparable from 
Privy Council meetings, Star Chamber under Cardinal Thomas Wolsey (Henry VIII’s 
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lord chancellor) strengthened its jurisdiction as a separate court.448  Like Chancery, 
Star Chamber was concerned with real property; but cases were more likely to 
involve claims of riot, forcible entry, and other sorts of disorderly conduct, and Star 
Chamber eventually prosecuted criminal matters.449  According to Lambard, Star 
Chamber supplemented the common law courts: sometimes “the ordinarie Courts of 
Iustice be hindered in their course and orderly proceeding, or … the Evill and Crime 
it selfe is … new in Device, for which no Law hath beene yet provided.” 450  In such 
cases, “helpe and supply must elsewhere be sought.”451  Sir Thomas Smith ascribes to 
Star Chamber the responsibility for dealing with those subjects, primarily members of 
the nobility, who were guilty of rebellion.452  Other infractions included perjury, 
bribery, slander, counterfeiting money, corruption on the part of magistrates, and riot 
on the part of any subject.453  Smith explains that Henry VIII and Wolsey’s use of 
Star Chamber helped to convince the nobility that “they had a Prince who would rule 
his subiects by his laws and obedience.”454  By the end of the sixteenth century, Star 
Chamber was associated with the monarch’s prerogative.  In theory, at least, th  court 
and its judges ruled on the monarch’s behalf in extraordinary cases. 
For its part, Chancery evolved from its administrative origins into a court of 
law that, like Star Chamber, was meant to complement the common law courts.  By 
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the fifteenth century, common law judges were expected to interpret law narrowly; 
however, the chancellor, who was in close contact with the monarch, could overrule 
judgments meted out by a “fixed and a rigid system.”455  As William Lambard 
explains, “considering that the Prince of this Realme is the immediate minister of 
Iustice under God,” it is only to be expected that the monarch will “reserve to 
himself, or referre to others a certain soveraigne and preheminent Power, by which he 
may both supply the want, and correct the rigour” of the common law.456  The lord 
chancellor did not need to “follow the technicalities of the law.  He represented the 
king’s grace….”457  Here is Sir Thomas Smith:  “for so much as in this case [the 
subject] is without remedie in the common lawe, therefore he requireth the 
chauncellor according to equitie and reason to provide for him and to take such order 
as to good conscience shall appertaine.”458  The concept of equity has classical roots 
(Aristotle termed it “‘a correction of law where it is defective owing to its 
universality’”), but in fifteenth-century England, many of the chancellors were 
ecclesiastics.459  They “based their equity on the more restricted idea that the court 
ought to compel each individual litigant to fulfill the duties which reason and 
conscience would dictate to a person in his situation.”460  Chancellors were to arrive 
at decisions pertaining to individual cases not arbitrarily but based on reason and their 
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knowledge of God’s laws.461  Thus it was that Chancery became known as the court 
of conscience.       
The conscience referred to was that of several parties.  As noted above, 
Chancery aimed to help the subject act in accordance with his or her conscience: 
“Chancery did not concern itself with legal title but merely with title in consience, 
that is, it ordered the defendant’s conduct as the conduct of his conscience 
required.”462  Chancery also came to represent the “conscience” of the 
commonwealth.  In 1595, one justice of the peace observed that “the general 
conscience of the realm … is Chancery.’”463  And by the end of the sixteenth century, 
conscience often referred to the chancellor’s relationship to the monarch.  Sir 
Christopher Hatton, Lord Chancellor from1587 until his death in 1591, is generally 
credited with first claiming that the lord chancellor was the “keeper of the king’s 
conscience.”464  Indeed, the lord chancellor’s office as keeper of the king’s 
conscience was so important that it sparked debate about what sort of professional 
background best prepared the chancellor for his position.  In 1597, Edward Hake, 
author of a later tract on equity, wrote in a letter to Sir Julius Caesar about his plans 
for still another tract, observing that he had initially meant to argue  
in a sorte and as I mighte, that as in former tymes the Lord Chauncellor hath 
not usually been (and in olden times not at all) a temporall Lawyer, so 
considering how and whereupon the Equity of that Courte is to be derived, 
namely, upon the Conscience of the Judge, it is not therefore of necessity (nec 
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quid ulteius dicam) that he should be a temporall Lawyer and none other, but 
rather indeed of such a profession of learning as may be said to approach 
nearest to Divinity.465   
Hake eventually decided that a background in common law was best, but he still 
allowed for the appointment of ecclesiastics.466  Either way, lord chancellors required 
the knowledge and skill to reconcile positive law with God’s law on behalf of the 
sovereign and the subject.   
Anthony Munday’s Sir Thomas More, which apparently was never staged, 
dramatizes the life of a lord chancellor who was ordered by his monarch to 
contravene what he deemed to be God’s law on the monarch’s behalf.   The play 
traces More’s life from his time as a London officeholder to his execution.  Scholars 
have debated the date of the play and its revisions, its sources, and each of the seven 
hands evident in the extant manuscript (particularly “Hand D,” said by many to be 
William Shakespeare’s).467  Editors Vittorio Gabrieli and Giorgio Melchiori explain 
that while dates of composition from 1586 to 1603 have been proposed for the play, 
scholars generally concur that the play was written in the early 1590s, and they argu  
that the revisions were also written then.468  In addition to questions of dating and 
authorship, scholars have considered the play’s structural integrity and its 
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topicality.469  Some have argued that the play avoids contemporary political issues.  
Charles Forker and Joseph Candido, for example, observe that “Historical events 
sweep by in a hazy background” as the play examines More’s personal life and 
characteristics, “rather than … the political or religious significance of his [public] 
life and actions.”470  However, I will argue that the play’s representation of More’s 
intertwined private and public lives is closely connected to contemporary religio-
political issues.  In what follows, I also accept 1591-93 as the probable time of 
composition and revision: certainly, these years help to explain the play’s focus on 
More and on other officeholders administering the law.   
The likely connection between Munday’s depiction of the Ill May-Day riots 
and anti-alien sentiment in Elizabethan London, particularly acute in the late 1580s 
and 1590s, has been noted.471  Many of the aliens, or strangers, were French and 
Dutch immigrants, fleeing religious persecution.  Taking asylum in London, they 
were accommodated in various ways by sympathetic magistrates, including members 
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of the Privy Council.472  But increasing competition in the marketplace meant that 
aliens “were resented because they were thought to evade company regulations and 
produce substandard goods.”473  The measures that Londoners took, such as 
circulating libels against the strangers and resorting to riots, were not just “mindless 
violence: rather the threat of popular action should be seen as a negotiating strategy, 
designed to remind the magistrates of their obligations to redress apprentice 
grievances.”474  Although  restrictions were placed on aliens, they were not always 
easy to enforce, and City companies thus turned to Crown ordinances, litigation, and 
legislative efforts in Parliament in order to tighten up regulations.475  Economic and 
xenophobic tensions between English people and aliens also weighed on the 
administration of the law.   
The early 1590s provide still another context for Munday’s focus on the 
administration of the law.  While he highlights More’s refusal to acquiesce to the 
monarch’s wishes, he never specifies that More refuses to subscribe to the Act of 
Supremacy.  Gabrieli and Melchiori note that Munday thus “avoids raising the 
question of the conflict between the Roman and the English Church, replacing it with 
that of the freedom of the individual conscience from worldly authority.”476  This 
strategy would have been one way to placate the censor, but it would have been to 
risk calling attention to another, related controversy, this one pertaining to the oath ex 
officio.  Church leaders such as John Whitgift, intent on upholding monarchical 
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supremacy, shaped ecclesiastical policy accordingly.477  Because their campaign 
called for strict enforcement of conformity to the Church of England, the 
ecclesiastical courts and Star Chamber became venues for prosecuting and 
persecuting Puritans and Catholics alike. 478  And this is where the controversial oath 
ex officio came into play.479  Administered upon their summons to court, defendants 
were required to swear that they would answer truthfully all questions put to them by 
the court before they were even informed of the accusations made against them or of 
the prosecution’s evidence.480  While the oath itself originated much earlier, the 
Elizabethan courts acquired a reputation for abusing it, unfairly questioning 
defendants about their behavior at home and seeking information about their family 
or friends, which was then used to indict them.   
The oath thus impinged on legal procedures, on recusancy, and on the politics 
of the administration of God’s law.  Both Puritans and Catholics accused in a church 
court, or brought before the High Commission on charges of recusancy or failure to 
observe the Book of Common Prayer, could tie up legal proceedings by refusing to 
swear the oath ex officio.  The trial was then pre-empted, the defendants were charged 
with contempt of court, and a new trial over the oath would commence.  Such cases 
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might then be taken to Star Chamber. 481  Trials of individuals such as Sir Thomas 
Tresham, whose argument in 1580 against the oath ex officio included the objection 
that “this ys not a mere temporall demaunde but a case of conscience, therefore yt ys 
against iudicium to sweare herein,” helped to call into question the legality of the oath 
ex officio and so the courts’ procedures.482  John Udall, arrested in 1590 as a result of 
the Martin Marprelate scandal, also refused to swear.  When told that he must go to 
prison, he responded, “God’s will be done!  I had rather go to prison with a good 
conscience, than to be at liberty with an ill one!”483  These cases typically upheld 
Magna Carta as the fundamental law of the land.484  The oath was objectionable on 
the grounds that a person’s thoughts and beliefs were his or her private property and 
as such were protected under the articles of the Magna Carta.  However, the notorious 
verdict in the trial against Robert Cawdrey, a trial that lasted until 1591, upheld the 
“ancient prerogative of the monarch to govern the ecclesiastical affairs of the
nation.”485  Monarchical prerogative prevailed over what subjects felt were God’s 
laws and the law of the land.   
Sir Thomas More himself had been involved in a dispute over the oath ex 
officio which was part of an earlier polemical debate over the reach of the church 
courts.  After Henry VIII’s decision to break from the Roman Catholic Church, More
upheld the courts’ right to administer the oath ex officio as a defense against the 
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spread of heresy.486  But More himself, after being brought to trial for refusal to swear 
to the oath of supremacy, refused to swear to the oath ex officio.  He was “offred … 
an othe by which [he] shoulde be sworen to make true aunswere to suche things as 
shoulde be asked [him] on the Kinges behalfe, concerning the Kinges owne 
person.”487  More refused, answering that “‘verily I never purposed to swere any 
booke othe more while I lived.’”488  More’s sixteenth-century biographer, Nicholas 
Harpsfield, records that, when pressed by Cromwell on the parallels between More’s 
forcing heretics to “make a precise aunswere thereto” and the monarch’s will to 
“compell men to aunswere precisely to the lawe here, as they did then concerning the 
Pope,” More argued that “in this case a man is not by the lawe of one Realme so 
bounde in [his] conscience where there is [a] lawe of the whole corps of christendome 
to the contrarie in matter touching beliefe, as he is by the lawe of the whole corps.”489  
Disputing the monarch’s jurisdiction over his conscience, More called into question 
the monarch’s office as minister of the law.     
More’s objections might have resonated in the 1580s and 90s, when his own 
grandson, Thomas More II, was prosecuted for recusancy.490  In particular, More’s 
integrity might have been perceived by both Catholics and Puritans to stand in stark 
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contrast to the integrity of two lord chancellors who served around the time of the 
play’s composition.  They both supported the conformist agenda.  Sir Christopher 
Hatton, Lord Chancellor from 1587-1591, and John Puckering, Lord Keeper 
from1592-1596, had both been involved in prosecuting various ex officio cases.491  
Hatton represented the Queen in her opposition to Puritan efforts in Parliament 
further to reform the church.  In 1589, he “charged the Commons not to meddle in 
matters religious except to bridle the activities of the queen’s enemies, papit and 
puritan alike.”492  He also supported Whitgift’s campaign for new articles that would 
have upheld the episcopacy and the Crown’s authority over ecclesiastical matters. 493  
Hatton’s support for these programs may have been motivated less by ideology than 
by his indebtedness to Queen Elizabeth, financial and otherwise.494  Puckering, as 
Queen’s Sergeant before his appointment as Lord Keeper, was involved in 
prosecuting Presbyterians such as Thomas Cartwright. 495  By 1590, he had been 
appointed recorder for Warwick, and he was a key figure in the trial of the Puritan 
John Udall.496  His contemporaries accused him of using office for self-advancement 
and of being a “tool” of others.497  Puckering was apparently successful at promoting 
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himself.  He was appointed Lord Keeper after Hatton’s death despite the fact that he 
was “not an automatic choice for the lord keepership.”498   
Hatton and Puckering’s manipulation of the Court of Chancery sets More’s 
very different behavior in high relief.  More was appointed Lord Chancellor in the 
wake of Cardinal Wolsey, whose “ministerial policy had aimed first at strict and 
impartial enforcement of existing law upon all the king’s subjects, irrespective of 
social status and private power.” 499  Wolsey had encouraged men who feared the 
corruption of local judges to turn to Star Chamber and Chancery.  These courts were 
also more expeditious and flexible than the common law courts.500  However, Wolsey 
alienated common law judges, and upon his downfall, there was some question as to 
whether More would continue to encourage the growth of Chancery and Star 
Chamber.501  As it turned out, More upheld the authority of these courts, viewing 
them as effective venues for ensuring “impartial and efficient justice.” 502  He not only 
continued Wolsey’s initiatives, he improved upon them; for instance, he consistently 
enforced penalties, making judgments final.503  During the sixteenth century, 
hagiographical accounts of More’s life credited him with unfailing integrity in the 
execution of his office.  Harpsfield records More’s resistance to importuning even by 
his sons-in-law.504  He also notes More’s availability, stating that More “used 
commonly every afternoone at his house at Chelsey to sitt in his open hall, to the 
intent that, if any persons had any sute unto him, they might the more boldly come to 
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his presence, and there upon bring their complaintes before him.”505  Other 
biographers, such as T. Stapleton, in his Life and Illustrious Martyrdom of Sir 
Thomas More, reported that More cleared up the backlog of cases in Chancery.506  
More’s reputed efficiency and impartiality in administering the law stood in stark 
contrast to perceptions of Hatton and Puckering. 
Hatton and Puckering were both appointed to the office at a time when 
Chancery procedures needed reforming, yet neither made significant changes.  
Ironically, while earlier litigants had turned to chancery because of delays attending 
common law court cases, by the mid-sixteenth century, Chancery itself wa 
overburdened with cases, many of which were frivolous.507  Processes were not clear 
for litigants.508  Such confusion allowed for abuse by the clerks; while theoretically 
many of the writs and orders issued needed to be approved by the head of Chancery, 
clerks often acted on their own volition.  W.J. Jones observes that “numerous orders 
in the entry books... testify to the illegal and unauthorized issue of process.”509  
Elizabeth’s choice of Hatton had been a surprise for many; while he had been at the 
Inner Temple, he apparently never was called to the bar, nor did he have the legal and 
judicial experience expected of the lord chancellor.510  While his time in the office 
“cannot be regarded as disastrous,” he managed only a few administrative reforms.511  
After Hatton’s death, Queen Elizabeth waited six months before naming Puckering 
Lord Keeper, exacerbating the delays in getting cases through Chancery that were 
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caused by “procedural difficulties” and “clerical slackness.”512  While Puckering 
made some attempt to clarify Chancery’s jurisdiction in relation to other courts, he, 
too, failed to address the real problems by not defining procedures.513  Theoretically, 
Chancery was the court of conscience, where justice was speedily, impartially nd 
definitively litigated, but in practice, Chancery proceedings could mean a drain on 
litigants’ and defendants’ time and money.   
  Munday’s play leaves us with no doubt that even a man as wise and good as 
More does not have the duty, much less the right, to question monarchical authority.  
In the last speech of the play, Surrey’s comment that “a very learned worthy 
gentleman / Seals error with his blood” (5.4.126-27) serves “explicitly to vindicate 
the authority of the state.”514  Sir Thomas More counsels obedience because 
“opposition to the king is opposition to God.”515  Yet even in an evidently cautionary 
play, Munday asks what it means to be a minister of the law.  Given the lord 
chancellor’s position as a minister of state and traditional associations between his 
office and ecclesiology and conscience, any examination of his office would have 
entailed an interrogation of assumptions about officeholders’ duties.  Officeholders 
were charged with upholding the law and keeping the peace, but how extensive was 
the reach of the law?  Were thoughts private?  What were the pastoral responsibilities 
of a minister of law?516   
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Munday’s lord chancellor play suggests that officeholders protect subjects’ 
property, their conscience in particular.  Munday emphasizes the issue of property 
right from the start of the play.  Londoners are rioting in good measure because of 
their anger over the aliens’ appropriation of their property.  Sherwin and Lincoln are 
upset that Caveler has taken Williamson’s pair of doves; Lincoln complains “It is 
hard when Englishmen’s patience must be thus jetted on by strangers, and they not 
dare to revenge their own wrongs” (1.1.25-27).  Wives are also considered property.  
Doll Williamson, upset over the approaches Bard has been making toward her, 
rebukes her husband:  “How now, husband?  What, one stranger take thy food from 
thee, and another thy wife?” (1.1.31-32).  These objections are not limited to the 
commoners, however.  Surrey expresses amazement that “this high-crested insol nce 
should spring / From them . . . / That [are] fattened with the traffic of our country” 
(1.3.12-15), and he and the other lords discuss the strangers’ insolence.  Property is 
key to the happiness of the English people, a right that requires defending. 
 There are also grievances about the laws that protect the strangers.  When 
George threatens to “revenge their injury,” Francis de Bard taunts him with the fac  
that “My lord ambassador shall once more make your mayor have a check if he 
punish thee not for this saucy presumption” (1.1.37-39).  Williamson concurs, 
lamenting that “Indeed my lord mayor, on the ambassador’s complaint, sent me to 
Newgate one day because (against my will) I took the wall of a stranger” (1.1.40-42).  
George is thus “curbed by duty and obedience” from exacting revenge on de Bard 
(1.1.51).  Sherwin expresses his hopelessness: “It is not our lack of courage in the 




you talked of, but how to redress yours or mine own is a matter beyond all our 
abilities” (1.1.75-78).   
The aggrieved Londoners, stymied by the rigor of the law, take it upon 
themselves to secure redress.  Doll threatens Caveler with bodily harm, rationalizing 
that “If our husbands must be bridled by law, and forced to bear your wrongs, their 
wives will be a little lawless, and soundly beat ye” (1.1.65-68).  A bill of complaints 
is drawn up and preachers are enlisted to “openly publish [it] in the pulpit” during the 
Spital sermons, the sermons given in the week before Easter (1.1.91-92).  The aim is 
to garner enough support to carry out May Day attacks on the foreigners (1.1.127-32).  
As Lincoln declares, “Since justice keeps not [the strangers] in greater awe we’ll be 
ourselves rough ministers at law” (2.1.29-30).   
 To the citizens’ rough justice, Munday poses the alternative that is Thomas 
More, the play’s spokesman for equity.  More is concerned with upholding the law, 
but he considers each case with understanding and mercy.517  The audience is first 
introduced to Sheriff More, adjudicating the sentence of Lifter, a cutpurse.  Munday 
takes pains to include More’s use of a jest to teach Justice Suresby a lesson.  Suresby
has suggested that “Had [Lifter] had right, he had been hanged ere this” (1.2.7).  But 
in pretence of defending Lifter, Suresby makes what he believes to be a ridiculous 
argument, blaming Smart, Lifter’s victim, for not having paid attention to his purse.  
More then has Lifter lift Suresby’s own purse.  As Lifter notes, More’s intent “[i]s but 
to check the folly of the justice / For blaming others in a desperate case / Wherein 
                                                
517As has been noted, Munday adapts historical fact.  More was only an undersheriff of London, and he 
was not successful in resolving the Ill May-Day riots.  Instead, in shaping him as an officeholder, 
Munday attributes to More the role played by the lord chancellor at the time, Cardinal Wolsey 




himself may fall as soon as any” (1.2.92-94).  Munday illustrates More’s capacity to 
judge with equity, to examine the circumstances of a case and to mitigate the rigors of 
the law.     
 In his role as sheriff, More is concerned with keeping the peace, with 
resolving situations by diplomacy rather than violence.  When the commoners 
threaten to riot, the nobility turn to More.  According to the Earl of Surrey, More is “a 
wise and learned gentleman, / And in especial favour with the people” (1.3.86-87).  
He hopes that More “may by his gentle and persuasive speech / Perhaps prevail more 
than we can with power” (1.3.89-90).  When violence erupts, however, and the 
subjects break into London’s prisons and plan to attack the aliens, the Lord Mayor, 
the nobility, and the monarch himself turn to force.  The Earl of Shrewsbury reports 
to the Lord Mayor that the king has sent him and Surrey “To add unto your forces our 
best means / For pacifying of this mutiny” (2.3.23-24).  Still, More remains confident 
that “we shall appease / With a calm breath this flux of discontent” (2.3.30-31).  
When the Londoners themselves call for “Peace, peace!” so that More may speak, he 
urges them, “Look what you do offend you cry upon, / That is the peace” (2.3.66-68).  
More also asks them to think through the consequences of their actions.  Should they 
get what they ask for, the “removing of the strangers,” it will only lead to fur her 
disorder:  
you had taught  
How insolence and strong hand should prevail,   
How order should be quelled, and by this pattern,  




For other ruffians ... would shark on you. 
(2.3.76-92) 
He urges obedience to the king since “God hath his office lent / Of dread, of justice, 
power and command, / Hath bid him rule, and willed you to obey” (2.3.106-08).  
More further emphasizes that the laws protect the subjects and their property.       
Sheriff More’s actions and speech prefigure those of Lord Chancellor More.  
He urges the Londoners to put themselves in the strangers’ place, asking them if they 
were to go abroad, “What would you think / To be thus used?  This is the strangers’ 
case, / And this your mountainous inhumanity” (2.3.149-51).  More also holds out the 
promise of the monarch’s grace:  
 Submit you to these noble gentlemen 
 Entreat their mediation to the king, 
 Give up yourself to form, obey the magistrate, 
 And there’s no doubt but mercy may be found 
 If you so seek it.  
(2.3.155-59) 
When the commoners yield, More again suggests that they will receive the monarch’s 
pardon, although he cannot guarantee this:  “No doubt his majesty will grant it you. / 
But you must yield to go to several prisons, / Till that his highness’ will be further 
known” (2.3.161-63).  In his office as sheriff, More keeps the king’s peace by 
exhorting the commoners to do their duty, and he himself keeps within the bounds of 




on behalf of the subject (the political crisis involving Cardinal Wolsey is absent from 
the play, as is Henry himself).  Surrey explains that  
Sir Thomas More humbly upon his knee,  
Did beg the lives of all, since on his word  
They did so gently yield.  The King hath granted it 
And made him Lord High Chancellor of England,  
According as he worthily deserves.  
(2.4.145-49)   
Acting as the king’s conscience, More argues that the rigor of the law should be 
mitigated by the subjects’ submission, and he is rewarded for acting on their behalf.  
 Having earned the title of Lord Chancellor, More meditates on the challenges 
of holding office.  Munday invokes More’s reputation as a humanist and the humanist 
appreciation for the value of officeholding.  Writers such as Thomas Pritchard, 
arguing around 1579 for men’s engagement in civic affairs, cited Cicero: “‘Tullie 
saith in his Offices, that wee bee borne partly to pleasure and profit our freendes, our 
Parentse, and most of all, our native Countrey.’”518  Munday’s More recognizes the 
tensions between private and public life:   
I must now sleep in court, sound sleeps forebear:   
The chamberlain to state is public care.  
Yet in this rising of my private blood  
My studious thoughts shall tend the city’s good.  
(2.3.234-37) 
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More divorces civic life from personal gain.  For Cicero, the magistrate “representes 
the persone of the citie: and… he ought to maintein the honour, and reputation therof: 
and to keepe the orders of the same: and to sette oute lawes fit therefore: and to 
remember, they be committed to his charge.”519  More knows that to be “from such an 
humble bench of birth / [and to] … step as ‘twere up to my country’s head / And give 
the law out there …” could lead to corruption (3.1.5-14).  He realizes that he must 
guard against such corruption among his servants as well.  When the players who 
perform for More and the Lord Mayor suspect that they have not been paid in full, 
they turn to More to rectify the situation.  He commends Wit for his quick thinking in 
recovering the money:  “Well Wit, ‘twas wisely done, thou playest Wit well indeed, / 
Not to be deceived of thy right” (3.2.333-34).   More is especially concerned that the 
players recuperate their rightful property due to his office:  “Am I a man by office 
truly ordained / Equally to divide true right his own, / And shall I have deceivers in 
my house?” (3.2.335-37).   
In the first three acts, then, Munday depicts a humanist More concerned with 
his duty to God, the king, and the commonwealth, associated with equity by nature 
and by office.  More appears to be an exemplary keeper of the king’s conscience; h  
represents the monarch as he metes out justice and mercy to all.  But like the 
defendants in the oath ex officio cases, More himself is eventually expected to 
conform to the monarch’s will.  He is busy performing the duties of lord chancellor, 
meeting with Surrey, Rochester, and other lords to debate the wisdom of war 
strategies, when Sir Thomas Palmer arrives with “These articles enclos d, first to be 
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viewed / And then to be subscribed to” (4.1.70-71).  The articles of course refer to the 
Oath of Supremacy and Act of Succession, which established the monarch’s status as 
head of the church in England.  In point of fact, these were submitted to More in 
1534.  In the play, More instantly recognizes the gravity of the king’s demand:  “Stay,
let us pause: / Our conscience first shall parley with our laws” (4.1.73-74).  More 
must decide whether or not he can reconcile the signing of the oath with canonical or 
constitutional law.  Munday’s focus shifts from More as minister of the law to the 
monarch as minister of the law, as More proceeds to “resign mine office / Into my 
sovereign’s hands” (4.1.88-89).  But the monarch appears to be ministering his will 
rather than the law.  Even as disobedience to the monarch is duly punished, Munday 
questions whether justice is served.   
  An ineffective minister of the law, the absent monarch is an effective tyrant.  
While Munday might avoid trouble with the Elizabethan government by failing to 
specify which oaths are in play, such vagueness comes at the expense of the 
dramatist’s ability to justify the monarch’s demands, making those demands appear
capricious.  The lord chancellor was charged with examining a wrongdoer’s 
conscience, a duty More effectively performs in Act 2.  Lincoln both confesses his 
sins and asks for forgiveness before his execution (2.4.52-70).  The absent monarch 
also sets out to probe More’s conscience.  When More informs his wife and family of 
his resignation, he remarks that “The King seems a physician to my fate, / His 
princely mind would train me back to state” (4.3.79-80).520  His son-in-law urges him 
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to “be his patient” (4.3.81), but More realizes that to be the patient would be to 
construe himself as being ill, as having a defective conscience.  This he denies.  
Hence his citation from Seneca:  “Ubi turpis est medicina, sanari piget (When the 
medicine is disgusting one is loath to be healed)” (4.3.83).521  Munday suggests that 
rather than being truly concerned with his subject’s conscience, the monarch is 
concerned only with matters of state; the pastoral relationship a monarch might cla m 
with his subjects is mere pretence.     
 For Munday, the monarch is no more effective where state matters are 
concerned.  More’s passage into the Tower is interrupted by a woman seeking his aid.  
When the First Warder reminds the woman that More is no longer lord chancellor, 
she replies, “The more’s the pity, sir, if it pleased God” (5.1.20).  The First Warder 
himself has earlier pronounced that “A wiser or more virtuous gentleman / Was never 
bred in England” (5.1.10-11).  The woman explains that she has had “A suit this two 
year in the chancery, / And [More] hath all the evidence I have, / Which should I lose, 
I am utterly undone” (5.1.24-26).  The woman’s reference to her two-year delay in 
Chancery seems more a reference to Elizabethan circumstances than to More’s 
reputation for speedily dispatching justice.  When she asks More for her “writings” 
(5.1.34), More can only lament that 
 Poor silly wretch, I must confess indeed, 
 I had such writings as concern thee near, 
 But the king has ta’en the matter into his own hand: 
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 He has all I had; then, woman, sue to him, 
 I cannot help thee, thou must bear with me.  
(5.1.37-41) 
Chancery, now in the hands of the monarch—a monarch who has been entirely absent 
from the process of governing in the play—has lost its conscience.  And the 
monarch’s subjects must bear this together.522  Is Munday intimating the futility of the 
monarch’s efforts?  This king is less concerned with the administration of the courts
than with interrogating and convicting loyal subjects on matters of faith.   
 Skeptical about the pastoral nature of the monarch’s office, Munday reaffirms 
that conscience is an individual spiritual concern.  More relies on his conscience in 
much the same way as did opponents of the oath ex officio.  Summoned to the Tower, 
he is resigned: “To a great prison, to discharge the strife / Commenced ‘twixt 
conscience and my frailer life / More now must march” (4.4.62-64).  He ruminates 
upon the many guilty persons who have passed through the doors, but he is relieved 
that he has “ne’er [entered] with a clearer conscience / Than at this hour” (5.2.62-63)   
When the warrant for his execution arrives, he is calm in the face of death, assuring 
the lieutenant that “I thank my God / I have peace of conscience, though the world 
and I / Are at a little odds” (5.3.10-12).  Similarly, the defendants in the oath ex 
officio trials claimed the right to act in accordance with their consciences.  When 
questioned about the Book of Common Prayer, Robert Cawdrey, too, maintained that 
“I could not have done it according to the order of the said book, or otherwise than as 
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I have done, I think, with a safe conscience.”523  On one occasion, when asked to 
swear to follow the Book of Common Prayer in each particular point, he avowed that 
“I will so far as I may according to the word of God, and with a good conscience.”524   
Part of More’s defense of his behavior depends on the tenet that one’s beliefs 
and private thoughts are one’s own personal property, not subject to appropriation.  
Thoughts do not belong to the monarch.  When Shrewsbury urges More to “publish to 
the world / Your great offence unto his majesty,” More responds that he will “confess 
his majesty hath been ever good to [More]” (5.4.69-72).  But More will only “send 
[the king] for my trespass a reverent head, somewhat bald…. If that content him not, 
let him but bury it, and take it” (5.4.75-79).  The king can have his head, but not his 
thoughts, beliefs, or convictions.  When Surrey urges More to “hold conference with 
your soul” for “the time of life is short,” More assures him that he “dispatched t at 
business the last night” (5.4.80-83).  As St. German had once said in an attack on the 
oath ex officio, only God “‘is the sercher of man[’s] herte.’”525  Such a sentiment was 
accommodated earlier in Elizabeth’s reign, when the government tended not to “make 
windows into men’s souls and secret thoughts, as Elizabeth herself was reputed to 
say.”526  One’s conscience, which is one’s property, ought to be protected, not 
harassed by the law.    
 More’s exchange with the sheriffs who escort him to his execution 
underscores Munday’s skepticism about officeholders as pastors.  When More 
reminds the sheriffs that he himself had once been a sheriff of London, the First 
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Sheriff responds “Then you know our duty doth require it.”  More acknowledges that 
it is the sheriffs’ responsibility to make arrangements for sentences to be carried out 
(5.4.31-36).  But More also comments to the Second Sheriff that “you and I have 
been of old acquaintance: / You were a patient auditor of mine / When I read the 
divinity lecture at Saint Lawrence’s” (5.4.37-39).  The Second Sheriff acknowledges 
this connection, assuring More that “I have heard you oft, as many other did, / To our 
great comfort” (5.4.40-41).527  More’s choice of topic for this lecture, and Munday’s 
allusion to it in the play, suggest a concern with government.  In de Civitate Dei, 
Augustine distinguishes between the City of God, the community of souls who love 
and are ruled by God, and the City of Men, the temporal community of individuals 
who love and are ruled by their self-interest.528  Augustine argued that while it was 
impossible for any temporal government or State to dispense true justice (since only 
God could do that), the State still was needed to keep temporal peace for men to 
achieve salvation.529 For Augustine, the State is only an “external order,” ensuring the 
“absence, or at least the diminution, of overt violence.”530  It was not for the State to 
shape “the thoughts, desires, and wills of its citizens” or to make “men truly good or 
virtuous.”531  It was left to the State to protect the goods and property of men, thereby 
to prevent them from lapsing into disputes and enabling them to pursue salvation.532   
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Augustine also argued that a Christian ruler must be quick to pardon.533  But 
Munday’s monarch is disinclined to pardon even when More resigns his office.  He 
also deprives the commonwealth of an effective minister of justice.  More, the keep r 
of the monarch’s conscience, is prevented from acting upon his conscience.  Munday 
exposes the irony here, and connects it to contemporary debates over the oath ex 
officio, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, and divine right theories of 
monarchy and episcopacy.  He at once questions the jurisdiction of any secular 
officeholder over an individual’s conscience and makes a case for office. 
Shakespeare’s Henry VIII revisits the occasion of Thomas More’s rise to the 
lord chancellorship.  Notorious for the 1613 performance at the Globe that led to the 
burning of the theatre, Henry VIII raises both authorship questions (it is the work of 
both Shakespeare and John Fletcher) and generic questions (what sort of history play 
is it?).534  A number of critics have argued that it is a topical play, commenting on 
King James I and his court, in particular James’s efforts to expand the royal 
prerogative.535   By continuing to focus on the lord chancellor’s office, I believe that I 
can provide additional insight into the play’s politics.  While Gordon McMullan has 
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written that Henry VIII  “lack[s] … a single, obvious central character,”536 I will argue 
that the lord chancellor fits that bill.  The play depicts lord chancellors past, present, 
and future:  Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, Archbishop of York, and Sir Thomas More, 
lord chancellors to Henry VIII; then Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester and lord 
chancellor to Mary.  Like Sir Thomas More, Henry VIII acknowledges the lord 
chancellor’s office as conscience of the king.537  In re-visioning these historical 
personages, Shakespeare and Fletcher explore what it means to be a minister of the 
law.  They appear to recommend that the minister’s obligation to guide the state 
should take precedence over the pastoral nature of his relationship with subjects.            
 Debates over the x officio oath, of concern in the More play, were related to 
the extension of the royal prerogative in the 1590s.  Twenty years later, debate over 
the royal prerogative related to the widening jurisdiction of Chancery.  In defeding 
Chancery’s prerogative to judge with equity, legal theorists associated the courts and 
the lord chancellor with the royal prerogative:  “Alterations of law by the Chancellor, 
however, had no more obvious contemporary justification than alterations by a judge, 
and thus the position was reached…that the Chancellor was here acting for the Prince, 
that he was the keeper of the king’s conscience, and that the Chancery, in 
consequence, depended solely upon the prerogative and was a prerogative court—the 
court of the king’s absolute power.”538  Theoretically, the lord chancellor’s 
jurisdiction represented the monarch as the deputy of God on earth, meting out 
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justice; but this could take a perjorative turn.  As John Selden suggested, “if the 
measure of equity was the chancellor’s own conscience, one might as well mak  the 
standard measure of one foot the chancellor’s foot.”539  Decisions made in Chancery 
courts that could be seen as the judgments of God’s deputies on earth could also be 
seen as the arbitrary verdicts of tyrants. 
Thomas Egerton, Lord Keeper under Queen Elizabeth and Lord Chancellor 
Ellesmere under King James (until illness forced his resignation in 1617), was a 
lightning rod.  While Egerton sought to reform both Chancery and common law 
courts, he continued to uphold the superior jurisdiction of Chancery.540  Early in his 
career, Egerton addressed such Chancery issues as the proliferation of frivolous law-
suits and clerks’ abuses of office, seeking thereby to improve Chancery as a venue for 
justice.541  He also expressed concerns about overreaching common law judges:  
The Iudges of the Kinges bench and Commen place have of late yeares taken 
vpon theym as Chancellors to mak orders in Equitye, according to theyr owne 
discrecions, not regarding nor standing vpon, the stricte rules of Lawe, 
(whervnto they use to saye they are sworne).542   
Egerton’s defense of Chancery jurisdiction pitted him against Sir Edward Coke, who 
mounted an assault on the prerogative of the Chancery courts, insisting that that they 
did not have the authority to overturn decisions handed down in the common law 
courts.  Coke and his fellow common lawyers worked hard to establish the common 
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law’s supremacy.543  These debates culminated in a showdown between Egerton and 
Coke several years after Henry VIII’s first performance, but they were conspicuous in 
court cases as early as 1607, and they continued during the years preceding the play’s 
performance.544  
As it happens, Egerton was involved in other disputes related to the monarch’s 
prerogative, particularly debates over ecclesiastical commissions.  Challenges to the 
High Commission (the ecclesiastical court used to enforce conformity), initiated in 
the latter part of Queen Elizabeth’s reign, continued into James’ reign.  These 
disputes became more and more contentious, with the House of Commons debating 
the issues and various parties printing and circulating treatises.545  Eventually, in 
1609, James requested his attorney general to prepare a defense of the High 
Commission.546  Edward Coke, chief justice at the time, attacked the position held by 
the attorney general, and the dispute ended up before the Privy Council in 1611:  
“The Archbishop invoked God, Crown, Church, and Commonwealth in defending the 
High Commission against prohibitions.  The Chief Justice invoked the ancient, 
immemorial customs of the common law.”547  Egerton intervened, eventually 
achieving a compromise of sorts.  He acknowledged the need to reform the High 
Commission’s legal processes, but he upheld its jurisdiction. 548  Like Coke, Egerton 
was concerned with limiting the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, but he 
disagreed with the extent to which Coke would limit the courts.  Seeking to uphold to 
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uphold the courts’ basic authority, Egerton argued that Coke was attacking in part the 
episcopacy’s legitimacy.549   
These conflicts over court jurisdiction were inextricably linked to 
contemporary conceptions of monarchical prerogative, ecclesiastical polity,and 
divine right theory—debates that turned on the monarch’s office as God’s minister.  
King James favored the Chancery courts in the dispute between Ellesmere and Coke, 
a perspective that was influenced by his own political theory.550  In The True Law of 
Free Monarchies (1598), James had argued that the monarch was subject only to 
God, not the positive laws of the land.  In speeches made in 1604, 1605, and 1610, 
James reiterated this position.  He thus justified the jurisdiction of equity:  
…I have at length prooved, that the King is aboue the law, as both author and 
giuer of strength thereto; …And where he sees the lawe doubtsome or 
rigorous, he may interpret or mitigate the same, lest otherwise Summum ius 
bee summa iniuria: And therefore generall laws, made publickely in 
Parliament, may vpon knowen respects to the King by his authoritie bee 
mitigated, and suspended vpon causes onely knowen to him.551 
While James distinguishes between a king and a tyrant (a king follows a country’s 
established laws; a tyrant advances his own good), in the end, “‘Kings are in the word 
of GOD it selfe called Gods, as being his Lieutenant and Vice-regents on earth.’” 552  
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And, for James, Chancery provided an important instrument with which the monarch 
could minister God’s will.553   
 The combination of James and Egerton was formidable.  For lawyers such as 
Timothy Tourneur, their agenda raised constitutional issues: 
…the high power of the chancellors…persuade the king that they are solely 
the instruments of his prerogative, and insinuate with the king that his 
prerogative is transcendent to the common law; and thus in a short time they 
will enthral the common law (which yields all due prerogative) and by 
consequence the liberty of the subjects of England will be taken away, and no 
law practiced on them but prerogative, which will be such that no one will 
know the extent thereof….554          
A diary entry from a contemporary judge, Richard Hutton, acknowledges that 
Egerton was “a man of great and profound judgment, an eloquent speaker, and yet in 
his later times he became more choleric and opposed the jurisdiction of the common 
law and enlarged the jurisdiction of the Chancery, and in many things he derogated 
from the common law and the judges.”555  Tourneur concluded that Egerton’s actions 
were motivated “yet not for any hate he bare [the law], but for the love he bare to his 
own honour to greaten himself by the fall of others.”556   Egerton had his champions, 
but extant records suggest a contemporary perception that, toward the end of his 
career, he failed to minister the law equitably. 
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 At the very moment when the power of Chancery was increasing under James, 
the power of another institution with which the lord chancellor was associated, the 
Privy Council, declined in one important respect—that of advising the monarch.557  
The Privy Council continued to carry out administrative and judicial duties, but James 
rarely attended meetings and instead consulted with his favorites on matters of 
state.558  While men such as Egerton remained on the Privy Council, by 1613, the 
Spanish ambassador to England, the Count of Gondomar, felt that it was made up of 
“‘men of small property and little experience in affairs of state and of war.’” 559  The 
rise and fall of such institutions as Chancery and the Privy Council according to the 
personalities of both monarch and advisors meant that the duties themselves of the 
monarch’s ministers of state fluctuated.  One assessment of the lord chancellor’s 
office attempted to define those responsibilities.  In a tract that was reputed to be the 
work of Egerton, the lord chancellor’s “Authority and power” are said to consist of 
two sorts,  
As a Judge, and that is either ORDINARY…[or] ABSOLUTE,…[and] AS a 
MINISTER, GRANTING of pardons of Common Grace.  GRANTING and 
Sealing of Commissions, OF patents and preservations, &c.  MAKING of 
Originall Writs of Processe, upon the Statute Staple, &c.  CONSTITUTING 
of certain Officers belonging to his Office.  GIVING of Oathes to Officers, 
And such like.560  
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As Egerton sought to delineate what it meant to be lord chancellor, so Shakespeare 
and Fletcher sought to define what it meant to be a minister of state.  They are 
skeptical about the claim that one can be a minister of God’s law, pointing to the 
necessity of interpretation.561  Moreover, they portray both Wolsey and Henry VIII as 
ministers of their own words.  Each would have his will become law.  Neither has 
regard for the law of the land.  Neither serves God.   
 The authority of ministers of state is already an issue in the opening scene of 
the play.  When members of the nobility lament the influence that Cardinal Wolsey, 
Lord Chancellor, exerts over Henry, one of their primary concerns revolves around 
Wolsey’s office as a minister.  Buckingham asks Norfolk who “did guide” the 
elaborate Field of the Cloth of Gold.  Norfolk responds that “one, certes, that 
promises no element / In such a business,” since “All this was ordered by the good 
discretion / Of the right reverend Cardinal of York” (1.1.45-51).  Buckingham then 
questions the propriety of Wolsey’s involvement:  “What had he / To do in these 
fierce vanities?” (1.1.53-54).  The nobility are dismayed that low-born Wolsey has 
risen to a position of such power (1.1.59-66), and they are worried about their own 
financial well-being (1.1.80-83); but they are also concerned about Wolsey’s 
involvement in affairs of state.  “What did this vanity / But minister communication 
of / A most poor issue?” (1.1.85-87), asks Buckingham.  Norfolk confirms that the 
expensive display was worthless, since “France hath flawed the league” (1.1.95).  
Wolsey’s meddling is dangerous for the state and for individuals alike.  What his 
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“high hatred would effect wants not / A minister in his power” (1.1.107-08).  That 
“he’s revengeful” (1.1.109) further confirms that he ought not to be lord chancellor.   
 For his part, Wolsey is ever careful to project an air of thoughtfulness about 
what it means to be a minister of state.  Katherine protests the unfair taxation he has 
levied:  “There have been commissions / Sent down among [the subjects] which hath 
flawed the heart / Of all their loyalties” (1.2.20-22).562  Wolsey’s reply to Henry 
about the commissions is cagey; he takes advantage of his place among a cadre of 
advisors:  
Please you, sir,  
I know but of a single part in aught  
Pertains to th’ state, and front but in that file  
Where others tell steps with me.  
(1.2.40-43)   
At the same time, he defends his actions by theorizing about what it means to be a 
statesman: 
If we shall stand still  
In fear our motion will be mocked or carped at,  
We should take root here where we sit,  
Or sit state-statues only.  
(1.2.85-88)   
Lacking in integrity and unwilling to take responsibility for the hard measures that 
fall to statesmen, Wolsey can only say in his self-defense that he has “no further gone 
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in this than by / A single voice, and that not passed me but / By learned approbation 
of the judges” (1.2.69-71).  When he is not being self-serving, he is content to shift 
blame onto Henry and the Privy Council. 
Henry responds on behalf of the commonwealth and its laws, not the 
individual statesman.  Asking whether Wolsey has “a precedent / Of this 
commission” (1.2.91-92), he insists that “We must not rend our subjects from our 
laws / And stick them in our will” (1.2.93-94).  To do so might enable a ruler to gain 
temporarily, but the commonwealth would suffer in the long run:   
Why, we take  
From every tree lop, bark and part o’th’timber,  
And though we leave it with a root, thus hacked  
The air will drink the sap.  
(1.2.95-98) 
Even if Henry’s words are insincere (according to Kurland, “Henry criticizes n 
Wolsey’s government what he consistently does himself”563), even if they are merely 
public relations, they articulate values that pertain to officeholders as well as the 
monarch.  If anything, they pertain most to those ministers of state who, as counselors 
to the monarch, must persuade their sovereign to uphold the law.  
Wolsey is most, if only temporarily, adept at upholding the power of his office 
to advance his own agenda, and, bye the bye, that of the monarch.  The King tells his 
Lord Chancellor to “send our letters with / Free pardon to each man that has denied / 
The force of this commission” (1.2.99-101).  Such a pardon will restore confidence in 
the law of the land.  Wolsey, ever the opportunist, instructs his secretary: 
                                                




Let there be letters writ to every shire  
Of the King’s grace and pardon.  The grieved commons  
Hardly conceive of me:  let it be noised  
That through our intercession this revokement  
And pardon comes.  I shall anon advise you  
Further in the proceeding.  
(1.2.102-08)  
Utilizing Chancery documents as a prop, the lord chancellor pretends to be the keeper 
of the king’s conscience.  Wolsey also exploits his office as the keeper of the king’s 
conscience in relation to Henry’s divorce from Katherine.  The gentlemen discussing 
rumors of the matter believe that “Either the Cardinal / Or some about him near hav , 
out of malice / To the good Queen, possessed him with a scruple” that will lead to her 
downfall (2.1.155-58).  Norfolk, too, believes that Wolsey “dives into the King’s soul 
and there scatters / Dangers, doubts, wringing of the conscience, / Fears and desp irs” 
(2.2.24-26).  These could be just the bitter accusations of Wolsey’s enemies, but 
Henry’s own words point to Wolsey’s office as keeper of the king’s conscience.  
Henry greets Wolsey:  “Who’s there?  My good lord Cardinal?  O my Wolsey, / The 
quiet of my wounded conscience, / Thou art a cure fit for a king” (2.2.72-74).  Later, 
after Henry has acted upon his decision, he blames “conscience, conscience” 
(2.2.141).   
 Katherine’s subsequent “trial” indicts both Wolsey and Henry for failing to be 
ministers of justice.  Her hearing is suggestive of the contemporary controversies over 




Commission.  With bishops, archbishops, members of the nobility, and the King 
seated in state, Wolsey begins the procedures:  “Whilst our commission from Rome is 
read, / Let silence be commanded” (2.4.1-2).  Henry, however, dismisses protocol, 
asserting “It hath already publicly been read, / And on all sides th’authority allowed; / 
You may then spare that time” (2.4.3-5).  Editor Gordon McMullan observes that 
“Henry’s intervention is not in Holinshed, and is possibly added simply to avoid a 
tedious recital of the commission, but also to demonstrate the King’s unease.”564  
Might not the King have been asserting his prerogative, as the monarch and ministers 
did through the ecclesiastical commissions?  Katherine’s actions further recall 
subjects’ challenges to the High Commission’s unfair procedures.  When called upon 
to affirm her presence in the court, Katherine refuses to respond in the expected 
manner.  Instead, she silently rises from her chair, walks about the court, and then 
kneels at the King’s feet, asking him for mercy (s.d. 2.4.10).  Like the accused in the 
ex officio oath trials, Katherine disrupts the proceedings, jeopardizing their 
legitimacy.   
 She also exposes Wolsey’s failure as a minister.  The lord chancellor 
traditionally spoke on behalf of the monarch, but he also spoke on behalf of subjects.  
Katherine has already suggested that Wolsey twisted Buckingham’s words, having 
urged Wolsey to “Deliver all with charity” when he accuses Buckingham of malign 
intent (1.2.143).  During her own trial, she accuses Wolsey of again failing to do what 
is in the best interest of both monarch and subject:  “For it is you / Have blown this 
coal betwixt my lord and me, / Which God’s dew quench” (2.4.76-78).  On these 
grounds, she once again impedes the trial:  “Therefore, I say again, / I utterly abhor, 
                                                




yea, from my soul / Refuse you for my judge” (2.4.78-80).  When Wolsey protests, 
Katherine further indicts him, arguing that he has  
                by fortune and his highness’ favours,   
Gone slightly o’er low steps, and now are mounted  
Where powers are your retainers, and your words,   
Domestics to you, serve your will as’t please  
Yourself pronounce their office.  I must tell you,  
You tender more your person’s honour than   
Your high profession spiritual….  
(2.4.109-15) 
When Katherine exits and refuses to return when she is called back, Henry himself 
acknowledges that she is justified in her objections:  “That man i’th’world who shall 
report he has / A better wife, let him in naught be trusted / For speaking false in that”
(2.4.131-33).  Still, he continues with his plans, like Wolsey ministering to his own 
agenda instead of to justice.           
The scene depicting Wolsey’s downfall underscores his failure as a minister 
of state.  Stunned by Wolsey’s inventory of his vast household, Henry finally 
acknowledges that Wolsey has relinquished his duties as keeper of the king’s 
conscience.  He cannot help but comment ironically on Wolsey’s spiritual 
contemplations:  
You are full of heavenly stuff, and bear the inventory   
Of your best graces in your mind, the which  




To steal from spiritual leisure a brief span   
To keep your earthly audit.  
(3.2.137-41)  
Wolsey responds that “For holy offices I have a time; a time / To think upon the part 
of business which / I bear i’th’state” (3.2.144-46).  But Henry attacks Wolsey’s 
sanctimonious manner, comparing the ways each of them has held his office: 
Since I had my office,   
I have kept you next my heart, have not alone   
Employed you where high profits might come home,   
But pared my present havings to bestow   
My bounties upon you.   
(3.2.156-60)       
While Norfolk, Buckingham, and Katherine have all commented on Wolsey’s 
shortcomings as a cleric, Henry also reproaches Wolsey for his shortcomings as a 
minister of state: “Have I not made you / The prime man of the state?” (3.2.161-62). 
The indictment brought against Wolsey emphasizes the extent to which 
Wolsey exploited the prerogative of his office in order to betray his monarch.  Many 
of the charges against Wolsey relate to his appropriation of official communicatio s 
to advance his own power.  According to Norfolk,  
 all you writ to Rome, or else  
To foreign princes, ‘ego et rex meus’  
Was still inscribed, in which you brought the King  




(3.2.313-15)   
In any number of ways, Wolsey has transgressed the boundaries of his authority.  He 
“made bold / To carry into Flanders the great seal” (3.2.318-19) and he tried to make 
alliances without the king’s knowledge:   
Item, you sent a large commission  
To Gregory de Cassado, to conclude,  
Without the King’s will or the state’s allowance,  
A league between his highness and Ferrara.  
(3.2.320-23)   
He has “stamped” his “holy hat … on the King’s coin” (3.2.325).  As Katherine later 
concludes, he made “His own opinion … his law” (4.2.37). 
Wolsey’s actions precipitate his downfall, but so does Henry’s assertion of his 
own power.565  Early in the play, Henry is depicted as a distant governor; like in the 
More play, the absent monarch creates a void that, here, Wolsey fills.566  But 
immediately after Katherine’s trial, Henry reconstitutes his relationship with his lord 
chancellor(s).  Wolsey asks Henry to clear him of the charge Katherine has made 
against him.  Henry acquiesces, but in his narrative of events, Henry publicly re-
claims his conscience.  He explains that after “My conscience first received a 
tenderness, / Scruple and prick on certain speeches uttered / By th’Bishop of 
Bayonne, then French ambassador” (2.4.167-69).  He subsequently deliberated about 
the propriety of his marriage to Katherine, consulting with others.  Three more times 
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Henry repeats that he was acting according to “my conscience.”  He thus relieves 
Wolsey of personal responsibility for his actions.  But in doing so, he relieves his lord 
chancellors of their duty to keep the king’s conscience.  And while an unchecked lord 
chancellor is potentially dangerous, an unchecked monarch is not the solution.  
Gordon McMullan notes the ambivalence toward Henry VIII in Jacobean England, 
particularly among Protestants; while the significance of his split with Rome was 
acknowledged, he was also remembered for defending the Catholic faith, persecuting 
Protestants, and for the absolutism of his reign.567  When Shakespeare and Fletcher 
explore the relationship between Henry VIII and his lord chancellors, they inevitably 
consider the implications of any minister of the state who, like James, insists that he 
is above the law. 
Wolsey’s downfall sets the stage for Henry’s delimitation of his officeholders 
in general.  News is brought to Wolsey that Sir Thomas More has been made Lord 
Chancellor.  But after this hasty transfer of power, More’s name is never again 
mentioned, and the office of the lord chancellor is now reduced to a largely 
ceremonial role.  The “Lord Chancellor, with purse and mace before him” appears as 
part of the stage directions for the Queen Anne’s coronation procession (4.1.36).  Not 
to mention More’s name is to minimize his presence and thus, as R.A. Foakes notes, 
to “‘avoid the intrusion of a personality.’”568  It may also be that the dramatists’ desire 
is to minimize the lord chancellor’s role so that they may emphasize the monarch’s.  
Another reference to Henry’s consolidation of his power occurs in the discussion of 
the coronation proceedings.  When one of the gentlemen mentions that the party of 
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state has gone to York Place for the feast, another gentleman corrects him: “You must 
no more call it ‘York Place’—that’s past; / For since the Cardinal fell, that title’s lost. 
/ ‘Tis now the King’s, and called ‘Whitehall’” (4.1.95-97).   
In the play’s final scenes, Shakespeare and Fletcher appear to uphold the 
monarch’s newly-claimed prerogative, prophesying peace and prosperity for 
Protestant England.  But the depictions of Thomas Cranmer’s hearing and the 
subsequent baptism of Elizabeth are ambivalent.  Still other scenes depicting Henry 
suggest his tyrannical bent.  His words and actions reveal a man who wants his word 
to be the law and the truth.  When the Old Lady arrives to inform him of his 
daughter’s death, Henry greets her with a question and a command: “Is the Queen 
delivered? / Say ‘Ay, and of a boy’ (5.1.162-63).  As McMullan notes, the Old Lady 
is thus put into an impossible position, caught between following the King’s 
command and telling the truth.  She manages to squirm her way out by reporting  
Ay, ay, my liege,   
And of a lovely boy.  The God of heaven   
Both now and ever bless her: ‘tis a girl  
Promises boys hereafter. 
    (5.1.163-66).569   
Henry later professes outrage over the Council’s treatment of Cranmer, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury; when they summon Cranmer to the Council meeting, they 
have him hold “state at door ‘mongst pursuivants, / Pages and footboys” (5.2.23-24).  
Henry remarks that “‘Tis well there’s one above ‘em yet” (5.2.26).  Henry is outraged 
that they would treat a fellow member of the Council this way, particularly one who 
                                                




is “so near our favour” (5.2.29).  It is unclear what he resents more, the insult to 
Cranmer or the fact that the Council presumes a privilege Henry assumes should be 
his, making “A man of [Cranmer’s] place … / To dance attendance on their lordships’ 
pleasures” (5.2.29-30).   
 Henry’s meeting with Cranmer has its own tyrannical aspects.  When 
Cranmer is summoned to confer with Henry prior to his hearing, he is “fearful.  
Wherefore frowns [Henry] thus? / ‘Tis his aspect of terror.  All’s not well” (5.1.87-
88).  Henry rebukes Cranmer for Cranmer’s naïve belief that “the good I stand on is 
my truth and honesty” (5.1.122).  Henry protests,  
Your enemies are many and not small: their practices   
Must bear the same proportion, and not ever  
The justice and the truth o’th’question carries  
The due o’th’verdict with it.  At what ease  
Might corrupt minds procure corrupt knaves as corrupt  
To swear against you? Such things have been done. 
       (5.1.128-33) 
Henry acknowledges that justice is habitually corrupted but faults Cranmer.  He also 
demeans Cranmer’s faith:   
Ween you of better luck –  
I mean in perjured witness – than your master,  
Whose minister you are, while here he lived   
Upon this naughty earth?  Go to, go to:   




And woo your own destruction. 
     (5.1.135-40)   
Henry comes off as a poor minister of the law, both God’s law and the realm’s.  He 
tolerates the corruption of justice rather than root it out.  Indeed, corruption even 
seems to serve his purpose, enabling him to ride in as savior whenever he wishes.  
When he construes Cranmer’s faith as naïve, he suggests that his law is more 
powerful than God’s.   
It hardly helps the reputation of the lord chancellor’s office that Stephen 
Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester and future lord chancellor under Queen Mary, makes 
an appearance as a poorly qualified minister of justice in the play’s final scene .  In 
conversation with Sir Thomas Lovell, he celebrates the birth of Elizabeth, but he 
reveals that he would be happy with the Queen’s death (5.1.20-23).  Lovell’s response 
points to Gardiner’s lack of a conscience.  While he agrees with Winchester, his 
“conscience says / She’s a good creature and, sweet lady, does / Deserve our better 
wishes” (5.1.24-26).  Gardiner, for his part, acknowledges that he instigated the 
proceedings against Cranmer (5.1.41-45).  When Cranmer protests the inquisitorial 
nature of the proceedings, begging “That in this case, of justice, my accusers, / B  
what they will, may stand forth face to face / And freely urge against me” (5.2.80-8 ), 
Gardiner tries to intimidate Cranmer, imputing that they have more important 
business to attend to and that Henry has decreed that Cranmer be sent to the Tower 
(5.2.88-91).  Cranmer, Shakespeare and Fletcher respond by calling into question 
Gardiner’s integrity as a judge and priest:  




I shall both find your lordship judge and juror,  
You are so merciful.  I see your end:   
‘Tis my undoing.  Love and meekness, lord,  
Become a churchman better than ambition.  
Win straying souls with modesty again;   
Cast none away.  That I shall clear myself,  
Lay all the weight ye can upon my patience,  
I make as little doubt as you do conscience  
In doing daily wrongs.  I could say more,   
But reverence to your calling makes me modest. (5.2.93-103) 
This assessment must be taken as an implicit indictment of Henry and Mary, too.  
 In contrast, the Lord Chancellor, were he given the chance, would fulfill the 
office of minister of justice.  When the trial begins, the Lord Chancellor informs 
Cranmer of the complaint against him, and does so in a way that suggests the 
potential for forgiveness that inheres in the office of the lord chancellor:  
we are all men,   
In our own natures frail, and capable   
Of our flesh – few are angels –  out of which frailty   
And want of wisdom, you that best should teach us   
Have misdemeaned yourself, and not a little,  
Toward the King first, then his laws, in filling   
The whole realm, by your teaching and your chaplains’ –   




Diverse and dangerous, which are heresies  
And, not reformed, may prove pernicious. 
      (5.2.44-53).   
The Lord Chancellor’s moderation stands in contrast to Gardiner’s overheated 
predictions of “Commotions, uproars, with a general taint / Of the whole state, as of 
late days our neighbours, / The upper Germany, can dearly witness” (5.2.62-64).  The 
hearing lapses into an exchange of insults between Gardiner, Cranmer, and Thomas
Cromwell (secretary to the Privy Council), until the Lord Chancellor finally 
interrupts, reminding them of their place: “This is too much. / Forbear, for shame, my 
lords” (5.2.119-20).  When Henry, in turn, charges the Council with unstatesmenlike 
behavior, only the Lord Chancellor assumes responsibility:  
My most dread sovereign, may it like your grace   
To let my tongue excuse all.  What was purposed  
Concerning his imprisonment was rather –   
If there be faith in men – meant for his trial   
And fair purgation to the world than malice,   
I’m sure, in me. 
     (5.2.182-87)   
The last words that the Lord Chancellor speaks present his office as a medium for 
forgiveness, fairness, and justice in the polity.      
Of course, the Lord Chancellor only nominally presides over the proceedings 
against Cranmer.  He has no control over them.  As noted above, Gardiner instigated 




scripted the whole affair.  He earlier reassured Cranmer, telling him to “Be f good 
cheer. / They shall no more prevail than we give way to” (5.1.142-43).  Now, with his 
dramatic entrance in the middle of the trial, he confounds the Council, ordering them 
to “respect [Cranmer]. / Take him, and use him well: he’s worthy of it” (5.2.187-88).  
Having extracted Gardiner’s acquiescence, Henry leaves the Council with one last 
directive:  “As I have made ye one, lords, one remain: / So I grow stronger, you more 
honour gain” (5.2.214-15).  But Henry’s direction to his Council is undermined by his 
own words.  Henry has earlier exposed Gardiner as an actor whose special talent is 
improvisation:   
You were ever good at sudden commendations,  
Bishop of Winchester.  But know I come not  
To hear such flattery now, and in my presence  
They are too thin and base to hide offenses. 
      (5.2.157-60)  
In light of this acknowledgement, it seems improbable that Gardiner’s acquiesenc  is 
sincere; rather than forging unity, Henry’s parting words to his Council ring empty.  
After all, Henry earlier confirmed his Council’s irrelevance, telling them that he 
understands that they “would try [Cranmer] to the utmost, had ye mean, / Which ye 
shall never have while I live” (5.2.180-81).  Henry keeps the peace by virtue of his 
absolute power.  But tensions simmer beneath the surface, and in ministering his 





  Henry dismisses the Council’s hearing of Cranmer – even though it has 
everything to do with the administration of the laws of God and of England – by 
exclaiming that “we trifle time away” (5.2.212).  He longs only to have his “young 
one made a Christian” (5.2.213).  Obviously a monarch needed to be concerned about 
succession and about his heir’s baptism, too.  However, this ruler has been by turns 
licentious and tyrannical.   Camille Wells Slights argues that the crowds depicted at 
Anne’s coronation scene and at the baptism “evoke images of strength and 
fertility.” 570  But the “fry of fornication” cited by the Porter (5.3.34) suggests 
lawlessness and futility every bit as much as fertility.  Celebrating the birth of 
Elizabeth, the play ignores the births of Mary and Edward, and England’s years of 
religious turmoil, to which Henry’s fertility in some measure led.   
If, as Cranmer’s prophecy suggests, the monarch’s chief concern is the 
establishment of a Protestant nation, then it might be more productive to administer 
the law in the present than to place his hopes in an heir.  The crowd that gathers to 
watch the baptismal procession is rowdy and threatening: “These are the you s that 
thunder at a playhouse and fight for bitten apples, that no audience but the tribulation 
of Tower-hill or the limbs of Limehouse, their dear brothers, are able to endure” 
(5.3.60-63).  The Porter indicts both the crowd and the spectacle of government they 
have gathered to watch.  Rather than show respect for the baptismal ceremony, the 
crowd behaves “as if we kept a fair here” (5.3.66).  The Lord Chamberlain, dismayed 
by the scene, chastises the porters themselves for failing to do their duty:  
As I live,   
If the King blame me for’t, I’ll lay ye all   
                                                




By the heels, and suddenly; and on your heads   
Clap round fines for neglect.  Y’are lazy knaves,   
And here ye lie baiting of bombards, when  
Ye should do service.  
(5.3.77-82)   
Note that the Lord Chamberlain will act only if the monarch blames him for not 
keeping the peace.  We have reason to doubt that Henry will; here are his last words: 
“This day, no man think / Has business at his house, for all shall stay: / This little one 
shall make it holiday” (5.4.73-75).  The kind of reverence that Henry demands – the 
reverence that makes the birth of his heirs into a holy-day – leads to irreverence, and 
consequently lawlessness, among their subjects.    
When they staged England’s lord chancellors, the dramatists behind Sir 
Thomas More and Henry VIII were not just representing famous personages.  They 
were examining the claims made by contemporary officeholders to be ministers of the 
law, ministers of justice, God’s ministers on earth.  When an officeholder claims “to 
minister,” he claims simultaneously to serve, to provide, to manage and to control.571  
Does he, then, serve the law, provide the law, or manage the law?  Is he governed by 
the law, or does he govern his subjects according to the law – or his law?  
Interrogating the broad jurisdiction that such claims allowed, Munday, Shakespear, 
and Fletcher raise questions about the purpose of governors and government. 
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Chapter 4:  Officially Speaking 
“The office of the Maior is the highest and cheefest in the citie, and is named 
in the Latine, Maior, and in the Saxon Mayer, both which importe one, and 
the same thing; namelie one more excellent and above the rest.  And as he is 
in authoritie above all others, so much the more is he in godliness, wisdom 
and knowledge to excel and exceede them.  He is the eie and the head of the 
whole common-weale, and therefore must he see and understand all things 
incident and appertaining both to the common governement of the citie, and to 
the preservation of the public state.”572 
 
Toward the end of the sixteenth century, London’s lord mayor was 
increasingly celebrated in popular media.  The lord mayor’s show, held yearly for his 
installation, was an important civic procession that honored the City and its merchant 
elite.573  Individual lord mayors were mythologized; the legend of the medieval lord 
mayor, “Dick” Whittington, the poor boy who came to London and made his fortune 
with the aid of his cat, was well-known in the 1590s.574  Lord mayors’ major and 
marginal roles in early modern plays were part of a “wave of civic mythmaking” that 
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celebrated “a whole gallery of urban luminaries whose virtues equalled or outshone 
those of nobility and kings.”575  In addition to exalting these men’s virtue, these plays 
explore the virtue of office itself.  Even when the mayor’s role is marginal, his office 
often proves central to a play’s overall concerns.  In this chapter, I will examine 
William Shakespeare’s Richard III and Thomas Heywood’s 1 King Edward IV and 1 
If You Know Not Me.  Whereas Heywood’s Edward IV features London’s lord mayor 
and its recorder in prominent roles, the lord mayors play more marginal roles in the 
other two plays.  Nonetheless, in all three plays, Shakespeare and Heywood are 
concerned not only with royal succession but with civic officeholding.  The plays link 
these two concerns by exploring the officeholders’ prerogative of free speech, 
ultimately questioning exactly whose interests these officeholders represent. 
Associating civic office with free speech, Shakespeare and Heywood rely on 
the language of classical republicanism to criticize monarchs and, in Heywood’s case, 
perhaps hereditary monarchy itself.  Freedom of speech and freedom to debate were 
tenets of early modern republicanism.576  Humanists studied classical republican 
texts, such as Cicero’s De Officiis, which addressed not only the virtues of holding 
office, but the virtues one needed to govern well.577  As Cicero recognizes, the 
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“power of speech is considerable, and has a twofold application, in argumentation and 
in conversation.  The first is to be employed in debate in the courts, in public 
assemblies, and in the senate….”578  Cicero urges statesmen  
even in times of greatest success [to] exploit the advice of friends to the full, 
and lend even greater weight than previously to their authority; and under 
those same favourable circumstances we must beware of lending an ear to 
sycophants, and of exposing ourselves to flattery, for it is easy to be deceived 
in that way once we believe that our standing merits such praise.579   
Early modern English humanists associated debate and advising with participation in 
the vita activa as governors and as counselors.580  Members of Parliament, in 
particular, considered counseling the monarch to be one of their duties.581  A  is well-
known, under both Elizabeth and James, Parliament’s right to debate and to counsel 
was contested.582   
Under Elizabeth, the question of freedom of speech in Parliament often was 
related to the succession crisis.  Members of Parliament broached concerns over 
Elizabeth’s marriage and the naming of her successor at various times throughout her 
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reign, in spite of the fact that she forbade discussion of such topics.583  In 1566, a 
“Mr. Lambert” began a speech on the succession in spite of the fact that three days 
earlier, Elizabeth had specifically prohibited Parliament from addressing these 
issues.584  Paul Wentworth, objecting to these restrictions, wondered “‘whether hyr 
Hyghnes’ commawndment, forbyddyng the lower howse to speake or treate any more 
of the successyon and of any theyre excuesses in that behalffe, be a breacheof the 
lybertie of the free speache of the Howse or not?’”585  Historians today caution that 
“free speache” in this context does not imply modern concepts of “freedom of 
conscience and freedom of expression.”586  Instead, it refers to the latitude members 
of Parliament had in discussing political matters of national importance.587  John Guy 
cautions that debates about Parliament’s role as counsel never assumed Parliament’s 
counsel as a right per se:  “Even in the Privy Council, counseling was a duty, not a 
right.”588  But he also observes that Wentworth’s brother Peter “exceeded all bounds” 
when he argued for Parliament’s right to free speech in the 1570s.589  In responding to 
issues like the succession question, members of Parliament were exploring 
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Parliament’s role as counselor and their roles as representatives; how freely they were 
able to give counsel was a central concern.     
Important local officeholders would have been familiar with the limits of 
representation in Parliament.  Town officers, like the mayor and recorder, often sat in 
Parliament.590  Mark Kishlansky has found that “in perhaps the most common method 
of selecting members, boroughs used one of their civic officers either to hold a place 
or to nominate to it.”591  A list of London’s representatives to Parliament finds 
substantial crossover between civic and national offices in Elizabethan England:  
Edward Osborne, lord mayor in 1583, sat in Parliament in 1586; George Barne(s), 
lord mayor in 1586, sat in Parliament in 1589; John Harte, lord mayor in 1589, sat in 
Parliament in 1593 and 1597; Stephen So(a)me, lord mayor in 1598, sat in Parliament 
in 1601; Henry Billingsley, lord mayor in 1596, sat in Parliament in 1603.592  William 
Fleetwood, London’s recorder from 1571-1592,593 was very active in the Parliaments 
of 1572, 1585, 1586, and 1589.594  Indeed, Fleetwood’s background served him well:   
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  …[Privy] Councillors … relied on a number of competent second-line 
members with whom they had direct links, like Thomas Norton and William 
Fleetwood.  These were men with legal expertise, busy on committees and in 
debate, and prominent in drafting important measures.  They were thus in the 
midst of ‘government’ business in the Commons….595 
While these men were advancing the interests of Privy Council and the Crown, they 
were just as often advocating for London.  London “had long experience of using 
Parliament to solve its problems” and its lobbies were “the most active, best 
organized and therefore most troublesome.”596  At the same time, City officeholders 
were wary of courtiers who sought reversions to offices in order to bestow them as 
patrons.  In the 1570s and again in the 1590s, City rulers took measures to restrict the 
granting of these offices, limiting some of them to freemen.597  Such action suggests 
that City rulers were conceptualizing their own offices as sites of representation, since 
they were wary of allowing those who might have extraneous allegiances to hold 
office. 
Both Shakespeare and Heywood cast or invoke characters that had historical 
connections to Parliament.  Indeed, Heywood’s play foregrounds London citizens 
who held prominent civic and national offices; three of Heywood’s main characters, 
Lord Mayor John Crosby, Recorder Thomas Urswick, and citizen Ralph Josselyn, sat 
in the Parliament of 1461.  Although the historical John Crosby was never lord 
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mayor, Heywood casts him instead of John Stockton, who was the lord mayor but 
who never sat for London in Parliament. 598  As for Ralph Josselyn, he was not lord 
mayor at the time of the rebellion depicted in Heywood’s play, but he was later 
elected lord mayor twice.599  While Richard III’s lord mayor, Edmund Shaw, did not 
sit in Parliament, Shakespeare refers to Thomas Fitzwilliam, who was named recorder 
of London in 1483, and who was returned to Parliament for London in 1483 (under 
Richard III), and again in 1485, 1488, and 1489 (under Henry VII).600  Heywood and 
Shakespeare predictably align these characters’ Parliamentary connecti s with 
concerns about freedom of speech.  But they also develop them as officeholders of 
London, thereby shifting the focus from debates about Parliamentary representation 
to the representative nature of office, emphasizing in particular the offices o  lord 
mayor and recorder.           
 Historically, London’s lord mayor was deputized to act on behalf of both the 
citizenry and the Crown.  Presiding over London’s primary governing body, the Court 
of Common Council, the lord mayor was integral to the regulation of City life.601  
While the Court of Common Council oversaw taxation, the lord mayor was 
responsible for determining wages and setting prices.602  He “set the price of fewell 
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for summer, and [took] good order for good bondes to keepe it.”603  It was the lord 
mayor’s job “to looke to the provision of graine as occasion shall require,” and “to 
provide for the store of all other vitaile from time to time.”604  In his role as a paternal 
figure, the lord mayor looked after widows and orphans.605  He was also a diplomat 
on behalf of both London and England, welcoming England’s monarch as well as 
foreign statesmen to the City.606  In his administrative capacity, he interpreted and 
applied national statutes to City matters; he saw to it “that all letters and 
commandments from the Queen’s Majesty be … duly and speedily executed and 
answered.”607  Should the monarch die, the lord mayor “became the chief legal 
authority in the kingdom.”608  Clearly, the lord mayor was a central figure in the life 
of both London and its citizens and England and its subjects.   
That the lord mayor was duty-bound to the City and the commonwealth was 
brought home by the election of a new mayor each year.609  In 1594, the recorder 
noted that the annual election was important since it reminded the lord mayor that he 
was “to rule Men, and his Fellow Citizens; to rule them not after his will, but 
according to the laws; to rule, not alwaie, but for a time, and no longer tyme then only 
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one yeare; then to lay downe his office … and become a Member, and noe Head, as 
ready to obey as he was willing to command.”610  Printed tracts carefully record the 
events surrounding the lord mayor’s election, presenting the peaceful transfer of 
power as a normal course of events.  The lord mayor’s final September duty was to 
“call the Commons on Michaelmas day to elect a new Maior for the yeare 
following.”611  In October, “on the day before Simon and Jude the Commons being 
assembled in the Guildhall, the old Maior then being in the Inner Court before their 
commyng out to the Commons, after thankes to all his brethren for their assistaunce 
and such othr speache of excuse advise or otherwise as shall please him to use is to 
yelde the Chayre to the Maior elected.”612  The annual lord mayor’s inaugural shows 
had unmistakably republican undertones:  
in contrast to the royal entry ceremony, modeled on the pattern of the 
Christian and Roman imperial advent, the lord mayor’s shows were modeled 
formally on the Roman republican processus consularis and the military 
‘triumph.’  The mayor’s ‘triumph’ was understood not as a once-and-for-all 
salvific miracle, but as an annual renewal in an ongoing history of orderly 
transitions and exceptional achievements.613   
The lord mayor’s office was a celebration of civic service.  He was admonished to act 
in the best interests of the City and the kingdom.    
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Although the lord mayor was preeminent, London governance was shared by 
many.  Thomas Norton observed that it should be some comfort to James Hawes, lord 
mayor in 1574-75, that  
the generall forme of the settled and true pollitie of the Citie of London [was] 
so distributed and marshaled in ordre by the wysdome of oure forefathers as, 
lyke a heavye burthen parted and laied upon manie shoulders, or lyke a great 
woorke sorted into manie handes, the officers of wardes, parishes, and 
precincts, the companies with their Masters, Wardenns, and Governors, moste 
prudentlie assigned to everie woorcke and place, together with the orderlie 
formes, times, limitations, and circumstances, delivered by knowen and usuall 
presidentes, shall beare the waight with yowe, and make yowe to beare 
lighter.614   
Among the City’s officers was the recorder, appointed by the Crown but answerable 
chiefly to the City.  Norton further encouraged Hawes by observing that the current 
recorder was “learned and painefull, and to her Majesties service dutifullie, to the 
Citie faithefullie, and to your selfe lovinglie affected.”615  The recorder was 
“originally appointed to be the City’s chief legal adviser and judge in certain of its 
courts," including the Old Bailey.616  As a justice of the peace for the City, the 
recorder often worked with the Privy Council.617  The Crown relied upon the recorder 
for consultation about trials; regarding Edmund Campion’s trial, for example, 
Burghley suggested to Walshingham that he convince “‘Her Majesty that the Lord 
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Chancellor [Bromley] by conference with the Recorder might devise some way 
agreeable to the law for [Campion’s] punishment.’”618  Additionally, “the Mayor and 
Aldermen have been accustomed commonly to set forth all other matters touching the 
City in presence of his lordship the King and his Council, as also in all the royal 
Courts, by the mouth of such Recorder.”619  Like the lord mayor, the recorder was in 
the service of both the City and the Crown.   
Of course, these were interdependent.  Both the City as a corporation and its 
individual merchants were important financial resources for the Crown.  The City 
funded the Crown’s ventures through taxes, customs revenues and loans.620  
Certainly, Londoners were well aware of the Crown’s dependence on them.  David 
Harris Sacks cites John Stow’s characterization of London as the “‘Kinges 
chamber.’”621  Ian Archer also notes that, particularly during the 1590s, the Crown’s 
increased demands for money led to the perception of a fiscal crisis, regardless of the 
actual burden that these demands posed.622  Nevertheless, the citizens of London 
recognized the advantages of cooperation.  The royal prerogative gave the Crown 
jurisdiction over other vital aspects of City life: “the Crown granted the livery 
companies their charters and supervised their ordinances.”623  The Privy Council 
helped City rulers in their provisioning of London and in enforcing tax policies.624  
Aldermen relied on the Crown’s support for bills introduced in Parliament that were 
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meant to regulate City companies; but companies might rely on the royal prerogative 
in attempts to bypass the aldermen.625  The Crown’s notorious issuing of monopolies 
led to various negotiations between City and Crown.626  No wonder “monarchs found 
themselves engaging in the process of dialogue, exchange, and contractual 
obligation” during their ceremonial royal entries.627   
Nor was the “contractual obligation” merely economic.  The Crown also 
depended upon City rulers’ help to keep the king’s peace.  Elizabethan authorities 
were leery of disorderly apprentices (and gentry), and disorder was on the rise in the 
1590s.628  Authorities were also concerned about the threat posed by foreigners, 
including ambassadors and especially those from Catholic countries.629  The Privy 
Council required the help of London’s officeholders since “to lose control of the 
capital was to lose control of the realm.”630  As ex officio justice of the peace, 
Recorder Fleetwood not only provided legal advice for the Privy Council, he was also 
entrusted with keeping the peace.631  The City elite’s law and order function was 
literally embodied in their role in coronation entries: “by forming a buffer between 
the tumultuous London crowds behind them and the nobility and royalty passing 
before them, … the orderly ranks of London officials, in full regalia, served as a 
symbolic reminder of the City’s essential role in maintaining civil order.”632  The 
City’s loyalty was crucial during the 1601 Essex rebellion, when the Earl of Essex 
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mistakenly counted on the City’s support.633  Maintaining order in the City no less 
than in the realm required a joint effort.   
Jurisdiction was another two-way, City/Crown, street.  The Crown granted 
London’s liberties.  These liberties allowed the City to govern itself as well as to 
award “freeman citizenship” to certain inhabitants.634  But because these liberties 
could be revoked, negotiations between Crown and City were not uncommon.  Henry 
I, in granting London its charter, formalized the liberties the City had previously 
enjoyed.635  However, even though these liberties had been confirmed by King John 
in Magna Carta (1215), subsequent monarchs challenged the privileges.  For 
example, following Henry III’s accession, London’s liberties were re-negotiated in 
1218, when the citizens turned over to the monarch “a fifteenth of their personal 
estates for the confirmation of their ancient privileges.”636  According to W. 
Woodcock, London’s history—and England’s—involves a constant interplay between 
England’s monarchs and London’s citizens, with the lord mayor serving as the 
citizens’ chief representative.637   
In her day, Queen Elizabeth promised to protect London’s liberties: “As for 
the privileges and Charters of your City, I will discharge of my oath and affection, see 
them safely and exactly maintained, … and persuade yourselves that for the safety 
and quietness of you all, I will not spare, if need be, to spend my blood in your 
behalf.”638  But as Ian Archer observes, these “privileges and Charters” remained 
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precarious in the eyes of Elizabethans.639  London’s recorder acknowledged the City’s 
debt in a speech to Queen Elizabeth in 1593 (“we enjoy our jurisdictions and 
privileges derived from your imperial crown”);640 the author of Apologie of the Citie 
of London refers to causes that “‘have heretofore moved the Princes, either to fine and 
ransome the Citizens of London, or to seize the Liberties of the Citty it selfe.’”641  
Such causes included “the City’s support for rebels against the prince, the breakdown 
of order within the capital, abuses in the City’s own government and justice, and 
straightforward extortion by the Crown on flimsy pretexts.”642  Citizens responded to 
their anxieties over these liberties in different ways.  City rulers in 1580 approved a 
plan to revamp the City’s system of record-keeping; newly archived and indexed 
records were meant to facilitate the retrieval of records relevant to protecting 
London’s liberties.643  Archer attributes the cohesiveness of London’s ruling elites in 
part to the need to appear united in the face of a meddlesome Crown.644  In 1587, the 
recorder of London admonished citizens reluctant to serve as sheriff, recalling “the 
City’s forfeiture of its privileges under Edward II when a mayor cast off his robes and 
refused to come to commissions of oyer and terminer.”645     
Finally, Londoners’ vulnerability to the Crown was exacerbated by succession 
issues.  London’s rulers knew something about complicated choices, for example, 
“choices for or against Somerset in October 1549, and for or against Lady Jane Grey 
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and the Duke of Northumberland in July 1553.”646  In 1549, “when the City was 
approached by the lords of the privy council for aid against the isolated Protector,” 
the citizen George Tadlowe cautioned against the “wrong decision”: “rebellion 
against Henry III had resulted in the loss of the liberties of the City, ‘and strange s 
appointed to be our heads and governors.’”647  The City’s aldermen again experienced 
difficulties “in the first year of the reign of Mary Tudor, who regarded them with 
intense suspicion for their acquiescence in the nine days’ rule of her rival.”648  Queen 
Elizabeth frustrated her subjects by refusing to address publicly an issue that had such 
significant ramifications. 
But Elizabeth’s subjects managed to voice their apprehensions, particularly in 
print and on stage.649  Shakespeare’s Richard III, for example, is clearly concerned 
with succession.650  Gloucester exploits both London’s lord mayor and the City 
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recorder in order to establish his legitimacy as monarch.651  Less readily apparent may 
be the extent to which Richard III explores republican theory, particularly concepts of 
free speech, in relation to Richard’s (or Elizabeth’s) succession crisis.  Hence 
Shakespeare presages his later treatment of the Roman republic in Coriolanus 
(c.1609).  Annabel Patterson has argued that Coriolanus represents Shakespeare’s 
“belief that Jacobean England desperately needed to borrow from the strengths, as 
well as learn from the difficulties, of republican political theory.”652  Patterson 
situates the play in the context of the 1607 Midlands Rising and the 1610 Parliament, 
arguing that the play is “devoted to these questions: who shall speak for the 
commons; what power should the common people have in the system; to what extent 
is common power compatible with national safety?”653  In Richard III, Shakespeare 
was already examining similar issues in their English context.  The earli r play 
certainly acknowledges that England could benefit from “the strengths … of 
republican political theory.” 
Richard III (c.1593) refers rather pointedly to questions surrounding the 
Elizabethan succession and to Londoners’ increasing concerns regarding official 
record-keeping.  This is to link officeholding with subjects’ freedom of speech.  Thus 
Gloucester plots his way to England’s throne, resorting to assassination to remove 
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obstacles, but he cannot entirely ignore the will of the subjects.654  Accordingly, he 
enlists the aid of London’s Lord Mayor and the Recorder in his attempt to claim 
popular support.  Andrew Gurr has argued that the play depicts the importance of 
“democratic process” since it is the nobility who determine the outcome.655  Gurr is 
referring to an abstract democratic process, resolved by the nobility choosing sides in 
battle.  I believe that Shakespeare emphasizes the importance of the subjects’ voice 
even before war, and that in doing so, he points to the importance of office in 
mediating that voice.   
The Lord Mayor is first introduced as London’s representative when he 
welcomes the young Prince Edward, heir to Edward IV’s throne, to London.  Richard 
has just warned Prince Edward against his other uncles, who, Richard contends, are 
“dangerous” (3.1.12) and “false friends” (3.1.15).656  Richard then introduces the 
Lord Mayor, who wishes the new monarch well:  “God bless your Grace with health 
and happy days!” (3.1.18).  This ceremonial greeting conveys the subjects’ loyalty.  
Richard III goes on to develop the Lord Mayor’s importance as an officeholder rather 
than as a historical accomplice in Richard’s usurpation of the throne.  According to 
Sir Thomas More’s account of events, the lord mayor “upon trust of hys awyne 
avauncement, where he was of a proude harte highly desirous, toke on hym to traine 
the cytie to their appetite.”657 Shakespeare’s Lord Mayor may be ambitious, or 
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perhaps just naïve; in either case, Shakespeare is less concerned with the Lord 
Mayor’s personal characteristics than with the importance of his office.   
In the play, it is the office of the lord mayor that disseminates the words of the 
would-be monarch to his subjects.  Richard needs the Lord Mayor to justify the trial 
and execution of Hastings, when in fact the process has been a mockery of justice.  In 
More’s narrative, as soon as news of Hastings’s execution begins to circulate, the 
“Protectoure immediately after dyner (entending to set some colour upon the mat er) 
sent in all the haste for many substancial men out of the cytie into the Towre”; after 
“explaining” the circumstances to them, “he required them to report.”658  Instead of 
relying on a cadre of the City’s elite “to report” the incident to other subjects, 
Shakespeare emphasizes the Lord Mayor’s ratification of Richard’s and 
Buckingham’s words.  According to Buckingham, they had not intended to execute 
Hastings until the Lord Mayor himself had “...heard / The traitor speak, and 
timorously confess / The manner and the purpose of his treasons” (3.5.55-57).  
Unfortunately, according to Richard, Catesby and Buckingham acted impulsively: the 
“loving haste of these our friends, / Something against our meanings” (3.5.53-54) has 
kept the Lord Mayor from hearing this testimony.  Since Hastings’ guilt is taken as a 
given, the real value of the Lord Mayor’s presence is as a witness; Richard would 
have had the Lord Mayor hear Hastings’s confession of treason, “That you might well 
have signified the same / Unto the citizens, who haply may / Misconstrue us in him 
and wail his death” (3.5.58-60).   
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Shakespeare’s depiction of Richard’s interactions with the Lord Mayor 
correlates the behavior of a tyrant with denial of freedom of speech to his 
officeholder.  The Lord Mayor is expected to serve as witness to what he has not 
seen.  The worth of his testimony is vitiated.  When Richard and Buckingham provide 
the Lord Mayor with a script, he acquiesces: 
 But, my good lord, your Graces’ words shall serve 
 As well as I had seen and heard him speak; 
 And do not doubt, right noble princes both, 
 But I’ll acquaint our duteous citizens 
 With all your just proceedings in this cause. (3.5.61-65) 
When he deploys the Lord Mayor to cover up unlawful proceedings, Richard 
exemplifies Sir Thomas Smith’s key characteristics of a tyrant:  “A tyraunt they name 
him, who by force commeth to the Monarchy against the will of the people, breaketh 
lawes already made at his pleasure, maketh other without the advise and consent of 
the people, and regardeth not the wealth of his communes but the advancement of 
him selfe, his faction, & kindred.”659   
Tyranny and free speech are again put into play in the scene at Guildhall, 
where Buckingham makes public the case for “the bastardy of Edward’s children” 
(3.7.4).  Buckingham reports to Richard that the subjects were silent in the face ofthis 
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justification of Richard’s claim.  When Buckingham questioned the meaning of this 
“wilful silence,” the Lord Mayor excused it, explaining that “the people were not us’d 
/ To be spoke to but by the Recorder” (3.7.28-30).  But when the Recorder “was urg’d 
to tell [the] tale again,” he undermined the authority of the narrative by clarifying that 
the speech had been scripted for him:  “‘Thus saith the Duke; thus hath the Duke 
inferr’d’-- / But nothing spake in warrant from himself” (3.7.31-33).  After the 
Recorder’s narrative, Buckingham can claim a victory only because his plantsin the 
audience cried out support of King Richard.  The subjects recognize Richard’s 
disdain for them, and Richard wonders whether the Lord Mayor will fall into line 
with him or them: “What, tongueless blocks were they?  Would they not speak! / Will 
not the Mayor then and his brethren come?” (3.7.42-43).       
     Although fleeting, this reference to the Recorder in Richard III is significant, 
invoking as it does the recorder’s duties.  In More’s narrative, Richard and 
Buckingham first enlist the lord mayor’s brother, “Raffe Shaa,” to preach a sermon 
concerning Edward’s bastardy.  In a subsequent episode, at the Guildhall, the lord 
mayor tries unsuccessfully to elicit a response from the people.660  In shifting the 
emphasis to the recorder, Shakespeare suggests a perversion of the recorder’s 
responsibilities.  The recorder was associated with the routine yearly peaceful 
selection of City officeholders, customarily pronouncing the City’s newly elect d lord 
mayor and sheriffs. 661  The Recorder’s very title points to a vital aspect of his office:  
His name is derived out of the Latine toong, Recordator, which signifieth a 
rememberer, or adviser: that is to put everie man in remembrance of his dutie, 
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both according to the course and order of the lawes, and according to the 
orders and customes of the citie, and to see all things in government, to be 
directed accordinglie.662   
The recorder of London’s “duty is, always to be seated at the Mayor’s right hand 
when recording pleas and delivering judgments; and by his lips, [the] records and 
processes holden before the Mayor and Aldermen at Saint Martin’s le Grand, in 
presence of the Justiciars assigned for the correcting there of errors, ought orally to be 
recorded.”663  The recorder’s approval was enough to establish a custom.664  
Additionally, according to custom, the recorder was called upon to present City 
concerns to the Crown since he was esteemed “a man more especially imbued with 
knowledge, and conspicuous for the brilliancy of his eloquence.”665  In Richard III, a 
tyrant-in-the-making calls upon the Recorder to report to the City, thereby 
establishing his case as record, but the Recorder shrewdly resists, withholding his 
“warrant” (3.7.33) and conspicuously undermining Richard’s credibility.   
 While Richard cannot rely on the Recorder, he can resort to the Lord Mayor’s 
office.  In their last scene with the Lord Mayor, Buckingham and Richard carefully 
orchestrate appearances, depicting Richard as reluctantly being called to th  throne by 
the people.  The Lord Mayor is an essential witness: “See where his Grace stands, 
‘tween two clergymen!” (3.7.94).  Buckingham promptly interprets for him: “Two 
props of virtue for a Christian Prince, / To stay him from the fall of vanity” (3.7.95-
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96).  Richard absolves himself from blame should matters go awry, since kingship 
has been “imposed” upon him:  “For God doth know, and you may partly see, / How 
far I am from the desire of this” (3.7.234-35).  The Lord Mayor indicates that he will 
report Richard’s sentiments: “God bless your Grace: we see it, and will say it”
(3.7.236).  Richard does his best to establish his legitimacy, and Shakespeare does his 
best to undercut it.  When Shakespeare warrants the subjects’ support for Richmond, 
this is not simply, as Gurr finds, evidence of “their preference for a good man to a bad 
one.”666  Shakespeare has them actively reject a tyrant who does not respect their 
offices.  
Thomas Heywood goes one step beyond Shakespeare.  His 1 King Edward IV 
(1599) not only explores the monarch’s relationship to the lord mayor and recorder; it 
stages alternative models of governance.  For some time, scholars dismissed the first 
part of Edward IV, perhaps because of its historical inaccuracy or its preoccupation 
with commoners.667  But scholars have begun to revisit the play, exploring in 
particular the relationship between Edward IV and his subjects. 668  I will concentrate 
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on Heywood’s primary officeholders, his King and his Lord Mayor.  The Lord Mayor 
leads the defense of London in the beginning of the play; after the citizens’ victory, 
he appears primarily in relation to the monarch.  1 Edward IV, then, does not merely 
contrast two historical personages; it contrasts the ways two officeholders fulfill their 
offices.  In doing so, Heywood, as Jesse M. Lander notes, depicts “London as the 
embodiment of a civic culture that is seen to be appropriate for the nation as a 
whole.”669  A key component of this civic culture, one that Lander does not explore, 
is freedom of speech.   
Heywood, like Shakespeare, associates succession issues with freedom of 
speech, albeit in a different manner.  In the initial scenes of the play, the Lord Mayor, 
the Recorder, and other citizens of London debate Edward IV’s claim to the throne 
with the rebel Falconbridge and his supporters. Heywood’s concern with these issue 
was perhaps spurred by the 1598 printing of a tract written by Peter Wentworth.  
Peter, like his brother Paul, was involved in earlier disputes over freedom of speech in 
Parliament.  A Puritan leader, he had hosted “extraordinary assemblies” in 1579 amid 
Puritan discontent over Elizabeth’s marriage negotiations with the duke of Anjou.670  
In 1576, he defended Parliament’s right to discuss religious matters, and again in 
1587, he was involved with Sir Anthony Cope and other Puritans when Cope 
sponsored a bill calling for ecclesiasticical reform.671  Wentworth was sent to the 
Tower of London  for his “celebrated defence of the imagined liberties of the House 
of Commons.  In the rhetoric of his ringing, prophetic questions, Parliament was 
entrenched in the fundamental constitution of the country with prerogatives of its 
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own, a deadly threat to the Tudor conception of kingship.”672  While historians have 
debated exactly how radical Wentworth’s declarations were, it is clear that his 
challenges mattered.      
   Printed posthumously, Wentworth’s A Pithie Exhortation To Her Majestie 
For Establishing Her Successor To the Crowne.  Whereunto Is Added A Discourse 
Containing the Authors Opinion of The True and Lawfull Successor to Her Majestie 
was written in response to Robert Persons’ A Conference about the Succession to the 
Crowne of Ingland (Antwerp, 1594), which argued on behalf of the claim of Phillip 
II.673  That these tracts were printed signals a shift in the public sphere; while matters 
such as the succession and freedom of speech were not to be taken up in Parliament, 
they could be addressed through other media.  The anonymous author of the prefatory 
letter concedes that “it may seeme strange that [Wentworth] woulde venture to w ite 
it, in respect of these ticklish times, and of his present troubles for a lesser matt .”674  
Indeed, Wentworth spent the last four years of his life again imprisoned in the Tower 
of London for expressing his opinions on the matter of the succession.  Collinson 
attributes the decline in Puritan leadership in Parliament in the latter years of 
Elizabeth’s reign to circumstances such as Wentworth’s imprisonment: “In the last 
two parliaments of the reign the puritan gentlemen were uncharacteristically doci e, 
when they were not missing altogether.”675  They did, however, pick up the slack in 
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print.  Wentworth’s tract was printed by Robert Waldegrave, the “puritan printer,” 
who earlier had printed some of the Marprelate tracts.676  Printing this tract—after 
Wentworth had been punished for expressing his opinion—could only be seen as a 
further assertion of the subject’s right to counsel the monarch.        
   The author of the prefatory letter invokes Wentworth’s own sense of duty, 
observing that Wentworth “was accustomed to say to his friends, if it bee a dutie 
required of us to communicate our knowledge in the meanest matters for mutuall 
instruction: who in any good conscience can suppresse his knowledge in matters so 
greatly importing every private and publick estate of these Realmes?”677  But the 
author invokes these sentiments to support his own reasons for publishing the tract:  
“I have published them both not so much to procure commendation & praise to the 
dead, though he justlie deserve it for his most worthie parts, as to worke a due regard
of right and equitie, to the good and behoofe of all my countriemen.”678  In the last 
part of this letter, it is agreed that James is the rightful heir to the throne (“if I did 
knowe a better right then the Scottish kings, I would unfainedlie favour it”), and a 
final appeal is made to the reader’s reason:  “I wish thee so to read these treati s of 
M. Wentworths, as hee was accustomed to read other mens, to wit, to yeeld to the 
reason, and not to the man.”679  Such language echoes the strains of humility many 
authors assumed in such prefatory materials.  But in addition to establishing a humble 
persona, the words also recommend “a due regarde of right and equitie.”680  In 
asserting the subject’s right to voice an opinion, the author asserts that debate leads to 
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the best decision.  Of course, this is to echo Wentworth and others’ claims to the right 
to speak freely in Parliament.681  While Wentworth’s previous efforts to secure the 
Commons’ freedom of speech in counseling the Queen might have failed, efforts to 
establish the subject’s rights continued on other fronts.   
 Wentworth carefully positions himself as a loyal subject.  He begins the 
Exhortation by asserting that  
true and heartie love, first towards God and his true Religion, secondlie a 
loyall and dutifull affection towards your highness person, & preservation: & 
lastly, a minde, by all lawfull meanes unfainedly wishing the good peace & 
prosperity of this our native country of England, and no other respectes 
whatsoever, have moved and stirred us up: first to devise and write, and nowe 
to offer and deliver unto your Majestie, this short discourse following.682     
He hopes that he does not offend, but at the same time, he cannot allow a fear of 
offending to prevent him “from performing of a necessarie, profitable, and honorable 
service unto God, our Prince, & countrie.”683  Throughout the tract, he insists that his 
are the words of a loyal subject.  He explains why naming her successor will protect 
the queen: she will learn “that the heartie good-will and liking of their subject towards 
them, is a farre better and stronger meane of their preservation, then either riches, 
strong holdes, or any such outward thing whatsoever.”684  By naming a Protestant 
successor,   
                                                
681 Hartley, Elizabeth’s Parliaments 140-42. 
682 Peter Wentworth, A Pithie Exhortation To Her Majestie For Establishing Her Successor To the 
Crowne.  Whereunto Is Added A Discourse Containing the Authors Opinion of The True and Lawfull 
Successor to Her Majestie (Edinburgh, 1598) sig.B1r-v. 
683 Wentworth, Exhortation sig.B2r. 




you should so break the neck of the Popishe hope of their golden day, that the 
despaire thereof would presently cause most of them (in reverence bee it 
spoken unto your Majestie) either to hang, or conforme themselves: and the 
rest woulde also give over all detestable practices against your noble person: 
yea, they would be glad to pray with us, & to use all good meanes with us for 
your preservation.685 
Wentworth argues that the queen should proclaim her successor, but he knows full 
well that Elizabeth could not possibly share his conviction.  Nonetheless, he argues 
that by advancing his judgment in the public sphere, he proves himself her loyal 
subject.   
Heywood’s Edward IV is equally concerned with the subject’s loyalty to the 
monarch, if not necessarily to the concept of hereditary monarchy.  Heywood was 
writing in an environment that entertained republican concepts to varying degrees: 
“In 1591, Oxford students presented to the degree of MA debated the manner of 
electing the magistrate, but in the following year they were told to argue that the well-
being of a commonwealth depended on hereditary kingship.”686  Tracts with 
specifically republican claims, some of which related to office and freedom of speech, 
were printed in 1598-99.  An anonymous 1598 translation of a work by the Polish 
author Laurentius Grimalius Goslicius, The Counsellour, advocated the election of 
virtuous rather than wealthy men to the magistracy; in 1599, Lewes Lewkenor’s 
translation of Gasparo Contarini’s De magistratibus et republica Venetorum also 
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praised the election of Venetian magistrates for their virtue rather than their wealth.687  
Lewkenor cited citizens’ involvement in governing, praising the Venetian republic’s 
inclusion of the people in electing new princes.688  Goslicius considered it an essential 
aspect of a “citizen’s liberty” to be “‘capable of offices, to have power to make & 
correct lawes, to speake freely in matters that concerne liberty, law or injury, ot to be 
arrested or imprisoned without order of lawe or authoritie, nor be unjustly judged, 
robbed or forced to pay tribute.’”689  The first part of Heywood’s Edward IV, in 
particular, points to republicanism and to its efficacy of putting virtuous men in 
leadership.  To the extent that Heywood associates free speech with London’s lord 
mayor, its recorder, and other subjects, and then goes on to contrast the lord mayor 
with the monarch, his play can be read as recommending elective monarchy.  At the 
very least, he protests the prohibition of speech about political issues such as the 
succession.  
The opening scene sets up the play’s comparison between the leadership of 
the monarch and the lord mayor.  As others have noted, Heywood’s Edward IV places 
“his private interests before the safety of London and the well-being of England.”690  
Word of Falconbridge’s rebellion in the name of the deposed Henry VI arrives while 
Edward and his mother, the Duchess of York, are disputing his marriage to Elizabeth.  
Edward is not surprised:  
This is no new evasion.  
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I surely thought that one day I should see  
 That bastard Falcon take his wings to mount  
 Into our eagle aery.  
(1.148-51) 
Enlisting Howard and Sellinger as his deputies, Edward declares that “Tomorrow you 
shall have commission / To raise up power against this haughty rebel” (1.157-58).  
Meanwhile, he will send a messenger to London:  “Sirrah, depart not ‘till you know 
our pleasure; / You shall convey us letters back to London / Unto the Mayor, 
Recorder, and our friends” (1.159-61).  But it is food that is on Edward’s mind:  “Is 
supper ready?  Come by, my bonny Bess” (1.162).  Whereas Heywood’s 
contemporaries emphasized Edward IV’s military prowess, Heywood focuses on the
king’s legendary self-indulgence, suggesting that it leads to disarray in the realm.691  
The monarch’s own household is not unified.  He has failed to rein in the nobility.  
He is unconcerned about the threat of civil war. 
If Heywood exposes the king, he idealizes the Lord Mayor, who takes 
Edward‘s place as “the model of a warrior king.”692  Chronicle accounts vary in the 
amount of detail they give to the Falconbridge rebellion.  Richard Rowland suggests 
that they vary in tone, as well, arguing that Heywood likely drew upon the “civic 
preoccupations” of Robert Fabyan’s The Great Chronicle when he dramatized the 
“rebels’ strategies of social inversion.”693  Fabyan’s account, like the play, features 
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the lord mayor in his role as the City’s protector, but Fabyan emphasizes the actions 
of individual citizens and two other City officeholders, the recorder and the lieutenant 
of the tower.  He celebrates the heroic actions of the recorder, Mr Ursewyk, who 
“Commandid In the name of God & Seynt Georege the portculious to be upp drawyn, 
The which was shortly doon, and theuppon Issuyd owth with theyr people, and with 
sharp shott and ffyers ffygth put theyr Enemyes bakk as fferre as Seynt Botulphis 
Chirch.”694  According to Fabyan, Robert Basset, an alderman of the City, led the 
citizens in pursuing the rebels, slaying many of them and taking others prisoner.695  
Sir Rauff Josselyn also slays and imprisons rebels, in addition to chasing 
Falconbridge until the rebel has fled for good.696   
Heywood develops Fabyan’s brief mention of the lord mayor to the degree 
that his Lord Mayor clearly directs the defense.  In Fabyan’s Chronicle, it is Robert 
Basset who encourages the citizens.  Basset “laid on ffast abowth hym as he from the 
beginning hadd doon & comffortid hys people In such maner, That there was slayn 
many of the said Rebellys and shortly afftyr put unto fflygth, whom the said Robert 
Basset with the other Cytyzyns chacid unto mylis end….”697  In Heywood’s play, 
however, it is the Mayor who articulates the values of the commonwealth and 
motivates the subjects:  “This is well done.  Thus should good citizens / Fashion 
themselves, as well for war as peace” (3.1-2).    The Lord Mayor commends the 
Recorder as  
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A discreet, painful gentleman … 
And we must, all of us, be so inclined,  
If we intend to have the city safe,  
Or look for thanks and credit with the King.  
(3.17-20) 
Later, when word comes of the challengers’ imminent arrival, the Lord Mayor 
exhorts, “St George, away! And let us all resolve, / Either to vanquish this rebellious 
rout, / … Or seal our resolution with our lives” (3.93-96).  The Lord Mayor stands in 
for the absent monarch.      
Heywood’s Lord Mayor, then, is not merely the King’s deputy.  He is a 
positive alternative to the monarch.  The appeal of the Lord Mayor’s leadership is not 
based merely on personality, but also, and crucially, on the more democratic 
institutional basis for his power.  James C. Scott observes that societies that are 
ordered by extremes of hierarchies, such as feudal monarchies, are represent d a  
being based on “vertical” relationships; all members of the community are united by 
their link to the lord or ruler, not by links to each other.698  While subjects or 
subordinates, of course, develop a variety of “horizontal” links to each other, these 
connections “had, however, no place in the official picture, which acknowledged only 
social action by subordinates originating with the will of a superordinate.”699  In the 
first scene of the play, Edward calls our attention to the vertical links that support the 
monarchy: he sends his messenger to rouse London.  When the Lord Mayor urges the 
citizens to earn the “thanks” of the King, he too acknowledges those vertical links.     
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However, the rhetoric available to a lord mayor also emphasizes the 
importance of the horizontal connections among citizens, making them part of the 
official picture.  Thomas Norton dispensed this advice to the lord mayor: 
In the generall course of governynge the Citie, … it is good that all be donne 
with your Brethernes advice and assent: if they devise the best waie, let th m 
allowe it: this waie is surest for wisedome and strongest concorde: suche 
warrant of agreement shall bothe direct yowe to do, and defende yowe when 
yowe have donne.700   
In his role as chief defender of London, Heywood’s Lord Mayor exemplifies such 
receptiveness to the counsel of his fellow citizens.  He anxiously awaits the return of 
the Recorder since “his advice / Must not be wanting in these high affairs” (3.12-13).  
The Recorder himself assumes that he will be part of the counsel; when he returns, he 
reports on the City’s preparations and then questions “Shall we now go together, and 
consult / What else there is to be determined of?” (3.49-50).701  The Lord Mayor’s 
response confirms the value placed on the Recorder’s opinion and the role of free 
speech in the community: “Your coming, Master Recorder, was the thing / We all 
desired; therefore, let us consult” (3.51-52). The Lord Mayor leads not only by 
accepting the counsel of others, but by demanding it. 
Heywood’s play brings to bear this mode of political participation on the 
succession dispute.  While the victor is eventually determined by battle, the subject  
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spend considerable time defending the respective claims to the throne, as if they were 
debating the issue in Parliament.  The Lord Mayor challenges Falconbridge:   
We have no warrant, Thomas Falconbridge,  
To let your armed troops into our city,  
Considering you have taken up these arms  
Against our sovereign, and our country’s peace.  
(4.11-14)   
Falconbridge says he seeks “entrance in King Henry’s name, / In right of the true line 
of Lancaster” (4.17-18).  The Recorder asserts that “Should Henry’s name command 
thee entrance here, / We should deny allegiance unto Edward, / Whose true and 
faithful subjects we are sworn” (4.25-27).  Shore tells Falconbridge that  
My Lord Mayor bears his sword in his defence,  
That put the sword into the Arms of London,  
Made the lord mayors for ever after knights:  
Richard—deposed by Henry Bullingbrook—  
From whom the House of York doth claim their right.  
(4.31-36)   
What is at stake for the citizens, however, is more than just the rightful claimant.   
To stage, in 1599, no less, citizens parrying monarchical claims to the throne 
must be to respond directly to anxiety over both the Elizabethan succession and the 
prohibition of comment about it.  Heywood’s characters’ rhetoric emphasizes who is
speaking, how they are speaking, and why they have the right to speak every bit as 




Mayor demands “What’s he that beats thus at the city gates, / Commanding entranc  
as he were a king?” (4.5-6). Falconbridge asserts that  
I tell thee, Mayor— and know he tells thee so  
That cometh armed in a king’s defence—  
That I crave entrance in King Henry’s name… 
Methinks that word, spoke from a Neville’s mouth,   
Should like an earthquake rend your chained gates.  
(4.15-20)   
In response to the defiance of the Recorder, Falconbridge reiterates “I tell thee, 
traitor” (4.28).  Shore frames his reply by claiming authority to speak and by 
denigrating Falconbridge’s: “Nay, then, I tell thee, bastard Falconbridge…” (4.30).  
No wonder Falconbridge wants to know “What’s he that answers us thus saucily?” 
(4.37).  Toward the end of the scene, after the Lord Mayor has spoken, Falconbridge 
mocks him as much for his manner of speaking as for his position: “Spoken like a 
man—and true velvet-jacket; / And we will enter, or strike by the way” (4.71-72).  
More than just rhetorical flourishes, these lines take up the vexed question of who is 
privileged to speak about political matters.   
 Falconbridge may mock the Lord Mayor, but the audience is being asked to 
respect the Lord Mayor for his reliance on his office as he prepares for battle.  
Encouraging the citizens, the Lord Mayor speaks of loyalty to the City: “Why, it is 
well, brothers and citizens; / Stick to your city as good men should do” (5.4-5).  
Significantly, he then holds up as inspiration a former lord mayor of London, rather 




 Think that in Richard’s time, even such a rebel 
 Was then by Walworth, the Lord Mayor of London, 
 Stabbed dead in Smithfield; 
 Then show yourselves as it befits the time, 
 And let this find a hundred Walworths now 
 Dare stab a rebel, were he made of brass.   
(5.6-11) 
As Garret Sullivan observes, the Lord Mayor exhorts the apprentices to fight since 
they might one day be lord mayor: “And prentices: stick to your officers, / For you 
may come to be as we are now” (5.12-13).702  The Lord Mayor invokes the highest 
authorities: “God and our King against an arrant rebel!” (5.14), but he concludes his 
speech by referring to horizontal links: “Brothers, away: let us defend our walles!” 
(5.15).  The Lord Mayor’s vision of social mobility gives vertical relationships 
meanings at odds with static, monarchical authority.  At the same time, it preserves 
horizontal (fraternal) dimensions.   
 As Janette Dillon observes, because the Lord Mayor’s speech to the troops is 
remniscent of Henry V’s Agincourt speech, it reminds the audience of the monarch’s 
absence.703  But the speech serves another purpose as well, leading as it does into the 
apprentices’ own “Agincourt” speeches.  The apprentices respond to the Lord 
Mayor’s exhortations:  “My Lord, your words are able to infuse / A double courage in 
a coward’s breast” (5.16-17).  The rebel Spicing challenges their declaration to fight 
until the end, taunting that their speeches are “but your words: when matters come to 
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proof / You’ll scud, as ‘twere a company of sheep” (5.27-28).  The apprentices resent 
this insult and offer as proof of their abilities testimony from history: 
 Nay, scorn us not that we are prentices. 
 The chronicles of England can report 
 What memorable actions we have done, 
 To which this day’s achievement shall be knit, 
 To make the volume larger than it is.   
(5.54-59) 
From the apprentices’ perspective, the history of England is—and should be—as 
much the history of apprentices as it is of monarchs.  They are aware of their valu  
and articulate their place in the official picture.   
 The character of Ralph Josselyn, historically both a representative in 
Parliament for London and a lord mayor, underscores the investment Heywood’s City 
leaders have in articulating their positions.  The chronicles’ Josselyn is remarkably 
brave; in the play, however, Josselyn is notoriously inept in speech, bumbling his way 
through speech after speech.  The Lord Mayor reassures him that “we are sure y  
mean well, / Although somewhat defective in your utterance” (3.37-38).  While the 
Lord Mayor is forgiving, Josselyn’s speeches suggest the dangers of being 
inarticulate:  “Sirrah Spicing, if Spicing be thy name, we are here for matters and 
causes, as it might seem, for the King; therefore, it were good—and so forth” (5.90-
92).  When Spicing responds with threats, Josselyn replies, “Fond fellow, justice is to 
be used—ay, marry, is it—and law, in some sort, as it were, is to be followed; O, God 




duty is to be observed, and officers must be obeyed, in sort and calling—and so forth” 
(5.97-100).  Spicing recognizes that Josselyn’s vagueness leaves the way open for 
further inroads into the City’s defense.  He tells Josselyn, “We’ll talk more anon, 
good master ‘and-so-forth’” (5.103).  A representative of London, whether in 
Parliament or as lord mayor, ought to be able to articulate the commonwealth’s 
values.  When Heywood’s Josselyn fails, his opponent perceives an opportunity to 
attack.    
 These first scenes, then, emphasize the importance of London’s citizens and 
the positions they (try to) articulate.  They depict a ruler not just accepting but 
expecting counsel.  Subsequent scenes continue to juxtapose the monarch and the lord 
mayor.  Edward’s knighting of the citizens, meant to display monarchical power, 
provides a further opportunity to celebrate the Lord Mayor.  Matthew Shore refuses to 
be knighted, but not because he does not merit royal favor.  Instead, he does not 
consider himself to be the equal of the Lord Mayor and other aldermen: “Far be it 
from the thought of Matthew Shore / That he should be advanced with Aldermen, / 
With our Lord Mayor, and our right grave Recorder” (9.233-35).  Later, the Lord 
Mayor ruminates on the honor of knighthood, but he, like Shore, distances himself 
from nobility: “I do not shame to say the Hospital / Of London was my chiefest 
fost’ring place” (16.11-12).  Found by “an honest citizen,” “a poor shoemaker,” he 
was named after the cross by which he was found and apprenticed to a grocer (16.13-
16).  He attributes his success to God’s blessing, but he also notes that he has “well 
requited” the man who found him as well as the Hospital (16.24).  He has even 




“the point of the speech is to highlight the civic context that supports this 
meritocracy.”704  The Lord Mayor expresses the different ways in which he lives up 
to the citizens’ values, such as the expectation that City leaders be charitable.  These 
values all speak to horizontal connections; the citizens foster each others’ prosperity, 
and they place as much, if not more, value on those relationships as they do on their 
relationships with the monarch.   
 Even though the Lord Mayor himself is initially impressed with Edward IV, 
Heywood immediately juxtaposes his keeping of the peace with Edward’s.  The Lord 
Mayor praises Edward: “Sir Ralph Josselyn, have you ever seen / A prince more 
affable than Edward is? / What merry talk he had upon the way!” (10.104-06).  
Josselyn agrees: “Doubtless, my lord, he’ll prove a royal king” (10.107).  But 
Heywood stresses that Edward’s language is ineffective; when it comes t containing 
the rebellion, the citizens, not the Crown, prevail.  The Lord Mayor and Josselyn are 
interrupted by the Miller:   
Here I present unto you, my Lord Mayor,  
A pair of rebels, whom I did espy  
As I was busy grinding at my mill;  
And taking them for vagrant idle knaves,  
That had beset some true man from his house,  
I came to keep the peace.  
(10.109-114)   
                                                





Fabyan’s Chronicle reports that after the fighting, Edward IV “with a grete band of 
men Rode Into kent, and there cawsid enquiries to be made of the accessaryes of the 
fforesaid Ryott, where many were ffound culpable, Of the which Such as were Rych 
were hangid by the purs, and the othir that were nedy were hangid by the nekkis.”705  
In Heywood’s play, it is the Lord Mayor who passes judgment on Spicing and Chubb, 
the two rebels caught by the Miller (10.119-48).  Still later in his play, Heywood 
introduces a Vice-Admiral and a Captain of the Isle of Wight, who capture 
Falconbridge and sentence him to die (15.1-111).706  It is, of course, the subject’s duty 
to keep the king’s peace.  But in this case, the officeholders’ dutifulness is contrasted 
with the monarch’s inaction.  It is no longer the king’s peace; it is simply “the peace.”    
 When Edward honors the Lord Mayor by dining with him, Heywood heightens the 
contrast between self-serving Edward and the self-sacrificing lord mayor.  Lander 
describes the Edward of Heywood’s play as “a potential tyrant”; I would omit 
“potential.”707  When the Lord Mayor makes a ceremonial speech, indicating the 
subjects’ loyalty to the monarch, Edward is preoccupied with how he is being served: 
“Thanks, good lord Mayor; but where’s my lady Mayoress? / I hope that she will bid 
us welcome too” (16.77-78).  Even though Edward covets Jane Shore, he ironically 
casts the Lord Mayor as the appropriator of another man’s property:  “And Master 
Shore, tell me how like you this: / My Lord Mayor makes your wife his Lady 
Mayoress?” (16.131-32).708  Of course, the Lord Mayor is only attempting to fulfill 
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the obligations of his office, while Edward ignores Cicero’s advice for statesmen:  
“all appetites are to be restrained and tranquillized, and our attention and care must be
awakened, to ensure that we do nothing rash or at random, without due consideration 
and in an offhand way.”709   
When Heywood depicts Edward as a monarch ruled by his whims, does he 
imply that electing magistrates is the best way to put virtuous men in office and thus 
serve the commonwealth?  Goslicius had written in his 1598 tract that, out of many 
ways to “preserve the commonweale & happiness therof, there is nothing better then 
to elect such men for magistrates, as be induced with greatest wisedome, judgement 
& vertue.”710 When Edward suddenly departs from the Lord Mayor’s banquet, the 
worried Lord Mayor feels certain that some sudden illness has carried Edward off 
from the banquet, since “[the king] knows how it would glad my soul / If I had seen 
his highness satisfied / With the poor entertainment of his Mayor” (16.193-95).  
Matthew Shore reassures him by reminding him that “Kings have their humours” 
(181).  Heywood, however, weighs monarchical “prerogative” (unquestioned by 
Shore) against the institutional checks on the lord mayor.  As the recorder noted in 
1594, yearly elections remind the lord mayor “to rule Men, and his Fellow Citizens; 
to rule them not after his will, but according to the laws.”711  Limited as he was by his 
supporting network of governors and by custom and law, a lord mayor would not 
easily—not as easily as a king—have devolved into a tyrant.712   
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When Edward prepares for war at the end of Part 1, he relies upon the Lord 
Mayor to be his deputy.  Heywood implies that a polity in which officeholders merely 
substitute for the monarch devolves into a polity based on appearances.  Subjects say 
only what they believe the tyrant expects.  In a scene remniscent of Richard III, 
Edward asks the Lord Mayor if he has “signified / Our thankfulness unto our citizens, 
/ For their late gathered benevolence?” (21.40-42).  The emphasis is on speaking; the 
lines reveal Edward’s overriding concern with how he is represented to the citizens.  
But this can work both ways; the Lord Mayor replies that  
Before the citizens, in our Guildhall,  
Master Recorder made a good oration,  
Of thankful gratitude unto them all;  
Which they received with so kind respect  
And love unto your royal majesty,  
As it appeared to us they sorrowed  
Their bounty to your highness was no more.   
(21.43-49)   
Historically, Edward’s extraction of benevolences from his subjects was gretly 
resented.713  The Lord Mayor’s lines indicate, however, that whether or not the 
citizens really are sorry that they cannot pay more is not as important as the claim that 
they “appeared” to be sorry.  Edward then invites the Lord Mayor to accompany him  
To see the order that we shall observe  
In this so needful preparation;  
                                                




The better may you signify to them  
What need there was of their benevolence. (21.52-55)   
Like Richard, Edward seeks to direct the Lord Mayor’s perceptions.   
But Heywood suggests just how difficult it is to dictate or prohibit speech.  In 
contrast to Richard III’s Lord Mayor, who articulates only support for the monarch, 
Edward IV’s Lord Mayor responds that he will “wait upon your gracious majesty,” 
only to note in an aside, “Yet there is one thing that much grieveth me” (21.56-57).  
Presumably a reference to Edward’s adultery, the statement could refer to any one of 
the various ways in which Edward has fallen short.  Matthew Shore later reiterates his 
loyalty to the king, telling Jane “I’ll not examine his prerogative” (22.113).  While 
Matthew may not consider it his right to question the prerogative, the Mayor’s 
comment suggests that he does and has, and he has found the monarch lacking.  
Richard Helgerson concludes that in Edward IV, like other plays that explore the 
monarch’s relationship to his subjects, “The kings are to blame, but kings are no more 
liable to retaliation than the inconstant world.  Effective resistance is impossible—
indeed, unthinkable.”714  But if the Lord Mayor cannot criticize the monarch to his 
face, he can do so in a dramatic aside, to others in the community.  He can resort to 
word of mouth, to gossip, to rumor—the “politics of the excluded.”715  The king is 
“liable to retaliation,” and “effective resistance” is not necessarily “unthinkable.”   
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Heywood’s juxtaposition of the two officeholders culminates in a scene in 
which a subject substitutes the Lord Mayor for the King.  The depiction of Edward’s 
preparations for war suggests that his conference with the Lord Mayor about 
England’s needs interrupts his pursuit of entertainment.716  Hobs has come to London 
to seek forgiveness for his son, and Edward wants to jest at Hobs’ expense.  He 
resumes his disguise as “Ned,” and Hobs, after greeting him, asks, “But, Ned, is not 
the King in this company? What’s he in the long beard and the red petticoat?  Before 
God, I misdoubt, Ned, that is the King” (23.42-44).  Hobs explains he has learned this 
from drama: “I know it by my Lord What-ye-call’s players…. Ever when they play
an enterlout or a commodity at Tamworth, the King always is in a long beard and a 
red gown, like him; therefore I ‘spect him to be the King” (23.44-49).  Janette Dillon 
observes that this is a “highly self-reflexive moment, reminding a watching audience 
that ordinary people throughout England, and especially outside London, form their 
images of the monarch via representations such as the interludes Hobs describes or 
the play they now view.”717  But is not Heywood also asking his audience to decide 
whether the Lord Mayor would be the better ruler?   
Whereas the Lord Mayor seeks to protect the commonwealth and advance the 
prosperity of its subjects, the King exploits his subjects for his entertainment.  In the 
scene with Hobs, Edward insists that the Lord Mayor collude in his deception: 
“Therefore, Lord Mayor, and you, my other friends, / I must entreat you not to 
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knowledge me; / No man stand bare; all as companions” (23.8-10).  The King can 
manipulate horizontal connections when it suits his purposes.  When Hobs falls for 
the jest, Edward sets him straight: “No, trust me tanner, this is not the King; / … This 
man is the Lord Mayor, Lord Mayor of London; / Here was the Recorder too, but he 
is gone” (23.50-54).  Hobs then wonders: “What nicknames these courtnoles have!  
Mare, and corder, quotha? We have no such at Lichfield.  There is the honest bailiff 
and his brethren; such words ‘gree best with us” (23.55-58).  When Hobs mistakes the 
Lord Mayor and Recorder for courtiers, Heywood implies that the officeholders of a 
tyrant are no more than vacuous courtiers, not to be trusted.   
Heywood’s play ends with Edward IV’s last command:  “Lord Mayor, we 
thank you, and entreat withal / To recommend us to our citizens. / We must for 
France” (23.148-50).  Once again, the monarch deputizes the Lord Mayor.  Had 
Edward been present earlier in the play, however, he would have realized that when 
the Lord Mayor speaks, he articulates the values not necessarily of a feudal monarch, 
but of a community that values horizontal connections as much as vertical.  He also 
would have realized that the subjects were not just fighting for him, but rather 
following the lead of the Lord Mayor and fighting for what he represents.  
Heywood’s Lord Mayor represents both the subjects’ interest and the subjects’ right 
to be represented. 
  Heywood returns to the significance of office in his later play, the first part of 
If You Know Not Me, You Know Nobody (1604).  If You Know Not Me, You Know 
Nobody has attracted some attention due to its textual transmission and to the 




Queen Elizabeth to the throne, and the second part deals primarily with the 
establishment of the Royal Exchange under Queen Elizabeth.  Scholars have 
considered the pair of plays in relation to Heywood’s works in general.718  And the 
second part has been examined recently in terms of its concern with the Royal 
Exchange.719  The first part, however, warrants attention for the precedent it sets for a 
newly-crowned monarch.  Nostalgically recalling Elizabeth’s virtues, the play can 
also be seen as another response to anxiety over monarchical succession.  While the 
peaceful accession of James had allayed subjects’ fears of civil disorder, it had led to 
new fears.  As James established his new regime, subjects worried about his 
management of controversial issues such as the religious settlement and Parliament’s 
authority.720  1 If You Know Not Me suggests that Heywood was still interested in 
republican concepts; at the very least, he takes pains to show the subject’s part in 
legitimizing the monarch.721  The play emphasizes the importance of the subject’s 
voice.  In particular, Heywood utilizes the lord mayor in his role as London’s 
representative.     
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Heywood contrasts Catholic Mary and Protestant Elizabeth, and the scenes 
that represent each queen’s accession are indicative of his perceptions about the two 
monarchs as well as the subject’s place in the commonwealth.  No coronation 
ceremonies for Mary are depicted in the beginning of the play; instead, Mary and her 
Lord Chancellor imperiously command the subjects to accept her.  Mary’s first 
entrance is signaled by the Bishop of Winchester’s direction to the conversing lords:  
“Good morrow Lords, attend the Queen into the presence” (1.42).722  Mary then 
declares “By god’s assistance and the power of heaven, / We are instated in our 
brother’s throne” (2.48-49).  The representation of Elizabeth’s installation, on the 
other hand, suggests a different sort of legitimacy for her reign. Lawrence Manl y has 
observed that in Elizabeth’s coronation entry in 1559, “contractual exchange played a 
crucial role.”723  Heywood’s Sussex initiates the exchange:  “The imperiall Crowne, I 
here present your Grace, / With it my staffe of Office and my place” (23.1520-21).  
When the other officeholders follow his example, resigning from their offices, 
Elizabeth reinstates some and accepts the resignations of others.  While Heywood 
represents Mary as assuming the throne in the manner of a tyrant, his Elizabeth s 
instated in office.   
Heywood also depicts the Lord Mayor endorsing Elizabeth as England’s 
rightful, Protestant ruler.  The final officeholder who takes part in Elizabeth’s 
coronation proceedings is the Lord Mayor of London:   
I from the Citty London do present,  
This Purse and Bible to your Majesty, 
                                                
722All citations are from Thomas Heywood, If You Know Not Me You Know Nobody Part I (Oxford:  
Malone Society Reprints, 1934).     




A thousand of your faithfull Cittizens 
In Velvet Coats and Chaines well mounted, stay 
To greet their royall Soveraigne on the way.  
(23.1573-77) 
In the historical procession, the Bible was given to Elizabeth in a pageant by figures 
representing Truth and Time.724  Heywood’s Lord Mayor, perhaps standing in for 
Truth, transfers to Elizabeth the symbols of her civic and spiritual authority.  
Elizabeth receives the gifts:  “An English Bible, thankes my good Lord Maior” 
(23.1580).725  In presenting Elizabeth with this symbol of Protestantism, the Lord 
Mayor upholds a primary obligation of his office: the lord mayor was “firste to have 
care of God” since “it is he that ministreth and prosperouslie governethe all good 
meaninges.”726  In particular, the lord mayor needed to beware of the “heresie of 
Papistrie, whiche hathe, and is not onelie the damnable subverter of sowles, but also 
the universall enemye and supplanter of all just crownes and kingedomes, and of all 
lawfull, civill, politics, states, and jurisdictions.”727  In contrast with the scene that 
represents Mary’s accession, here, the subjects legitimize the ruler.  
In Heywood’s 1 If You Know Not Me, as in 1King Edward IV and 
Shakespeare’s Richard III, it is the Lord Mayor’s duty to speak for the monarch and
for London’s citizens.  But these dramatists are also recording subtle differences in 
their perceptions of the mayoralty and of other offices.  Mary, Richard, and Edward 
                                                
724 John Nichols, The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth, vol. 1 (London, 1823) 
35.  David Bergeron notes that this final scene echo s accounts of Elizabeth’s royal entry into London 
and that Heywood has made some changes involving the Lord Mayor’s part, but he does not elaborate 
(Civic Pageantry  20, 25-26). 
725David Bergeron notes that in the original procession, Elizabeth also emphasized the Englishness of 
the Bible (Civic Pageantry 25).  
726 Norton, “Instructions” 7. 




assume that as monarchs, they can direct officeholders’ performances of their fic s, 
deputizing them to speak and scripting their speeches.  But Heywood and 
Shakespeare question the assumption that an officeholder is merely a monarch’s 
mouthpiece.  Early modern English subjects were engaged in constant negotiations 
with their monarchs over their role in England’s polity; in their depictions of 
London’s Lord Mayor and Recorder, Shakespeare and Heywood construe office as an 
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